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INTRODUCTION
In August 2004, Serhiy Brytchenko, the head of the PresidentialAdministration’s Migration Directorate, called attention to increasingimmigration into Ukraine in an article appearing in Uryadovyy
Kuryer, the newspaper of the Ukrainian Cabinet Ministers.1 Brytchenko
reported that the number of people granted Ukrainian citizenship rose by
40 per cent during the first six months of 2004 in comparison to the sim-
ilar period in 2003, and by 180 per cent in comparison to the first half of
2002.The Ministry of the Interior similarly observed an increase in appli-
cations for permanent residence, the initial step towards Ukrainian citi-
zenship. He continued on to note that the number of people adopting
Ukrainian citizenship substantially surpassed the number relinquishing
Ukrainian citizenship. Ukraine was, in short, becoming a country that was
increasingly attractive to foreigners and persons without citizenship.
Ukraine’s relatively liberal immigration and citizenship laws account for
part of this attraction to be sure.There is more to this interesting story,
however. With some notable exceptions, Ukraine provides arriving
migrants from abroad with opportunities for peaceful and productive lives.
This finding—surprising, perhaps, to many readers—becomes evident
from an examination of how individual migrants live in the Ukrainian
capital of Kyiv, as evidenced by the results of a 2001 survey of “nontradi-
tional” migrants conducted by the Kennan Kyiv Project. This report
reviews the results of that survey.
As the young Ukrainian state emerged from the ruins of the Soviet
Union during the early 1990s, it struggled with several tasks: among
them, to establish its place in the shifting landscape of Europe, to create
infrastructures necessary for administration of an independent country,
and to determine questions of borders, citizenship, and identity. At the
same time, the fall of the “Iron Curtain” beckoned to migrants pushed by
war, strife, and economic uncertainty in their home countries and pulled
by the promise of better lives elsewhere. Ukraine, now with increasingly
open borders and no institutions with experience in state regulation of
migration, became an arena for the mass relocation of people. Over a
period of ten years, nearly two million people arrived in the country
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seeking permanent residency. Most of these were ethnic Ukrainians and
their descendants who were living outside of Ukraine when the Soviet
Union collapsed.Approximately the same number of people left Ukraine
for post-Soviet countries, mostly Russia, and another 600,000 immigrat-
ed to other countries in Europe and North America.2
In addition, over the first decade of its existence as an independent
state, the number of foreign immigrants to Ukraine from distant Asian
and African countries has increased.This group of immigrants is consid-
ered “nontraditional,” since they do not represent ethnic groups that his-
torically have lived in Ukraine or the former Soviet Union.3 These
immigrants arrive continuously; some intend to reside permanently in
Ukraine, while others see the country as a stop-over on their way to
Eastern or Western Europe.They have various legal statuses, from official
refugees to illegal aliens.
Some nontraditional immigrants first came to Ukraine well before
1991.During the Soviet era, international agreements allowed foreign stu-
dents and workers to reside in Ukraine.After the break-up of the USSR
some of them could not or did not want to return to their home coun-
tries. Instead, they looked for ways to adjust their legal status and social sit-
uation. However, by far the majority of long-term residents are nontradi-
tional migrants who arrived after 1991, searching for a home away from
the political and economic instability in their native countries. Many of
them arrived in Ukraine illegally, often after attempting to make their way
to Western Europe or North America.
The majority of nontraditional immigrants in Ukraine—those who
were not in residence as students or workers in Soviet Ukraine—would
not have been able to reside in the country prior its independence.With
independence came changes in Ukraine’s legal system, economy, and soci-
ety that encouraged, or at least allowed for, increased migration.These
included the liberalization of border crossing regulations, opening
Ukraine to the rest of the world, implementation of market reforms, and
the creation of an application review process for those seeking asylum and
refugee status. For example, market reforms allowed foreign investors,
some of whom were formerly foreign students and workers, to start small
joint firms or companies and to invite their compatriots as cofounders or
employees. Many nontraditional immigrants first came to Ukraine
through such business contacts.
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Because many of the nontraditional immigrants have vague legal sta-
tus, reliable statistics for their total numbers and their countries of origin
are difficult to obtain. Official data from various registration agencies can
give only estimates of their number. Regardless of exact numbers, it is
obvious that immigrants from Asian and African countries have become a
significant component of the population of Kyiv.This study—supported
by the George F. Kennan Fund of the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars’ Kennan Institute, and conducted by the Kennan
Kyiv Project with the assistance of the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation and the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in Ukraine—seeks to answer to what extent nontraditional
immigrants have affected Kyiv, how they have integrated into city life,
and how they relate to the local residents.
This is not the first study addressing questions of immigration in
Ukraine. Ukrainian scholars in the fields of sociology, demographics, and
political science began studying the problems connected with immigra-
tion to Ukraine, and Kyiv in particular, as soon as they became apparent.
In view of the fact that the first priority after independence was to
develop a legal framework for regulating migration and training special-
ists, legal specialists have devoted considerable attention to issues of
immigration and the legal status of foreigners.The first work to appear
on this subject was a textbook by O. Piskun entitled Osnovy mihratsiino-
ho prava: porivnialnyi analiz,4 which was highly acclaimed for its analysis
and extensive documentation. The encyclopedia Mihratsiini protsesy v
suchasnomu sviti, edited by Yu. Rymarenko,5 later served as the basis for a
textbook developed by the National Academy of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine, entitled Osnovy mihratsiieznavstva.6 Taken together with the
two-volume publication Nelehalna mihratsiia ta torhivlia zhinkamy,7 these
works contain the most important international legal documents and
legislative acts of Ukraine.
Questions of the regulation of migration processes are covered in
Iurydychni aspekty mihratsiinykh protsesiv v Ukraini,8 a monograph by S.
Chekhovych analyzing the institution of citizenship, the legal status of for-
eigners, and the institution of asylum and refugee status. Chekhovych also
provides specific recommendations for improving legislation. Legal ques-
tions related to the regulation of migration problems are covered in
numerous articles in scholarly journals by both the above-named authors
Introduction
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and others, foremost among them S. Brytchenko, V. Andriienko, V.
Subotenko,V. Shepel.Articles devoted to these topics have been published
in the journals Pravo Ukrainy [Law of Ukraine], Rozbudova natsii [Nation
Building], and Problemy mihratsii [Problems of Migration].9
Sociologists have focused significant attention on migration issues.The
first sociological research on refugees—a group of immigrants that is new
to Ukraine—was conducted in 1997 by scholars from the National
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the National Institute of Ukrainian-
Russian Relations (S. Pyrozhkov, A. Ruchka, L. Aza, O. Malynovska).10
Their work focuses on the socio-economic situation of individuals who
have acquired refugee status in Ukraine.Two studies by Nikolai Shul’ga
focused on human rights issues in Ukraine with regard to refugees and
individuals seeking asylum, and were well received by both scholars and
the public.11 Interesting results were achieved in Shul’ga’s more recent
work Velikoe pereselenie narodov: repatrianty, bezhentsy, trudovye migranty.12
This study represents the first attempt in Ukrainian scholarly literature to
undertake a comprehensive examination of migration issues faced by
Ukraine during the first decade of independence. As part of an interna-
tional study in Ukraine, a sociological report entitled Problemy nelehalnoi
mihratsii ta transportuvannia mihrantiv was published under the aegis of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) Center for Technical
Cooperation for Europe and Central Asia.13 In addition to an analysis of
applicable laws and administrative practices based on interviews with ille-
gal immigrants, the study includes data on the means, methods, and routes
used for the illegal transportation of migrants.
In addition to the scholarly research noted above, several publications
have appeared in Ukraine by authors with practical experience in the area
of regulating migration processes. Noteworthy among them are V. Novik’s
analytical research Derzhavna polityka i rehuliuvannia immihratsiinykh prot-
sesiv v Ukraini and his guidebook for refugees and immigrants.14 Also
important are Yu. Buznytsky, P. Burlaka, and S. Rubanov’s book Sudovyi
zakhyst bizhentsiv i osib, shcho prybuly v Ukrainu u poshukakh prytulku, and an
informational publication entitled Pravove rehuliuvannia mihratsiinykh prot-
sesiv v Ukraini, edited by V.Andriienko and H. Subotenko.15
Studies on interethnic relations and interethnic tolerance of residents of
Kyiv, and Ukraine in general, are of significant interest. Foremost among
these is the sociological monitoring study Ukrainske suspilstvo: vid vyboriv
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do vyboriv, conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 1994, 1998, and 2002.16 This work
offers both a simultaneous and diachronological view of various aspects of
Ukrainian society. In the joint monograph Kyiv ta kyiany: sotsiolohichni
khroniky nezalezhnosti,which was written for the most part by specialists of
the above-mentioned institute, a separate chapter is devoted to an exami-
nation of interethnic relations in Kyiv.17 These issues are partially covered
in Yevtukh’s edited volume, Etnichnyi dovidnyk.18 Other articles have exam-
ined the question more closely, including O. Prybytkova’s “Korennyie
kievliane i migranty: monitoring sotsialnykh izmenenii na rubezhe XXI
veka”; “Vikova struktura mihrantiv ta rynok pratsi m. Kyieva: deiaki
aspekty vzaiemozv’iazku” by T.Vaidin; and O. Ivanova’s articles “Mihranty
u Kyievi: do stolytsi po krashche zhyttia?” and “Mihranty u Kyievi. Khto
vony?”19 In 2000 the materials of a roundtable discussion conducted by
the Kennan Institute’s Kyiv Project were published under the title
Netradytsiini mihranty v Kyievi.20 Also worth noting are many articles by N.
Panina,Ye. Holovakha,V. Kulyk, and S. Makeiev, who explore migration
problems, interethnic relations, and changes that have taken place in our
society in the last decade.21
It should be noted that the materials of this study were used in a series of
publications by O. Braichevska, H. Volosiuk, O. Malynovska, and Ya.
Pylynsky, which appeared in the journal Problemy mihratsii [Problems of
Migration].22 Also, various portions of this manuscript have been published
by Blair Ruble and Nancy Popson in the journals Post-Soviet Geography and
Economics, Urban Anthropology, and Nationalities Papers.23
Although the above-mentioned publications provide a sound scientific
basis for the study of migration and interethnic relations, there are still
issues that need further exploration.The system of social interrelationships
between local residents and immigrants is one area not covered by the
existing literature. In addition, the views of the immigrants themselves
have not yet been studied in depth.
This study seeks to fill these gaps. Based on concrete data collected in
the city of Kyiv, the study evaluates the impact of nontraditional immi-
grants on general municipal processes by studying their legal status, socio-
economic situation, and their cultural and religious behavior.The authors
look at the extent to which immigration from African and Asian countries
has led to an increase in the ethnocultural diversity of the city and to
Introduction
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changes in the ethnic structure of its population. Finally, it explores the
attitude of the average citizen and the municipal government toward non-
traditional immigrants.
Taking into account the somewhat biased attitude of a significant
part of the population toward immigrants from Asian and African
countries, special attention is paid to such issues as the level of interac-
tion between immigrants and the native population and immigrants’
integration into Ukrainian society.
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CHAPTER ONE
A Demographic and Social Portrait 
of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv
As a scientific, industrial, cultural, and educational center, Kyivwas traditionally a magnet for both rural and urban migrantsfrom different regions of Ukraine and the USSR even during
the Soviet period. Regardless of the fact that Kyiv was always one of
several cities with quotas limiting the number of new residents, as of the
last All-Union census (1989) more than half of its residents (55.7%) were
migrants from other regions of Ukraine and Union republics.24 The
great majority of migrants arrived in Kyiv from the villages and towns
of Kyiv oblast, as well as neighboring oblasts. However, the population
of Kyiv expanded not only as a result of the influx of people from other
areas of Ukraine: there was also a significant influx of migrants from
other Soviet republics, primarily Russia. Most migrants found employ-
ment at industrial enterprises in the city.
Among the Kyiv enterprises that used the labor of quota-restricted
migrants to the greatest extent were various construction companies,
enterprises providing basic municipal infrastructure services, the
“Arsenal” plant, the Darnytsia train repair depot, “Khimvolokno”
[Chemical Fiber] Production Union, and the Darnytsia silk plant.25
Beginning in the mid-1980s, these enterprises used foreign labor in
accordance with then current inter-state agreements with several social-
ist countries concerning the reciprocal employment of workers.
With few exceptions, the majority of foreigners who were perma-
nent residents of Kyiv in the five to seven years before 1991 consisted
of students and workers from socialist countries and those countries
whose governments had a pro-Soviet orientation. As a rule, they were
working or studying on referrals from their countries, and after gradu-
ating from Kyiv’s higher educational establishment or after the expira-
tion of their contracts with enterprises, they had to return to their
countries of origin.
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After Ukraine gained its independence, Kyiv was transformed from the
capital of a Soviet republic into the capital of an independent state.
Changes to the city’s functions and the emergence of new political and
economic realities had a fundamental effect on migration, and on the
nature and composition of migration currents involving city residents.26
A distinguishing feature of the migration situation in Kyiv after 1991
was the arrival of new categories of foreigners, which were not present in
Soviet times (refugees, asylum seekers, workers, bureaucrats, and specialists
working for joint ventures, businessmen, illegal migrants); at the same
time, these foreigners were representatives of ethnic groups that are not
traditional to Ukraine and the former republics of the Soviet Union.
COUNTING MIGRANTS: OFFICIAL STATISTICS
Official statistics on the number of foreigners permanently residing in
Kyiv, broken down by country of origin, have not been published.Thus,
the majority of studies on problems of international migration only esti-
mate the scale of immigration to Kyiv from Asian and African countries.
The methods used to arrive at these estimates are not usually made pub-
lic, and so their reliability is uncertain.27
Difficulties in determining the number of people from Asian and
African countries who reside in the capital of Ukraine are primarily tied
to their different legal statuses. Depending on their reasons for residing in
the city, they may be registered with any number of state agencies: munic-
ipal and raion passport registration and immigration divisions of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Directorate of Nationality Affairs and
Migration of the Kyiv Municipal Administration, the State Center for
Employment in the city of Kyiv, and the Ministry of Education and
Science. Each agency collects its own statistical data.28 Unfortunately, they
cannot provide detailed information on the number and ethnic break-
down of nontraditional immigrants in Kyiv, but they are at least able to
provide figures that may serve as a fairly reliable basis for estimates.
In 2001, 101,268 foreigners were registered with the municipal and
raion passport registration and immigration divisions of the Main
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the city of Kyiv.These indi-
viduals, who come from Asia,Africa, Europe, North America, and Australia,
as well as the former Soviet republics, were residing in the city for different
reasons. Only 20,052 of them were permanent residents officially registered
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with the passport registration and immigration divisions of the Main
Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the city of Kyiv, or .8% of
the total city population, which in early 2001 was 2,606,716.29 These are
officially recognized refugees; individuals who have permanent residency,
work permits, and business visas; students of Kyiv colleges and universities;
and illegal migrants who have been identified by law enforcement agencies.
As of 1 January 2002, data of the Department for Nationality Affairs
and Migration of the Kyiv State Administration indicate that 1,089
refugees (including children under 16) were living in Kyiv, of whom 689
individuals (63.3%) were citizens of Asian and African countries:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Mozambique,
Palestine, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and
Turkey. The rest were citizens of former Soviet republics: Armenia
(19.7%),Azerbaijan (9.9%), Georgia (4.7%), the Russian Federation (2%),
and Tajikistan (.4%).The largest number of refugees in Kyiv are citizens
of Afghanistan (48.6%).
In 2001, 5,439 foreigners had documents for residency in the capital,
40% of whom were from Asian and African countries. Of these, 31% are
stateless individuals.The remainder are made up of citizens of African and
Asian countries, in particular Syria (7%), Lebanon (6%),Vietnam (6%),
Afghanistan (5%), Iran (5%), Pakistan (5%), Bangladesh (3%), China (3%),
and Nigeria (2.5%).
In 2001, 2,071 foreigners obtained work permits from the State
Employment Center of the city of Kyiv, 35% of whom are from Asian
and African countries. Of these, the largest number of work permits was
issued to citizens of China (26%), followed by Turkey (13%) Lebanon
(10%), Vietnam (8%), Egypt (6%), Japan (6%), Pakistan (5.2%), South
Korea (5%), Libya (4%), India (2.7%), Iran (2.5%), Nigeria (3%),
Bangladesh (2%), and Cameroon (1.2%).
Out of 4,900 foreign students who were studying in Kyiv in 2000-
2001, 76% were from Asian and African countries: from China (46%), Iran
(15%), Jordan (7%), Vietnam (6%), Tunisia (4%), Lebanon (3.8%), India
(2.9%), Syria (2.7%), Bangladesh (1.7%), South Korea (1.2%), Mauritius
(1%), Turkey (1%), Mongolia (0.8%), Morocco (0.8%), Nigeria (0.6%),
Pakistan (0.6%), Sri Lanka (0.5%), and Japan (0.3%). The rest are from
other African and Asian countries.
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Another category of foreigners recorded in government statistics is
comprised of individuals who have violated residency regulations in
Ukraine, i.e., illegal migrants. According to researchers who study illegal
migration, Kyiv is an important transit point where international routes
for the transportation of illegal migrants from Asia and Africa intersect.30
According to data of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Ukraine, in 2001, 6,553 illegal migrants were identified in the
city of Kyiv, 65% of whom are from Asian and African countries. If we
agree with statements by experts working to curb illegal migration that
the identified portion of illegal migrants constitutes half of their real num-
ber, then the number of illegal migrants from Asian and African countries
residing in the city may be as high as 8,500.
COUNTING MIGRANTS: SURVEY DATA
These numbers enable us to estimate that in 2001 approximately 15,000
individuals from Asian and African countries were permanently residing
in the capital of Ukraine, i.e., 0.6% of the total city population.According
to respondents’ estimates obtained in the course of researching immigrant
households, the maximum number of their compatriots, regardless of their
legal status, who were permanently domiciled in the city at the time of
the survey was about 11,500 individuals, which almost fully corresponds
to the results of estimates made from official statistical data.
The 233 Asian and African households included in this study com-
prised a total of 547 people, 370 of whom were immigrants, i.e., foreign-
ers and stateless individuals born outside Ukraine (children born in
Ukraine, even with both immigrant parents were not considered immi-
grants).Therefore, based on the given estimate, the study covered 3% of
immigrants from Asian and African countries living in Kyiv.
Immigrants about whom data were gathered during the course of the
study come from twenty-three Asian and African countries (Table 1.1).
The total number of countries of origin generally corresponds with the
total number of countries of departure of registered refugees, labor
migrants, foreigners with residency permits, and identified illegal migrants.
For the sake of convenience, immigrants on which data were collected
in this study were divided into six groups: newcomers from Afghanistan;
African countries (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo [Brazzaville],
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco,
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TABLE 1.1 Countries of Origin and Numerical 
Breakdown of Surveyed Immigrants 
Country of immigrants’ origin Number %
Afghanistan 170 45.95
Angola 29 7.84
Cameroon 1 0.27
Chad 1 0.27
China 19 5.14
Congo 4 1.08
Dem. Rep. of Congo 8 2.16
Ethiopia 3 0.81
Guinea-Bissau 1 0.27
India 5 1.35
Iran 2 0.54
Iraq 9 2.43
Lebanon 3 0.81
Morocco 1 0.27
Mozambique 1 0.27
Nigeria 1 0.27
Pakistan 22 5.95
Palestine 2 0.54
Rwanda 1 0.27
Somalia 2 0.54
Syria 9 2.43
Turkey 5 1.35
Vietnam 71 19.19
Total 370 100
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Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia); China, India, and Pakistan; and
Middle East countries (Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria,Turkey).
In addition to actual immigrants (370 individuals), children born in
Ukraine and individuals from Ukraine, i.e., partners in mixed marriages,
were resident in their established households at the time of the survey.
This occurred both in families with two immigrant parents and mixed
families (Table 1.2).
All immigrants in the study arrived in Kyiv between 1983 and early
2001. A comparison between the dynamics underlying the arrival of the
study group members and the objective political and socio-economic fac-
tors that have taken place in the last twenty years in Ukraine, the post-
Soviet space, and their countries of origin enables us to conditionally
identify three periods of immigration from Asia and Africa to Kyiv: before
1991, between 1991 and 1998, and between 1999 and 2001 (Table 1.3).
Soviet-era Migrants
Immigrants who arrived before 1991 account for 20% of the total.These
are former workers or students of Kyiv colleges and universities who arrived
for work or study on state referrals from their governments. After gradua-
tion and the expiration of contracts with industrial enterprises, some did not
return to their homelands. Loopholes in the system of internal immigration
control stemming from conditions during the transitional period, and the
lack of an appropriate legislative framework, system of administrative agen-
cies, and most importantly, experience in addressing these issues created an
opportunity for them to prolong their stay in the city.
Migrants 1991–1998 
Two-thirds of all respondents arrived in Kyiv in the period between 1991
and 1998. The democratization of civic life and market reforms in
Ukraine led to the emergence of completely new ways to legalize new-
comers, such as establishment of their own businesses and joint ventures
or opportunities to obtain refugee status.
The economic crisis and civil conflicts that arose in the newly inde-
pendent states, especially the Central Asian and Caucasus republics, and
Russia, resulted in the deterioration of state border protection, particular-
ly along the outer perimeter of the former Soviet borders, which in turn
created favorable conditions for foreigners to enter the post-Soviet space.
 
A Demographic and Social Portrait of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv
| 13 |
A
ct
ua
l i
m
m
ig
ra
nt
s 
(t
ho
se
 w
ho
en
te
re
d 
th
e 
co
un
tr
y)
Im
m
ig
ra
nt
’s
co
un
tr
y 
of
or
ig
in
A
du
lts
(o
ve
r 
18
)
C
hi
ld
re
n
(u
nd
er
 1
8)
C
hi
ld
re
n
bo
rn
 in
U
kr
ai
ne
 in
fa
m
ili
es
 w
ith
tw
o
im
m
ig
ra
nt
pa
re
nt
s
C
hi
ld
re
n
bo
rn
 in
m
ix
ed
m
ar
ri
ag
es
w
ith
 c
iti
ze
ns
of
 U
kr
ai
ne
M
em
be
rs
 o
f
im
m
ig
ra
nt
fa
m
ili
es
–c
iti
ze
ns
 o
f U
kr
ai
ne
T
ot
al
A
fg
ha
ni
st
an
17
0
43
15
21
19
22
5
A
fr
ic
an
co
un
tr
ie
s
53
-
10
20
18
10
1
C
hi
na
19
3
-
3
2
24
In
di
a 
an
d
Pa
ki
st
an
27
-
-
10
9
46
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t
co
un
tr
ie
s
30
-
2
7
9
48
V
ie
tn
am
71
2
21
6
5
10
3
T
ot
al
31
5
55
48
67
62
54
7
T
A
B
L
E
1.
2 
C
om
po
si
ti
on
 o
f 
Su
rv
ey
ed
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
| 14 |
Period of arrival
C
ountry of origin
B
efore 1991
1991-1998
1999-2001
T
otal
A
fghanistan
16.5
66.5
17.0
100
A
frican countries
17.0
77.4
5.6
100
C
hina
5.0
95.0
-
100
India and Pakistan
3.7
96.3
-
100
M
iddle E
ast countries
20.0
53.0
27.0
100
V
ietnam
39.0
48.0
13.0
100
A
ll R
espondents
20.0
67.0
13.0
100
T
A
B
L
E
1.3 D
istribution of Im
m
igrants B
ased on C
ountry of O
rigin and P
eriod of A
rrival,in %
 (N
=
370)
A Demographic and Social Portrait of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv
| 15 |
As a result of the fact that the borders that existed between the Union
republics of the former Soviet Union were purely administrative, and
hence were unprotected, after the proclamation of Ukraine’s independ-
ence its eastern and northern borders became state borders that
remained open for foreign citizens to cross. The only exception was
Ukraine’s border with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, where
the system of protection created during the Soviet period remained
intact.Although by 1992 the Border Guard Troops of Ukraine formally
took over the control and protection of the state borders along the
entire perimeter, the creation of a working system of border control was
complicated by delays in the juridical designation of the borders and the
lack of funds to build such a system.
In the early 1990s it became possible to work productively and engage
in small business ventures, not necessarily with the proper documents or
permits. The visa regime in Ukraine was also in the process of being
developed, and obtaining a Ukrainian visa was not very difficult.
Moreover, Ukraine passed the law “On Refugees” in 1993, and the pro-
cedure for processing asylum petitions was first set in motion in Kyiv in
1996.This meant that immigrants had real opportunities to legalize their
residency status in the city.
Between 1991 and 1998 the immigrant community of Kyiv also
increased as a result of the internal migration of people from Asia and
Africa, who until 1991 had been studying or working in other cities of
Ukraine. This type of immigrant comprised 8% of those surveyed. The
main reason behind their move was to seek work, given that oblast cen-
ters in particular had been hard hit by mass unemployment as a result of
the economic crisis that engulfed Ukraine.
The increase of the immigrant population in Kyiv between 1991 and
1998 was also linked to external political factors.The fall of Najibullah’s
pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan in 1992 did not put an end to the civil
war there, but instead led to a greater escalation of the military conflict,
which sparked a new outflow of refugees. This flow of refugees also
reached Kyiv. Internal political struggle and resulting military and ethnic
conflicts, as well as civil wars in a number of African countries led to
upheaval, poverty, and the mass flight of people in search of both politi-
cal asylum and better living conditions.A significant number of Asian and
African refugees and people searching for a better life, who were head-
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ing for Western Europe, took advantage of existing opportunities to enter
the country, both legally and illegally, and arrived in Ukraine and Kyiv
with the subsequent goal of crossing into the European countries.
Migrants Since 1999
Beginning in 1999, immigration to Kyiv significantly decreased. Only
13% of the total number of respondents arrived in Kyiv in 1999–2001.
This drop can be explained by increased border controls, a new visa
regime, and a specific policy against illegal migration.
In the late 1990s significant changes were introduced into the system
of state control over immigration to Ukraine, which led to decreased
immigration throughout the country. A number of international agree-
ments were signed with neighboring countries concerning the creation of
a system of shared borders.At the same time, border security was stepped
up at the Ukraine-Russia border by increasing the number of border posts
and border subdivisions. As a result, the system of external immigration
control on the northeastern borders of the state was strengthened.
In late 1999 a new regime for issuing visas for entry into Ukraine was
introduced, providing control over the entry of people while they were still
outside the state. In addition to strengthening visa and border controls,
including on the eastern border, targeted measures to fight illegal migra-
tion and maintain control over foreigners’ sojourns in the country were
implemented in accordance with the state program aimed at the fight
against illegal migration; these measures led to a decrease in the numbers
of foreigners illegally entering Ukraine.31 Finally, the drop in immigration
can be linked to the municipal administration’s implementation of a
restrictive immigration policy targeting citizens from Asia and Africa32 and
the strengthening of immigration control within the city itself.
SOURCES OF MIGRATION TO KYIV
Most of the immigrants who arrived in Kyiv during Soviet times were
from Vietnam,Afghanistan, and those African and Middle Eastern countries
with which the USSR had friendly relations, and which were recipients of
Soviet economic and military aid and assistance in training qualified cadres.
In order to prevent unemployment in socialist Vietnam, an intergov-
ernmental agreement “On the Referral and Admission of Vietnamese
Citizens for Professional Training and Employment at Enterprises and
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Organizations of the USSR” was signed on 2 April 1981 between the
governments of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the USSR. Its
implementation launched the process of organized, state-sponsored
Vietnamese immigration to Ukraine.33 Foremost among the Kyiv-based
companies employing Vietnamese citizens was the Darnytsia Silk Plant.
The influx of Afghanistan citizens began to escalate as soon as Soviet
troops entered this country. Afghan students began arriving at Kyiv col-
leges, universities, and military schools. But the largest number of Afghans
arrived in Kyiv in 1989–90, when Soviet troops left Afghanistan.
The exacerbation of tensions in the political and economic standoff
between the superpowers on the African continent and in Middle East
countries forced the governments of the USSR and the countries of the
above-mentioned regions to take steps to ensure the creation of a future
pro-communist elite.This led to the influx in the 1980s of large numbers
of foreign students from these regions, who arrived to attend Soviet col-
leges and universities, including those based in Kyiv.At the same time, in
the 1980s, there were no students in Kyiv from Pakistan and very few
from socialist China, since the Soviet leadership did not consider these
countries as friendly states.As in the past, between 1991 and 1998 citizens
of Afghanistan, African countries, and Vietnam constituted the largest
number of immigrants. The number of emigrants from Pakistan and
China simultaneously increased. During this period the lowest number of
emigrants arrived from Middle Eastern countries.
After 1992, when the Mujahiddin, and afterwards the Taliban, came to
power in Afghanistan, the new government began to persecute the students
whom the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had sent to
study in the USSR.This was the main reason why former Afghan students
and those who had stayed briefly in Kyiv for different purposes refused to
return to their homeland.These Afghans became refugees.As a result of fur-
ther political cataclysms in Afghanistan, especially after the Taliban came to
power, PDPA functionaries, state bureaucrats, members of parliament, mili-
tary personnel and specialists who had studied in the USSR (including
Kyiv), and intellectuals who had supported the communist regime were not
the only ones fleeing the country. Also fleeing Afghanistan were business-
men—especially those whose families included socially active female teach-
ers, journalists, and doctors—and people who were trying to save their fam-
ilies from hunger and poverty caused by the protracted civil war.
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Like the Afghan students, a significant number of African students who
had studied in Kyiv during the Soviet period did not return to their
homelands in the early 1990s. Some did not return because of changes of
political regimes in their homelands; others cited the absence of valid doc-
uments and lack of money for their journey home. For others, economic
considerations were the primary reason, inasmuch as their diplomas did
not provide any safeguards against unemployment and poverty at home.
Consequently, even those Africans who were in a position to return to
their homelands remained in the city, hoping at some time in the future
to reach some Western European country.34
The increase in the number of newcomers from African countries
between 1991 and 1998 was also linked to military conflicts that broke
out or restarted in some African countries in the early 1990s, especially
in Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola, and Congo. People escaping from
war, upheavals, and poverty set out to reach Western European coun-
tries.With this goal in mind, they turned to traffickers who in the early
1990s were making intensive use of Ukraine to transfer illegal migrants
from Africa to the countries of Western Europe. Those who failed to
reach Western European countries as a result of corrupt traffickers or for
other reasons ended up in Kyiv.
With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the organized importation
of Vietnamese workers, which was guaranteed by the 1981 Agreement
(signed for ten years) was terminated. However, specialists estimate that
in the mid-1990s there were at least 1,100 Vietnamese citizens in
Ukraine whose work contracts had ended, but owing to the economic
crisis, the companies employing them could not fulfill their obligations
and provide for their return to Vietnam. Some Vietnamese workers had
no desire whatsoever to return home, preferring to live in Ukraine.
There were cases of Vietnamese returning to their previous place of res-
idence even from Moscow airports.35
Some emigrants from Vietnam opened small or joint businesses in Kyiv
and invited compatriots from their homeland to work as co-founders, or
managers, and specialists in these businesses, thus providing them with an
opportunity to enter Ukraine and legalize their status in Kyiv. Some
Vietnamese respondents, who had worked in Ukraine earlier under the
terms of the Agreement but were forced to return to their homeland dur-
ing the Soviet period, returned to Kyiv, bearing service passports issued to
 
A Demographic and Social Portrait of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv
| 19 |
Vietnamese citizens working in the USSR, which they had either saved
or purchased on the black market. In the early 1990s such passports
allowed them to enter Ukraine legally without any additional formalities.
Between 1991 and 1998, during the provisionally demarcated second
period of immigration, citizens of China, Pakistan, and India began arriving
in Kyiv.36 As we discovered in the course of this study, in Kyiv and Kyiv
oblast during this period there were several joint Pakistani-Ukrainian and
Sino-Ukrainian firms, especially in the food service and wood processing
industries.With the assistance of middlemen based in China or Pakistan, for
a large sum of money one could obtain an official invitation to work in
these firms, and apply for a visa to enter Ukraine.A significant number of
Pakistani (as well as African) émigrés ended up in Kyiv after having been
duped by dishonest traffickers promising passage to Western Europe.
Compared to the first immigration period, during this period the num-
ber of newcomers from Middle Eastern countries decreased for several rea-
sons.When Ukraine gained its independence, the agreements and treaties
that the USSR had signed with a number of countries in that region to pro-
vide financial assistance in training specialists with a higher education
became invalid. Foreigners now had to pay for tuition fees in order to study
in Ukrainian colleges and universities.This led to a sharp drop in the num-
ber of students from those regions attending Ukrainian and Kyivan schools;
this decrease was also reflected in the scale of immigration to Kyiv. At the
same time, newcomers from Middle Eastern countries also used Ukraine as
a transfer point en route to Western European countries.
Against the background of a general decrease in the general scale of
immigration between 1999 and mid-2001, citizens from Afghanistan and
Vietnam continue to account for the majority of new immigrants.The num-
ber of newcomers from the Middle East is also increasing. The arrival of
newcomers from China and Pakistan is not recorded, and at the same time,
the number of immigrants from African countries is noticeably decreasing.
The predominance of newcomers from Afghanistan (59.1%) during
this period may be explained by the further impoverishment of the pop-
ulation during the years of Taliban rule, the constant threat of persecution
by Muslim radicals, and the absence of any prospects for life or opportu-
nities to obtain an education and basic medical care.37
Despite the tightening of visa and immigration controls, the increase in
the number of immigrants from Vietnam among newcomers in the last
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few years is the result of the legalization of those surveyed immigrants
who arrived in Kyiv during previous periods, which resulted in the pos-
sibility to legalize newly arrived family members and even relatives.
A significant percentage of newcomers from Middle Eastern countries
after 1999—particularly Kurds—resulted from the influx of some among
them who came to study at Ukrainian educational institutions and paid
for their own tuition. For such immigrants, this was the only way to leave
their countries legally and take advantage of the existing, albeit now
greatly circumscribed, route for illegal crossings to Western European
countries which cuts through Ukraine.
Some respondents from the Pakistani community explained that fewer
Pakistani citizens arrived in Kyiv between 1999 and the first half of 2001
because of tightened visa and border controls and the “improved work of
traffickers.” According to the respondents, traffickers no longer “leave”
their clients in Ukraine but in neighboring Slovakia, from where it is eas-
ier for them to reach the Czech Republic, Germany, or Spain.
According to individual respondents from African countries, the drop in
immigration from Africa after 1999 is linked to the invalidation of a migra-
tion myth widespread among Africans until the mid-1990s: that entry into
Ukraine meant an almost obstacle-free route to the West. As a result, traf-
fickers are now forced to seek other routes to move their clients to Europe.
During the second, and especially the third periods of immigration
to Kyiv an increase was noted in the number of female immigrants.This
may be a reflection of a general trend denoting a rise in numbers of
women in international migration,38 and a more dynamic process of
family reunifications.
KYIV’S IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY: A DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT
The immigrant group in this study is characterized by diversity in terms
of countries of origin, ethnicity, and religious affiliation.
The ethnicity of people from Afghanistan reflects the multiethnic
structure of the country’s population and, at the same time, the charac-
ter of discrimination on ethnic grounds in their homeland during the
period of Taliban rule. Pushtuns comprise 20.6% of surveyed immi-
grants; the rest represent ethnic groups whose national leaders opposed
the Taliban and later joined the Northern Alliance: Tajiks—68.2%,
Hazaras—8.2%, Uzbeks—1.2%, and other ethnic groups—1.8%.
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More than one-half of surveyed immigrants from African countries
belong to the Bacongo ethnic group (56.6%), while one-fifth (21%)
identified themselves according to their country of origin—Angolans;
members of other African ethnic groups (21%) formed the rest of this
group. Most newcomers from the Middle East are Arabs (57%) and
Kurds (40%), while members of other ethnic groups account for only
3%. Among émigrés from Pakistan and India were Punjabis (33.3%),
Pushtuns (11.1%), and Hindus (18.5%). Some identified themselves as
Pakistanis (33.3%) and Kashmiris (3.7%). All emigrants from China and
Vietnam identified themselves as Chinese and Vietnamese.
The religious affiliations of the immigrants who took part in this
study reflect a diverse mosaic. Christianity (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and
Protestantism) is professed by 13%, with the following distribution:
Orthodox believers from Ethiopia, Syria, and Afghanistan—1%;
Catholics—8%; and Protestants—4% of the total number. Some immi-
grants from Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo are also
Catholics. Protestant Christianity is professed mainly by people from
Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
More than one-half of immigrants profess Islam (57%).Twelve per-
cent consider themselves Shiite Muslims, and 45%, Sunnis. Islam is pro-
fessed by people from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan,
Palestine, Turkey, Syria, as well as Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic
of Congo, and Morocco. Buddhism and Confucianism are professed by
14% and 2%, respectively. Buddhism is the religion professed by 58% of
immigrants from China, and 55% of those from Vietnam. Twenty-six
percent of Chinese immigrants consider themselves followers of
Confucianism. Yezidism is professed by 2% of immigrants from Syria
and from Turkish and Iraqi Kurdistan—Kurds by nationality.This group
includes Zoroastrians and Sikhs from Afghanistan and India (0.4% and
0.6%, respectively). Only 10% consider themselves atheists. Immigrants
from Vietnam (43%) form the largest group of atheists, with none at all
from Pakistan.
Men predominate in the study group (73%), with women account-
ing for only 27%. The largest number of women is recorded among
immigrants from Vietnam, while the lowest number includes immigrants
from African countries and the Middle East.There are no women from
Pakistan among the surveyed immigrants.
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The majority of immigrants (84%) are adults of working age. Individuals
below the working age account for 12%, and only 4% are older than work-
ing age.There are no underage children who arrived with their parents or
adults over the working age among immigrants from Pakistan, the Middle
East, or African countries. None of the African men were older than forty at
the time of the survey.This attests to the economic character of immigration
from the above-mentioned countries and regions. At the same time, the
largest number of underage (31%) immigrants and people over the working
age (6%) are from Afghanistan; this confirms the existence of family migra-
tion, which is a hallmark of refugeeism.
The average age of immigrants from Asian and African countries is
thirty.The youngest are Afghans, whose average age is twenty-eight.The
oldest are the Vietnamese (thirty-four years old). Some age differences are
noted with respect to gender: the average age of immigrant women is
twenty-eight; of men—thirty-two.
In general, the gender-age composition of immigrants corresponds to the
gender-age structure of the population involved in current international
migration, whereby the most active and mobile individuals taking part in
migration processes are men between eighteen and forty years of age.
One-third of the surveyed adult immigrants, regardless of the fact that
they are at the optimum age for starting families, have never been married,
which indicates that young people without family obligations are most like-
ly to migrate.At the same time, nearly 65% of the study group members are
married. Of these, 54% married outside of Ukraine—in their own or other
countries.Two-thirds are immigrants from the first period of immigration to
Kyiv (74%).Among those who arrived in subsequent periods the number of
married couples decreases and accounts for 65% and 50%, respectively.
Marriages registered in countries of origin are most frequently noted among
immigrants from China (78%) and Afghanistan (72%),while the largest num-
ber of marriages registered in Kyiv is recorded among Africans.
The largest number of mixed marriages is recorded among immigrants
from Pakistan, the Middle East, and African countries, among whom there
are either no female immigrants or significantly smaller numbers than male
immigrants. The lowest number of mixed marriages is recorded among
immigrants from Vietnam,Afghanistan, and China, among whom there are
many more female immigrants than in immigrant groups from other coun-
tries.Mixed marriages are almost always made up of a Ukrainian woman and
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an immigrant man. In the study, there was only one case of a female immi-
grant from Syria who is married to a Ukrainian man.
The majority of mixed marriages are officially registered. Immigrants
who do not have the necessary documents to register their marriages live
in civil unions. Specifically, the highest number of civil unions occurs
among immigrants from African countries, most of whom do not have
national passports.The lowest number of unregistered, mixed marriages is
recorded among immigrants from Afghanistan.This is explained by the fact
that the majority of Afghans who are married to Ukrainian women are
immigrants from the Soviet period, who at the time of their marriage had
the required documents to register their union.A correlation between legal
national documents and the number of civil unions is also noted among
the Pakistani participants of this study. Officially registered marriages occur
only among those who have genuine national documents and came to
Ukraine legally.The high percentage of Vietnamese couples who are living
in civil unions may be explained by a tradition that arose during the Soviet
period: the Vietnamese government warned everyone entering the USSR
to work that marriage was inadmissibile. But a large concentration of
young, unmarried people, who have lived and worked in close contact for
many years, has led to a rise in unregistered marital unions, which have
turned out to be unexpectedly durable.
The study also uncovered a few cases of officially registered but fictitious
marriages that were contracted exclusively for the purpose of legalizing their
status. But in the majority of cases there are no grounds to consider study
group members’ marriages with Ukrainian women as a strategy for obtain-
ing legalization and surviving in Ukraine and Kyiv.
Divorces are not typical for Asian and African immigrants living in Kyiv.
Only 2.5% of the respondents were separated.The only mixed marriages that
resulted in separation were those in which the spouses were Ukrainian
women who had initiated the divorce, according to the respondents. Two
percent of the group’s members are widows and widowers.
Each immigrant family has an average of two children. As the study
shows, 115 out of 176 children living in 233 surveyed households were
born in Ukraine.The lowest recorded number of children per family was
one, and the highest—five.
In their countries of origin, the majority of immigrants in the study
lived in cities. Forty-three percent of urban residents lived in capital cities.
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The largest number of such residents is comprised of immigrants from
Afghanistan (60%),African countries (57%), and Middle Eastern countries
(37%); there are none from Pakistan and China. Urban residents predom-
inate among Afghans,Africans, and immigrants from the Middle East, i.e.,
from those countries where emigration was associated with changes in
political regimes and military conflicts, causing greater suffering for urban
residents, particularly the elite in capital cities and young people.
Residents of rural areas are predominant among immigrants from
Pakistan, China, and Vietnam—countries with a surplus of labor resources
in the agricultural sector, and, as a result, high unemployment levels in
rural areas,39 which is a motivating factor in labor migration.
The level of education and professional skills are an important factor
affecting opportunities for employment, material security, and living stan-
dards of immigrants.The educational level of men in the immigrant study
group is much higher than that of women.There are more men who have
completed degrees at colleges and universities (77%), technical and voca-
tional schools (76%), high schools (77%), and those who have a profes-
sional education (78%).There are significantly fewer individuals with only
a grade-school education. The comparatively lower educational level of
immigrant women is due to the fact that the majority come from coun-
tries where education and social activity of women are traditionally low.
One-third (32%) of the surveyed immigrants obtained their education
in Ukraine. Of these, 72% studied in institutions of higher learning, 11%
in technical schools, 2% in military academies, 5% in graduate schools,
and the rest in elementary, middle, and high schools. More than half of
those who studied in Ukraine are immigrants of the first period who
graduated after 1991.
Among the immigrants of the second period only one in five studied in
Ukrainian colleges and universities, and among those who arrived after
1999—only one in ten. Sixty percent of those who studied in Soviet and
Ukrainian colleges, universities, and technical schools completed their stud-
ies; 75% of these were immigrants in the Soviet period, while 25% arrived
between 1991 and 1998.All those who completed only pre-college place-
ment courses (18%) also arrived between 1991 and 1998.The majority of
them (72.4%) are immigrants from Pakistan and China.Three individuals in
the study group (two men from Afghanistan and Palestine, and a woman
from Syria) obtained doctorates from Ukrainian universities.
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Reasons for Migration
The study shows that 38% of immigrant respondents came to Kyiv for
economic reasons: to find a well-paying job (13%), better living condi-
tions (15.2%), obtain a good education, for medical care (4.4%), and to
start a business (5.4%) (Table 1.4). These figures challenge the wide-
spread notion that the majority of immigrants from Asian and African
countries currently living in Ukraine are transit migrants.
Economic reasons for migration were given by the majority of immi-
grants from China and Pakistan, and about half from Middle Eastern
countries.The largest number of immigrants who wanted to engage in
business in Kyiv were those from China (31.6%), Pakistan (26%) and
Middle Eastern countries (10%).
Twenty-six percent of the surveyed immigrants arrived in search of
asylum for political, ethnic, and religious reasons, and because of military
conflicts.The largest number of asylum seekers and refugees from areas
of military action in the study group are from Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Turkey (Kurds), as well as from African countries, particularly Angola.
Some immigrants from Pakistan and India, especially from Kashmir,
consider themselves refugees; they say they are victims of a military con-
flict and are in Kyiv in search of asylum.
One-fifth came to Kyiv to study at colleges and universities and to
work on government referrals. Among those who came to study, the
majority are from Middle Eastern countries; this is linked to the Soviet-
era tradition of acquiring a higher education, especially a medical
degree, in Soviet and, later, Ukrainian colleges and universities.
Approximately one in ten immigrants came to Kyiv for the purpose of
family reunification. Some (3%) openly admitted that they had no other
choice but to remain in Kyiv; they ended up in Kyiv by accident, origi-
nally planning to move on to European countries.The majority of transit
migrants are from African countries. Besides Africans, a small number of
immigrants from Pakistan and Afghanistan also consider themselves tran-
sit migrants, whereas none of the respondents from Vietnam, China, or
Middle East countries stated that they were transit migrants.
Legal and Illegal Migration
More than one third (38%) of the surveyed immigrants arrived in Kyiv
illegally, i.e., without the necessary entry documents, with forged docu-
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ments, or with documents provided by traffickers. Immigrants who came
to Kyiv from other regions of Ukraine did not need any documents.The
rest arrived on legal visas issued on the basis of government referrals to
study or work in the former Soviet Union (immigrants of the first peri-
od), invitations from colleges and universities, companies, private individ-
uals, or on tourist visas (immigrants of the second and third periods)
(Table 1.5).
More than half of the immigrants from African countries and
Afghanistan arrived in Kyiv illegally.This confirms both the transit nature
of their migration and the lack of opportunities to obtain legal entry
visas, as there are no Ukrainian consulates in Afghanistan or in the major-
ity of African countries.
Among immigrants from the Middle East and Pakistan, the number of
illegal entries was significantly lower; none whatsoever were recorded
among immigrants from China and Vietnam.Taking advantage of existing
Ukrainian diplomatic missions in their countries of origin, immigrants
from these countries who participated in the study group actively seized
Country of
origin
Did not need
documents
Entered
illegally
Had entry
visas
Total
Afghanistan 9.0 58.0 33.0 100
African
countries 6.0 65.0 29.0 100
China - - 100 100
India and
Pakistan 3.7 14.8 81.5 100
Middle
East
countries
- 6.7 83.3 100
Vietnam 11.0 - 89.0 100
All Respondents 7.0 38.0 55.0 100
TABLE 1.5 Distribution of Immigrants Based on Country 
of Origin and Type of Entry Document,
in % (N=369)
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opportunities to come to Kyiv legally through invitations from companies
(26% of immigrants from China, 20% from Vietnam, 19% from Pakistan),
colleges and universities (68% of immigrants from China, 19% from
Pakistan, and 17% from the Middle East region), private individuals (17%
from Vietnam, 13% from Middle East countries), and as tourists (23% from
Middle East countries and 18.5% from Pakistan).
The Decision to Migrate
An important factor influencing the decision to move to other countries
for permanent residence are the availability of information sources.These
include family, extended family, business ties, and communities of compa-
triots in the target countries of immigration. Many immigrants obtained
information about opportunities to leave their country of origin from fel-
low countrymen studying or working abroad (49%). Eighteen percent
obtained the necessary information from their government.The same per-
centage of immigrants obtained information from family members or rel-
atives. Seven percent of the surveyed immigrants obtained information
from Ukrainian acquaintances, the mass media, and contacts with business
partners. The same number of respondents obtained information from
organizers of illegal migration.
For immigrants from Pakistan, African countries, China, and Vietnam,
information sent from compatriots who had settled abroad earlier played
a decisive role in their decision to move. For the majority of Chinese
immigrants who took part in the survey, their sources of information were
usually small business owners and traders, who were the first to take
advantage of favorable conditions for entering Ukraine immediately after
the break-up of the USSR, legalize their status, and launch and maintain
ongoing businesses, especially in the food service industry and trading at
Kyiv markets. Former workers of Soviet industrial enterprises were the
main source of information for immigrants from Vietnam.Potential immi-
grants from African countries were informed about possible immigration
to Ukraine or an “easy” transit through its territory en route to Western
European countries by countrymen, who had studied at Soviet and
Ukrainian colleges and universities.
The least amount of information from compatriots was obtained by
immigrants from Afghanistan.On the one hand, this is explained by the exis-
tence of “shock factors”40 in their country of origin, which forced them to
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emigrate, regardless of availability of information about the country of des-
tination. On the other hand, a significant number of future immigrants
already had the required information concerning relocation, the source of
which was their own experience acquired during their period of study or
temporary residence in the USSR, or through contacts with Soviet citizens
who had worked or fought in Afghanistan. Immigrants whose official reason
for coming to Ukraine was to study at Ukrainian colleges and universities
after 1991, and especially after 1999, when new regulations for issuing visas
were introduced, learned of stipulations for foreigners studying in Ukraine
and tuition fees from advertisements placed by colleges and universities in
local newspapers in the future immigrants’ countries of origin. In addition to
fellow countrymen, an important source of information about Ukraine for
immigrants from a number of Asian and African countries were migration
organizers—often the same compatriots who had studied and worked in
Ukraine or had visited the country and its capital city many times.
Regardless of the entry period, an important factor in the decision of the
surveyed immigrants to move to Kyiv was the existence in Kyiv of compa-
triot and family networks. Expectation of material and moral support is the
most important consideration for a prospective immigrant, who is selecting
a country for planned studies, a move, or transit. A proportion of current
immigrants in Kyiv had relatives, family members, and Ukrainian acquain-
tances in the city. Most had some acquaintances among their compatriots
living here. Only 23% came to Kyiv without any prior acquaintances or
family ties (Table 1.6).
During our research we discovered that immigrants arriving in Kyiv from
African countries and Pakistan were quite frequently the victims of fraud and
deception at the hands of their fellow countrymen. Immigrants from
Afghanistan, China, Middle East countries, and Vietnam did not lodge com-
plaints about being defrauded and deceived by their compatriots in Kyiv.
Immigrants who accepted the assistance of compatriots during the
migration process were most frequently from African countries, China,
Pakistan, and Vietnam, and least often from Afghanistan and the Middle
East. Only newcomers from Vietnam and China were assisted by business
partners helping to organize their move, usually by sending them invita-
tions to work in their companies.
The assistance of travel agencies in organizing their move was used
only by immigrants from Pakistan and Middle Eastern countries, which
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have Ukrainian diplomatic missions.One-fifth of the study group said that
they made the move by themselves. Mostly immigrants from Pakistan, the
Middle East, and Afghanistan relied largely on their own efforts.
Depending on the period of arrival, sources of assistance for organiz-
ing a move and the degree to which it was used varied. More than half
of immigrants in the first period named the official government as the
source of assistance for their move, since most of them arrived for study
or work on government referrals. There were four times fewer immi-
grants who reached Kyiv thanks to the assistance of compatriots during
this period. The assistance of relatives, family members, business part-
ners, and Ukrainian acquaintances was insignificant. Incidentally, none
of the immigrants of this period indicated assistance from travel agen-
cies and migration organizers.
Those who arrived between 1991 and 1998 received the most assistance
in organizing their move from their compatriots. The number of new
immigrants who received assistance from relatives and family members
increased significantly. In this period, 13% of immigrants participating in the
study stated that they received assistance from illegal migration organizers,
which was a new phenomenon in comparison with the Soviet period.
Almost one-fifth did not avail themselves of anyone’s assistance.
Immigrants of the third period received the most indispensable assis-
tance for their move from migration organizers, because, as indicated ear-
lier, more than half of them arrived illegally. One-third of the survey group
members who arrived in 1999–2001 indicated this type of assistance.The
number of immigrants who received assistance from relatives and family
members during the process of migration increased significantly in com-
parison with the previous period, which indicates an intense process of
family reunifications.There is no recorded case of Ukrainian acquaintanc-
es, business partners, or travel agencies assisting immigrants. This is the
result of new regulations governing the issuance of visas to Ukraine.
CONCLUSIONS
As our study revealed, the preconditions for the arrival of nontradition-
al immigrants in Kyiv were established in Soviet times.The start of the
sharp increase in their numbers was determined by objective political
and socio-economic factors that arose in Ukraine, the post-Soviet space,
and the immigrants’ countries of origin.
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Multiethnicity is typical of nontraditional immigrants who have set-
tled in Kyiv. By their religious affiliation, the majority of them are
Muslims. According to gender and age characteristics, the majority are
comprised of young men with high working potential.
A high marriage rate, a significant number of mixed marriages, and
strong families are characteristic of Kyiv immigrants from Asia and Africa.
They tend not to have many children. Obviously, this may be explained
by the fact that two-thirds of today’s nontraditional immigrants in Kyiv
lived in large cities or capitals in their home countries and had a high
level of education.
As we discovered during the course of the study, the majority of immi-
grants arrived in Kyiv by legal means or with official legal visas. Economic
reasons predominate among the general reasons for emigrating: the search
for better-paid employment and better living conditions, a desire to
engage in business, and desire for a good education and medical care.This
means that regardless of current economic hardships in the Ukrainian
state, Ukraine is economically attractive and a desirable destination for
many immigrants from a number of Asian and African countries.
A Demographic and Social Portrait of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv
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CHAPTER TWO
Living Conditions of Nontraditional
Immigrants in Kyiv
Legal status, possession of documents authorizing the right to residein the country, and documents in general have key significance forthe immigrant’s situation. This is the prerequisite for securing all
other rights, from finding employment and obtaining medical care, to
integrating into the receiving society.
DOCUMENTS ALLOWING LEGAL RESIDENCE IN UKRAINE
In accordance with the rules governing foreigners’ entry into Ukraine,
their departure from Ukraine, and transit through its territory,41 foreign-
ers must have a passport document for entering and staying in Ukraine.
Among immigrants over 18 years of age who participated in the study
group (315 individuals), only 53% had valid national passports (or were
included in valid passport of a husband or father). Nearly 20% had
invalid passports, most of which had expired. Nearly 30% did not have
any national passport documents.
Although the majority of foreigners who arrived in Ukraine before
1991 had valid passports (only 10% of immigrants in this period had no
national passports), the situation was different for immigrants arriving after
1991. One-third of immigrants who arrived in Ukraine in 1991–1998,
and 42% of those who arrived in 1999 and later, did not have passports.
Obviously, the lack of national documents is most likely linked to the for-
eigners’ method of entry into Ukraine in this period and the exacerbation
of problems linked to illegal migration. Among the surveyed immigrants
who currently do not have passports, nearly 70% arrived in our country
without necessary documents or with forged documents, i.e., illegally.
The situation differs markedly depending on the immigrant’s citizen-
ship. For example, all immigrants from Vietnam and China have pass-
ports.The majority of Indian and Pakistani citizens (85%) also have pass-
ports. Only 30% of Afghans hold valid passports (including family mem-
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bers recorded in passports). Africans are in the worst situation. A mere
9% have valid national documents. Consequently, most immigrants from
Vietnam and China enter the country legally, and most immigrants from
African countries do not.
Some respondents petitioned the embassies of their countries to renew
or extend their passports.According to figures provided by the Embassy of
Afghanistan, to respondents the cost of renewing a passport ranged from
300 to 500 US dollars, while a document stating that the person named
was a citizen of Afghanistan, whose passport was being processed, cost an
additional 30-50 dollars. For the most part, African immigrants cannot
petition their embassies in order to renew or extend their passports because
many African countries do not have diplomatic missions in Ukraine.
In accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On Foreigners” (Article 3),
foreigners are divided into those who live in Ukraine permanently, those
who are residing on its territory for a designated period of time, and those
who are in the country only temporarily. Foreigners receive permits for
permanent or temporary residency.42 Immigrants are differentiated
between permanent and temporary residents, based not on time factors
but legal grounds for staying here—a residence permit or visa.43 At the
same time, the above-mentioned Rules Governing the Entry of
Foreigners into Ukraine state that the general period of sojourn in
Ukraine of a foreigner who comes for a private visit cannot exceed one
year. Short-term visas are issued for up to six months, and long-term
ones—for a period of six months to one year.44
There are various types of visas.Among the respondents were individ-
uals who had tourist visas; visas issued to newcomers arriving for the pur-
pose of finding a job; student visas; business visas issued to individuals who
come to Ukraine as co-founders of joint ventures, representatives of com-
panies who monitor and implement contracts, or foreign consultants; and
visas issued to office personnel representing foreign subjects of economic
activity. In those cases where individuals must remain in Ukraine for more
than one year (students; workers and specialists with permits from the
Ministry of Labor; employees of foreign companies, etc.), internal affairs
agencies decide whether to extend the passport registration, rather than
the visa. If an application review lasts longer than twenty-four hours, the
applicant is issued a photo ID document indicating that his/her passport
is pending registration in the organs of Internal Affairs.45
Living Conditions of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv
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Another legal basis for remaining in the country is refugee status, which
is confirmed by the issuance of special identification to a foreigner.
According to the regulations that were in effect at the time of the study46 (a
new version of the Law of Ukraine “On Refugees” was passed in 2001), this
was a document for internal use, identifying the bearer of the document and
confirming that s/he had been granted refugee status. Refugee status was
granted for a period of three months and could be renewed.
The procedure for examining applications of individuals seeking asylum
and refugee status was predicated on the existence of several other docu-
ments authorizing the right to a temporary sojourn in Ukraine: a document
about the individual applying for refugee status and a document concerning
adjudication by a higher administrative organ of an asylum seeker’s appeal
over denial of refugee status.47
The only way that individuals who were denied refugee status by the gov-
ernment to obtain some kind of document was to forward an appeal to the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which was
opened in Kyiv in 1994. If, after an interview, the applicant was identified by
the UNHCR as one who met the criteria of the 1951 Geneva Refugee
Convention relating to the status of refugees, s/he was issued a document
with photo ID in the form of a letter declaring the person’s intent to seek
asylum in Ukraine. The UNHCR document is not an official document
authorizing the right to stay in Ukraine. However, the fruitful cooperation
between the UNHCR in Ukraine and the government of Ukraine, and the
high prestige of the former ensures them a certain respect,which is extreme-
ly important for immigrants who have no other documents but this letter.
Thus, a residency permit, visa, refugee card, and migration service docu-
ment are all accepted documents authorizing the bearer to stay in Ukraine.
In cases where the foreigner’s passport is pending registration, an internal
affairs agency document is provided.A student card authorizes foreign stu-
dents to reside in the country. Finally, a letter from the UNHCR is accept-
ed in certain cases by government officials.
LEGAL STATUS OF KYIV IMMIGRANTS
Only 15% of the immigrants in Kyiv who took part in the survey had a res-
idence permit.These were mostly individuals who have lived in Ukraine for
a long period of time. Among those who came before 1991, one of every
three had this kind of permit. Eleven percent of immigrants who arrived
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between 1991 and 1998 had a residence permit.Not a single immigrant who
arrived after 1999 has such a document.Therefore, mostly former students
or workers who came to Ukraine on the basis of relevant intergovernmen-
tal agreements, those who have resided here for a long period of time, and
immigrants who are married to local residents have such documents.
The next group of immigrants—nearly 30%—is comprised of individ-
uals who have visas, mostly business ones, or those whose passports were
registered on the basis of a contractual agreement or study in Ukraine (as
noted earlier, if an individual remains in Ukraine for more than one year,
his/her visa is replaced by registration, and an appropriate notation is made
in the passport by an internal affairs agency).The largest number of such
individuals was found among those who arrived before 1991; there were
somewhat fewer among those who arrived in the next period.
It should be noted, however, that a student visa or registration does not
always mean that the individual is really a student.This status is often used as
a means to enter Ukraine or legalize one’s status in the country.There were
few “students”of this kind among the immigrants taking part in the study—
just a little over 3%. It is clear that none of them were studying at an institu-
tion of higher learning.The majority of those who have a visa/registration
have the right to reside temporarily in Ukraine because of business or work.
Companies founded by individuals from the immigrants’ countries of
origin applied for work permits on behalf of their compatriots.The motive
behind these actions was the lack of certain types of specialists in Ukraine.
This is a typical phenomenon, e.g., among employees of Chinese or
Vietnamese cafes and restaurants.
A little over 3% of the immigrants taking part in the survey have work
permits. But, as in the “students’”case, the existence of appropriate doc-
uments rarely meant that this or that person was really working at a cer-
tain company.
Immigrants from China and Vietnam who are residing in Ukraine as
private entrepreneurs engaged in commerce issue private invitations to
their relatives whom they hire as workers.Thus, for some respondents a
private visa served as grounds for staying in Ukraine. In general, 80% of
immigrants from Vietnam, nearly 70% from China, and over 44% from
India and Pakistan, and one-third of immigrants from Middle Eastern
countries have a visa or registration. But only 3% of Afghans and only one
African have such documents.
 
Living Conditions of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv
| 39 |
The next group of immigrants includes individuals who are officially
recognized as refugees (33%) or have documents from the migration
service, stating that their applications to acquire refugee status are pend-
ing (2%). Afghans are predominant in this group: they account for near-
ly 70% of refugees, followed by Africans (nearly 22%).At the same time,
not a single citizen of China, India, Pakistan, or Vietnam has refugee sta-
tus or has applied for it in Ukraine.
The majority of refugees are found among immigrants who arrived in
Ukraine between 1991 and 1998 (35.5%). The majority are Afghans,
which is understandable, considering the fact that Afghans sought asylum
after the fall of Najibullah’s regime, and later, when the Taliban came to
power. Nearly 25% of those who arrived before 1991 are refugees. For
the most part, these are students who were studying in Ukraine but could
not return home, fearing persecution. At the same time, there are fewer
refugees among the immigrants of the last period—16%.
A small number of immigrants—six individuals, or 2% of the survey
participants—had surrogate documents authorizing their stay in Ukraine.
If an extension of the permitted period of residence in Ukraine is
reviewed by the organs of Internal Affairs for longer than twenty-four
hours, the applicant is issued a photo ID stating that his/her documents
are being held by the police. Documents issued by the embassy of the cit-
izen’s country, stating that the foreigner has lost his/her passport and has
applied for a renewal, also serve as surrogate documents. Finally, several
immigrants used forged migration service documents.
The next group of immigrants (nearly 12%) only has UNHCR doc-
uments.There are practically no holders of such documents among those
who arrived before 1991. The largest number of immigrants with such
documents is found among those who arrived between 1991 and 1998
(15%) and after 1999 (13%).The majority of individuals with documents
from the UNHCR are from African countries (nearly 70%). One in
every four is Afghan.There are practically no individuals under interna-
tional protection among immigrants from other regions.
Approximately 7% of the surveyed immigrants do not have any doc-
uments authorizing their stay in Ukraine, given that they entered the
country illegally. These are people from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and
African and Middle Eastern countries. All of them arrived after 1991.
More than half arrived with official visas and invitations from colleges
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and universities, i.e., they had the necessary grounds for entering the
country.As of today, one-third of these individuals have national passports
(including expired ones). If we add to these individuals bearers of
UNHCR letters, which are not considered identification documents, and
those who use information documents from the Department of Visas and
Registration of Foreign Citizens (VVIR) or embassies, or forged migra-
tion service documents, over 20% of the immigrants who took part in
the survey are living in Ukraine illegally, i.e., without documents author-
izing their stay in the country.
According to our research data, even those immigrants who have lived
in Ukraine for over ten years (an average of six years) do not have docu-
ments authorizing their stay in Ukraine.They actually became permanent
residents long ago: they have become integrated into society, have estab-
lished families with Ukrainian citizens (15% of the surveyed immigrants
who are in mixed marriages do not have documents authorizing their stay
in Ukraine), and have children who are Ukrainian citizens. Under these
circumstances, sanctions against these people as illegal immigrants and their
forcible deportation contravene various standards of international human
rights laws (e.g., a child’s right not to be separated from both parents,which
is included in the Convention on the Rights of the Child signed by
Ukraine).Thus, the information obtained in our survey of immigrants who
have no residence permits attests not so much to an exacerbation of the
problem of illegal migration so much as to flaws in the laws of Ukraine,
which regulate the status of foreigners in the country.
A sojourn in Ukraine is legal if the newcomer is registered with the
organs of Internal Affairs in his/her place of residence in Ukraine.There
is a state tax on this registration process and its extension.Violations of
registration requirements and other regulations concerning sojourns in
Ukraine may result in administrative or criminal liability, a reduction in
the duration of a temporary stay, and even deportation from the country.
Foreigners and stateless individuals without documents may be detained
by law enforcement agencies in order to establish their identity and deter-
mine the crucial circumstances of their case.
Liability for such violations is usually a rather hefty fine. As the study
shows, the majority of respondents do not own homes in Kyiv but rent
private apartments. Therefore, the possibility of registering their docu-
ments with internal affairs agencies depends entirely upon the consent of
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the landlord who must provide written confirmation of the rental agree-
ment and the foreigner’s residence at the stated address.
Decisions passed by the Kyiv municipal government have created addi-
tional difficulties for registering foreigners’ documents.The “Measures for
the Prevention of Illegal Migration and the Regulation of Migration
Processes in Kyiv,”48 which were passed by the deputies of the Kyiv
Municipal Council, empower the municipal administration of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Office of Nationalities Affairs and
Migration of the Municipal State Administration to “apply measures to
prevent the sojourn and settlement in the city of Kyiv of foreigners and
refugees who have permits for residence in other regions (incl. Kyiv
oblast).”The concept of migration policy in the city of Kyiv, which was
TABLE 2.1 Distribution of Immigrants 18 Years of Age or Older
with Documents Authorizing Residence in Ukraine and
Registration by Place of Residence, in % (N=310)
* Forms from VVIR stating that the passport is pending registration, embassy
forms stating that a passport is being re-issued, including similar forged forms.
Documents
authorizing
residence in
Ukraine
With
registration
No
registration
With
registration
at a
different
address
Total
Residence permit 69.6 - 30.4 100
Refugee card or
form issued by
migration service
65.1 19.3 15.6 100
Visa/registration 81.5 4.4 14.1 100
Form issued by
UNHCR - 100.0 - 100
Other* 57.1 28.6 14.3 100
No documents - 100.0 - 100
All Respondents 59.7 25.5 14.8 100
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approved by a Kyiv Municipal Council decision of 24 May 2001, is aimed
at putting “a certain artificial limit (yearly quota) on the settling and
sojourn of immigrants in the capital.”49 Regardless of the fact that the
Constitution of Ukraine (p. 33) guarantees foreigners who are in Ukraine
legally the right to move about and choose their place of residence freely,
internal affairs agencies in the city of Kyiv were absolutely unjustifiably
forced to deny registration to foreigners who had secured residence permits
or refugee cards in another oblast but had nevertheless moved to the capital.
These prohibitions, like other problems that arise in connection with reg-
istration, turn foreigners who have a legal right to stay in Ukraine into vio-
lators of established regulations with all the concomitant negative repercus-
sions of such a situation. In general, one in every four adult immigrants in
the survey does not have registration with the organs of Internal Affairs in
Kyiv, which means that there are more of these kinds of individuals than
those with no permits/visas for permanent or temporary residency in
Ukraine. Nineteen percent of officially recognized refugees are not regis-
tered,nor are more than 4% of those with visa/residency permits (Table 2.1).
According to the legislation, all of them are violating the regulations govern-
ing their stay in Ukraine.
As could be predicted, immigrants who arrived before 1991 are in the
best position with respect to document registration: only 11% do not have
registration documents; 29% of those who arrived between 1991 and 1998
are not registered, and 46% of those who arrived later have no registration
documents.The largest number of immigrants without registration is com-
prised of immigrants from Africa—66%.Thirty percent of Pakistanis have no
registration, and 27% of Afghans. Only 12.5% of Chinese and 1.5% of
Vietnamese do not have registration (Table 2.2).
In addition to documents authorizing the right to stay in Ukraine,
other documents that are issued in Ukraine are crucial to finding employ-
ment, acquiring an education, obtaining medical services, and securing
rights that arise from marriage. Ukrainian documents that are most wide-
ly used by immigrants are university or technical school diplomas.Among
immigrants 18 years and older who took part in the study, 15% had diplo-
mas.The largest number of diplomas are held by immigrants from Middle
East countries—28%, followed by Afghans—over 20%.
Nearly 42% of adult respondents have documents authorizing them to
engage in business: these are certificates issued by private businessmen or
 
Living Conditions of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv
| 43 |
trading licenses.The next group of documents consists of registrations of
civil status documents. Only about 54% of immigrants who contracted
marriages with citizens of Ukraine have marriage certificates.This means
that almost one-half of mixed marriages are not legally registered, even
though they have families and manage a joint household in which the
immigrant is the chief breadwinner in the family.
The main obstacle to marriage registration is the lack of valid nation-
al passports.A refugee card is not sufficient documentation for registering
a marriage, since legislation requires possession of a passport or a passport-
type document.This situation changed only in 2001, with the passage of
a new Law of Ukraine “On Refugees,” which states that a refugee card
qualifies as a passport.
Immigrants also experience problems with birth registration. Children
of mixed marriages, both registered and unregistered, are issued birth cer-
tificates without any difficulty, if their mothers are Ukrainian. However,
problems may arise when recording paternity. Registration of a child of
two immigrant parents is even more complicated.This is an insurmount-
able obstacle for those without national passports. Until recently, refugee
Country of
origin
With
registration
No
registration
With
registration
at a different
address Total
Afghanistan 53.4 27.1 19.5 100
African countries 30.2 66.0 3.8 100
China 62.5 12.5 25.0 100
India and
Pakistan 48.2 29.6 22.2 100
Middle
East countries 69.0 20.7 10.3 100
Vietnam 92.6 1.5 5.9 100
All Respondents 59.5 27.0 13.5 100
TABLE 2.2 Distribution of Immigrants 18 Years of Age or Older
Based on Country of Origin with Registration by Place
of Residence, in % (N=312)
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papers, as with marriage registration, could not replace passports. Other
obstacles to registering immigrants’ children stem from loopholes in
Ukrainian legislation. Until recently, the legislation defined that a birth
certificate is issued to a child who is a citizen of Ukraine or has acquired
Ukrainian citizenship.50 The situation was rectified only in 2001, with the
passage of a new version of the Law of Ukraine “On Ukrainian
Citizenship,”51 which stipulates that a birth certificate may attest only to
the fact of a child’s birth and name, but not citizenship.
In cases where both parents are immigrants, less than half of respon-
dents’ children born in Ukraine have birth certificates. Nearly 40% have
only a hospital form recording the birth, and nearly 15% did not possess
even these kinds of documents (they misplaced them or lost them for
other reasons).As with other types of documents,Vietnamese immigrants
are in the best position: over 70% have birth certificates for children born
in Ukraine. Immigrants from Africa are in the worst situation: only 20%
of their children have legal documents confirming their birth and name.
It should be noted, however, that some parents whose children do not
have birth certificates made no effort whatsoever to apply for such docu-
ments. There were various reasons for this: they felt their requests were
doomed to failure, lack of time or money. In addition, many believed that
the form issued to the mother at the hospital’s maternity unit was suffi-
cient documentation for their child.
According to our research, at the time of the survey none of the
respondents had acquired Ukrainian citizenship. At the same time, many
of them declared that they would like to have Ukrainian citizenship.
Thirty-four percent of immigrants who answered this question gave an
affirmative response. Nearly 15% explained their decision to apply for
Ukrainian citizenship by citing certain circumstances (existence of
employment, opportunities for their children’s education, etc.). The
majority of those who wished to acquire citizenship (answers: “yes” or
“probably”) were immigrants from Africa (72%) and Afghanistan (51%).
The lowest number was noted among citizens of Vietnam (32%). Still, a
definite affirmative answer was given only by 13% of Vietnamese. Not a
single immigrant from China wanted to acquire Ukrainian citizenship.
Many factors influenced this decision (for details, see Chapter Three),
primarily immigration reasons and further migration plans, as well as
legal status in Ukraine.
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None of the surveyed immigrants had obtained permission to immi-
grate to Ukraine. Pursuant to the Law of Ukraine “On Immigration”,52
“foreigners and stateless individuals [among others] who arrived in
Ukraine before 6 March 1998 in accordance with the 2 April 1981
Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam and the Government of the USSR concerning the referral and
admission of Vietnamese citizens for professional study and work at
enterprises and organizations of the USSR, who remained living in
Ukraine and applied for permanent residence permits in Ukraine with-
in six months of the date that this law came into effect” are entitled to
this kind of authorization.
Therefore, the legal status of immigrants in Ukraine, and in particular
the existence or lack of essential documents, determine all other condi-
tions of their residence.There is an obvious need to simplify and increase
the efficiency of organs in charge of processing documents for foreign-
ers, directing their primary orientation toward the interests of the indi-
vidual. In addition, there appears to be a crucial need to improve
Ukrainian legislation with respect to the legal status of foreigners and
stateless individuals. Our research confirms that the problems faced by
immigrants who have been living in Ukraine for years without any estab-
lished legal status require immediate resolution.
EMPLOYMENT OF KYIV IMMIGRANTS
To a great degree the legal status of immigrants in Ukraine in general, and
Kyiv in particular, is a definitive factor in employment opportunities.The
Constitution of Ukraine guarantees everyone the right to employment
(Article 43) and to engage in business (Article 42). At the same time,
equality of rights, freedoms, and obligations on a par with Ukrainian cit-
izens is guaranteed only to those foreigners who have legal grounds to
reside in Ukraine (Article 26).53 In accordance with the Law of Ukraine
“On the Legal Status of Foreigners,” foreigners who are living permanent-
ly in Ukraine have the same right to employment as Ukrainian citizens.
The Law of Ukraine “On Refugees” grants individuals with refugee sta-
tus the same right to employment as citizens of Ukraine. Hence, foreign-
ers residing permanently in Ukraine, as well as refugees, do not require
additional work permits. Employment opportunities for other categories
of foreigners are restricted by certain conditions.
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Without a doubt the economic situation in the city and general
municipal job market conditions affect employment among immigrants.
Even during peak crisis periods, the situation in Kyiv, the largest city in
Ukraine, was always better than in other regions. For that reason, the
capital was always a center attracting many residents from other areas.
Trading at the markets has become the niche where immigrants have
been able most easily to realize their working potential. First of all, for-
eigners wishing to engage in trading did not require any special work
permits, and secondly, as a result of unemployment and extremely low
wages, the majority of other spheres of activity were either inaccessible
to immigrants or unsuitable. Hence, it is no surprise that most (47%)
economically active immigrants who took part in the survey (there were
255 economically active individuals among immigrants older than 18,
excluding housewives/retirees and students supported by their families),
indicated trading as their major source of income. For the most part, the
activity of entrepreneurs (12.5%) is also connected with trading. Thus,
nearly 60% of economically active immigrants are engaged in trading.
A comparison of the nature of immigrants’ work in their homelands
and their activities in Kyiv reveals that 65% of former bureaucrats and
specialists, 65% of military men, and nearly 50% of those who were stu-
dents or pupils in their homelands have become traders.
Although for many immigrants the decision to engage in trading was
made under constraint, for others, primarily immigrants from countries
where migration is typically motivated by economic reasons, business and
trading were the goals behind their move to Ukraine.A significant num-
ber of such immigrants were from China, Pakistan, and Vietnam. The
majority of immigrants are private entrepreneurs and traders. There are
comparatively few hired workers among immigrants—15.3%.At the same
time, unemployment is quite high among immigrants—nearly 24%.
The largest number of hired workers is noted among Chinese immi-
grants. Practically all immigrants from India and Pakistan, and the
majority of newcomers from Afghanistan and Vietnam, are entrepre-
neurs. Unemployment is typical for immigrants from African countries.
Unemployment is lowest among those who arrived before 1991, while
the highest is among immigrants who have arrived in recent years. In
addition, the largest number of entrepreneurs is found among immigrants
who arrived before 1991; the lowest number is noted among newcomers
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who arrived in the last period (Figure. 2.1).
This may be explained not only by better integration thanks to lengthy
periods of residence, but to a great degree also by the immigrants’ legal
status, which is more stable among those who arrived before 1991.There
is a direct and obvious link between the existence of documents author-
izing residence in Ukraine and the possibility for employment or private
enterprise (Table 2.3).
Especially noteworthy is the fact that the category of private entre-
preneurs and traders also includes some immigrants who do not have
any valid documents whatsoever to stay in Ukraine or have only a form
from the UNHCR, which does not constitute official permission to
stay in the country. Many of these are individuals who work in a busi-
ness registered in the name of a Ukrainian wife. Some are engaged in
trading without any kind of permit. As a rule, these are traders selling
from hand to hand (without their own stands at the market), water or
tea distributors, and plastic bag sellers—individuals who occupy the
lowest rungs in the market hierarchy. Forty-six percent of economical-
ly active immigrants have trading licenses or documents identifying
them as private entrepreneurs. More than 60% of those who are
engaged in entrepreneurship are self-employed traders.
FIGURE. 2.1. Structure of Employment Statuses of Economically
Active Immigrants by Period of Arrival
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The development of markets also resulted in an increase in competition,
in the course of which immigrants constantly forfeit their standings.
Whereas earlier their advantage was experience in market relations, today
Ukrainian citizens have also acquired this type of experience, In compari-
son with immigrants, Ukrainian citizens have many more opportunities for
developing businesses and general room to maneuver in the job market.
Markets of the type that were prevalent in the 1990s are gradually becom-
ing a thing of the past. Many markets are now undergoing reconstruction
with the goal of creating modern trading enterprises with every necessary
convenience for both sellers and buyers. Therefore, the main sphere of
employment and source of income for immigrants is constantly shrinking.
They have a realistic view of their prospects. Most of the Chinese and
Vietnamese citizens who work in the Kyiv markets are planning to return to
their homelands or to switch to other forms of entrepreneurship, primarily
TABLE 2.3 Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants Based
on Documents Authorizing Residence in Ukraine and
Main Types of Work,in % (N=255)
* Forms from VVIR stating that a passport is pending registration, embassy forms
stating that a passport is in the process of being re-issued, including fabricated forms.
Type of
document
authorizing
residence in
Ukraine
Hired
worker
Private
entrepreneur
or trader
Unemployed Total
Residence permit 10.3 87.2 2.5 100
Refugee card or
form from
migration service
18.4 54.0 27.6 100
Visa/registration 21.8 74.4 3.8 100
Form from
UNHCR 3.7 11.1 85.2 100
Other* - 100.0 - 100
No documents 6.7 40.0 53.3 100
All Respondents 15.3 60.8 23.9 100
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the restaurant business. Afghan refugees are in a different position, for they
still face possible repatriation to Afghanistan. At the same time, immigrants
with specialists’ background who trade at the markets realize that with every
passing day and year they are losing their qualifications. This means that
opportunities for finding other kinds of jobs are constantly shrinking.
All this may explain why the level of job satisfaction among immi-
grants is extremely low. Only a little over 10% of entrepreneurs and
traders were satisfied with their work, while over 50% were either dis-
satisfied or quite dissatisfied. The largest number of those who are dis-
satisfied with their work may be found among immigrants with higher
education or vocational training.
The group of hired, working immigrants includes individuals work-
ing for international and non-governmental organizations; specialists,
translators/interpreters, managers, and service personnel of private com-
panies; workers employed in private, small- and medium-sized industri-
al enterprises; and workers in food service enterprises. Not a single
immigrant was employed at a state-owned enterprise or educational or
medical institution, etc.
Information obtained during the survey challenges the stereotypical
notion that immigrants appear to prefer to engage in trading than work
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in manufacturing. Finding a permanent and stable job is a great, but often
unrealistic, dream for immigrants.As noted earlier, the majority of unem-
ployed do not have the required documents to stay in Ukraine, which is
the main reason behind their inability to find employment. Some of the
surveyed immigrants who were not working anywhere, and had not had
a job in years, relied on assistance from charitable organizations, country-
men, and family members, and did not demonstrate any particular desire
to find a job. Nevertheless, the majority of the unemployed would like to
work, and they have the necessary education and qualifications for this.
The unemployed are mostly immigrants from African countries. Besides
the lack of documents, the reason also lies in the particularities of the
African community in the city of Kyiv.The community is quite small and
is comprised of immigrants from various countries, who have only sporadic
contact with each other. In contrast, there are far fewer unemployed indi-
viduals in more closely knit communities, such as the Afghan or Vietnamese
communities, who have a developed system of mutual assistance.
Immigrant employment in the city of Kyiv may be divided into three
main categories.The first includes Afghans and immigrants from India and
Pakistan, whose chief form of employment is trading at the markets.The
second category is mixed: trading at the markets, entrepreneurship, and
hired work in the restaurant industry and other enterprises.This is typical
for immigrants from China and Vietnam.The third category is character-
ized by the lack of stable employment and by sporadic, occasional earn-
ings, which is typical for immigrants from African countries. Some immi-
grants from Middle Eastern countries belong to all three employment cat-
egories, which is linked to the extremely diverse structure of this group,
both in terms of migration reasons and legal status.
The fact that the majority of immigrants from Afghanistan work in
retail sales at the markets, in the respondents’ own words, is because the
Afghan community in Kyiv was formed during the years of the econom-
ic crisis.Their workplaces are the Troieshchynsky and Sviatoshynsky mar-
kets. According to the respondents, the Troieshchynsky market was estab-
lished by Afghans whom the government forced out of other city markets.
According to the survey data, nearly 46% of economically active
Afghans who were engaged in entrepreneurship and commerce hold pri-
vate entrepreneurs’ permits; another 14.3% hold trading licenses. Some
only have taxpayer identification codes. This indicates that these people
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are included on other commercial licenses.At the same time, over 34% of
traders do not have documents for entrepreneurial activity (Table 2.5).
In terms of nature of work, Pakistanis are most similar to Afghans.The
market is their main workplace. There are half as many unemployed
Pakistanis, but the proportion of entrepreneurs and traders is higher.The
preponderant majority of Pakistanis have documents authorizing them to
engage in entrepreneurship and commerce. In some cases, since mixed
marriages with Ukrainian women are predominant among them, docu-
ments for business are issued to their wives.
As noted earlier, from its very beginnings Vietnamese immigration to
Ukraine was work-related.Throughout the 1990s a number of Vietnamese
companies were established in Kyiv, selling imported goods from Vietnam.As
sellers, they hired their compatriots who had lost their jobs at Ukrainian
enterprises but had remained in the country.Thus, former industrial work-
ers became hired workers in the commercial sector.Eventually,many of these
companies ceased to exist. Some workers obtained their own trading licens-
es or private entrepreneurs’ permits. In turn, they began to invite their com-
patriots to work, issuing invitations to both former migrant workers in
Ukraine and relatives and acquaintances from Vietnam. The majority of
TABLE 2.5 Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants from
Afghanistan Based on Employment Status and
Documents for Entrepreneurial Activity, in % (N=87)
Employment
status
Private
entrepreneur’s
permit
Trading
license
Taxpayer’s
code (for
those who
do not have
other
documents)
None of
the listed
documents Total
Hired
employee - - 44.4 55.6 100
Private
entrepreneur or
self-employed
45.7 14.3 5.7 34.3 100
Unemployed - - - 100.0 100
All Respondents 36.8 11.5 9.2 42.5 100
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respondents from Vietnam are private entrepreneurs engaged in commerce.
One in every four economically active immigrants from Vietnam is a
hired worker. Predominant among them are cooks, waiters in Vietnamese
cafes and restaurants, and managers and employees of small companies cre-
ated with Vietnamese capital. In this category are also specialists from var-
ious professions who were educated in Ukraine and who are working in
branches of Vietnamese companies, joint Ukrainian-Vietnamese compa-
nies, or Ukrainian firms who have business ties with Vietnam.There are
practically no individuals without documents authorizing their activities
among economically active immigrants from Vietnam (Table 2.6).
The majority of immigrants from China who participated in the study
are also traders at the Kyiv markets or hired employees in the food serv-
ice or food processing industries.
Among the most “eclectic” group of immigrants—those from Middle
Eastern countries—are quite a few very successful businessmen, mostly
citizens of Turkey, who are actively engaged in business with the help of
their partners-compatriots in Turkey and other countries. These are
mostly Kurds by nationality. Some Kurdish immigrants, however, who
Employment
status
Private
entrepreneur’s
permit
Trading
license
Taxpayer
code (for
those who do
not have
other
documents)
None of
the listed
documents Total
Hired
employee 8.4 33.3 33.3 25.0 100
Private
entrepreneur
or self-
employed
34.2 56.0 2.4 2.4 100
Unemployed - - - 100.0 100
All Respondents 31.4 50.0 9.3 9.3 100
TABLE 2.6 Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants from
Vietnam Based on Employment Status and Documents
for Entrepreneurial Activities, in % (N=54)
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have no permits to reside in Ukraine can neither obtain employment
nor engage in trading at the markets. Occasionally they work in compa-
nies owned by their countrymen, for the most part illegally.This oppor-
tunity is offered to some only as a form of assistance. In other cases, they
live on sporadic earnings by working in places where no one asks for
documents, e.g., at the vegetable warehouses of Kyiv, where they are
happy to hire additional seasonal workers to do the hardest and dirtiest
jobs for very low wages.
As noted earlier, the most acute problem affecting Africans is employ-
ment. Income gained, e.g., from retail sales at the city markets is typical for
Afghans,Vietnamese, and Pakistanis, but not for them. According to the
respondents, even though Africans were the first traders to appear at the
Sviatoshynsky market, when it was just in its inchoate, rudimentary stage,
they were later squeezed out. As a result, there were only three traders
among the surveyed Africans. Two of them were working as hired
employees of Afghan traders, and only one had his own market stall.
In general, only 20% of economically active African immigrants have
permanent employment. Besides the above-mentioned traders, these are
individuals working for NGOs (e.g, the UNHCR Reception Center),
branches of foreign companies, a sports club (professional athlete), and in
private manufacturing companies. The majority of Africans are unem-
ployed. It is difficult to find a job even for those of them who have high
qualifications and are fluent in several languages. The main obstacle to
employment is the lack of legal status. All Africans who do not have any
documents are unemployed, as are 95% of those who have only forms
from the UNHCR.Although the level of unemployment among official-
ly recognized refugees is high, it is much smaller than among refugees
without documents at 62%. Meanwhile, the majority (90%) of those who
have jobs have documents authorizing them to reside in Ukraine.
In summarizing the survey questions concerning employment and
immigrants’ sources of income in Kyiv, it should be noted that immigrants
are now a component of the economic system in the city: they are pro-
ducers of goods, providers of services, taxpayers, and employers who cre-
ate jobs, including jobs for Ukrainian citizens.They play a certain role in
supplying goods and services for the consumer market, and thanks to their
connections, they are contributing to the development of business rela-
tions between Ukraine and their countries of origin, as well as the distri-
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bution of goods and services not available earlier in Ukraine, e.g, Chinese
or Vietnamese cuisine, and economic know-how.
At the same time, the work and intellectual potential of immigrants are
not being fully exploited, primarily of those who have a high level of edu-
cation and qualifications, and who could be of greater benefit to
Ukrainian society by applying their knowledge that was acquired, in point
of fact, in Ukrainian institutions of higher learning. Notwithstanding cer-
tain positive changes of the last few years, immigrants’ employment and
work activity are taking place to a significant degree in the “shadow”
economy. Finally, unemployment and bleak prospects for job-hunting
among some immigrants are damaging to the individual and dangerous to
society, since they lead to the marginalization of immigrants, and create
fertile conditions for the spread of criminality.
INCOME LEVELS AND POVERTY
For 60% of economically active immigrants who participated in the
survey, the main source of income is commerce and entrepreneurship.
Over 15% work as hired workers. For 12.2% of respondents, the main
source of income is assistance provided by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Another 5% of those who
indicated other main sources of income, including commerce, said that
they receive assistance from the UNHCR and regard it as an addition-
al source of income.
At the time of this survey, UNHCR assistance was being issued to
refugees registered with the UNHCR Office in Kyiv and to their fam-
ily members in the amount of 30 and 20 dollars per month, respective-
ly. In one-parent families, aid for children was somewhat higher.
Additional aid was also being issued to immigrants suffering from tuber-
culosis—for medication and better nutrition. Most Africans, but not all,
receive this kind of assistance—only those who are considered refugees
from politically unstable countries with ongoing military conflicts. Since
the majority of African immigrants are unemployed, this assistance is
actually their main source of income. This is also the case for some
Afghans, mostly families with many children and single-parent families,
sick people, and the disabled. Meanwhile, not a single member of the
Kurdish community has received UNHCR aid, even though some
Kurds are recognized refugees.
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Respondents who have no stable job listed occasional earnings (5.5%)
among other sources of income. Help from families, relatives, and acquain-
tances, or their own savings,was cited by 6.3% of respondents.This is most-
ly assistance from family members in Ukraine, including Ukrainian wives
or their families, and to a lesser degree from relatives abroad; there are a few
such cases.The surveyed immigrants never received any kind of social assis-
tance from the state. Even those who according to Ukrainian law are enti-
tled to a pension—i.e., people who are permanent residents of Ukraine
and refugees—encounter serious difficulties when filing their applications
because they are unable to provide all the necessary documentation.
A proportion of immigrants, primarily socially vulnerable categories, i.e.,
families with children or disabled family members, one-parent families, and
those without stable income, were receiving non-monetary income in the
form of humanitarian aid—food (flour, cooking oil, sugar, etc.), second-
hand clothing, medicine, and children’s vitamins. Humanitarian aid is
named as a source of additional income by over 10% of immigrants.This
kind of aid was being provided by the UNHCR Office and some religious
communities (Baptist, Catholic, and the “Victory” church).
The Ukrainian Red Cross Society provides assistance to refugees and
asylum seekers. Approximately 10% of its humanitarian programs were
being allocated to this type of assistance. In particular, the Red Cross in
Kyiv was distributing hot food to needy migrants and refugees in districts
with dense immigrant populations, and providing food packages once
every two months: two kilograms of rice, a liter of cooking oil, one pack-
age of macaroni, and one kilogram of sugar. Financing of these programs
was provided by sponsors’ donations with no government intervention.
Nearly 400 individuals were receiving assistance. At the time of this sur-
vey there was also a program to assist refugees, asylum seekers, and indi-
viduals suffering from tuberculosis.The program entailed the distribution
of food, hygiene products, and medicine. Seventy-five immigrants in the
survey were receiving this type of assistance. Africans predominated
among recipients of various types of non-monetary assistance.
The questionnaires used in this survey did not include direct questions
about amount of monetary income, in view of the fact that people usual-
ly prefer not to reveal this kind of information. Fifty-four percent of the
economically active immigrants who took part in the survey, or 138 indi-
viduals, agreed to provide their income amount. The majority of those
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who were more willing to discuss this issue were immigrants from
Vietnam, which may be explained by the fact that they feel secure about
their status, since, as a rule, they have all the necessary documents to live
and work in Ukraine. Immigrants from Africa who are recipients of
UNHCR monetary assistance were also open about reporting their
income, since amounts and payment schedules are clearly defined.
There was a huge difference between immigrants’ minimum and maxi-
mum incomes. There are also significant differences in the amount of
income among immigrants from different countries of origin.The highest
median income with the smallest difference between minimum and maxi-
mum income was recorded among immigrants from China.The income of
Vietnamese immigrants is rather sizeable. Meanwhile, the median income
of Afghans is significantly lower, with Africans’ income being the lowest.
The highest median income of economically active migrants living in
Ukraine working on contract is 3,200 hryvnias per month. In second place
are holders of business visas or registration documents, and those with per-
mits to reside in Ukraine—1,900 hryvnias. Immigrants who have only
UNHCR forms have the lowest median income—400 hryvnias. Income is
somewhat higher among those with refugee documents—700 hryvnias.
TABLE 2.7 Distribution of Economically Active Immigrants Based
on Country of Origin and Amount of Monthly Income,
in hryvnias (N=138)
Country of origin
Minimum
income
Maximum
income
Average
income
Afghanistan 300.0 2,400.0 864.3
African countries 160.0 1,300.0 439.4
China 1,000.0 3,500.0 2,875. 0
India and Pakistan 500.0 3,500.0 1,612.5
Middle
East countries 250.0 5,300.0 1,931. 3
Vietnam 800.0 4,000.0 2,141.3
All Respondents 160.0 5,300.0 1,271.7
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In the distribution of median income based on employment status,
the highest was among entrepreneurs—2,100 hryvnias. The median
income among traders was 1,400 hryvnias; among the unemployed, 430
hryvnias. In the distribution of immigrants based on country of origin,
the highest incomes were noted among groups that included a larger
number of entrepreneurs, businessmen, and individuals with residence
permits and business visas.
Market trading is the primary and most widespread type of employ-
ment among all immigrants, and especially those from Afghanistan and
Pakistan. In the majority of cases, market trading generates an income of
501-1,000 hryvnias. Earnings that are neither too low nor very high are
not typical for this group.The largest incomes are connected with “com-
bined” employment, which is widespread among immigrants from China
and Vietnam who are engaged in entrepreneurial activity and other high-
ly paid hired work (mostly in companies owned by their countrymen).
Here the incomes of the majority of respondents fluctuate between 1,000
and 5,000 hryvnias. In the third type of employment, where income is
generated by occasional work and humanitarian aid (typical for immi-
grants from African countries), incomes are the smallest and for the major-
ity of respondents total less than 250 hryvnias per month. Finally, immi-
grants from Middle East countries, who are the most eclectic group in
terms of migration motives and legal statuses, also turned out to be the
most diverse with regard to income levels.
Taking into account the small number of answers and the respondents’
low level of candidness, data on the amount of their earnings may be
regarded as somewhat provisional. However, they have been verified by
information from other sources, particularly from the expert survey and
from Ukrainian citizens who were also working at the market and agreed
to tell the interviewers about their work.
Without a doubt, the real well-being of immigrants depends not only
on the level of monetary income but also household size. For that reason,
data on the average per capita income in families of respondents appear to
be more revealing.The average per capita incomes of nearly 10% of immi-
grants and their family members in the city of Kyiv are below the official
poverty line of 118.3 hryvnias per month, which was introduced by law
at the time of the survey.The incomes of 52% of members of immigrant
households were lower than the minimum wage, i.e., 311.3 hryvnias per
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month at the time of the survey. If we agree with researchers who con-
sider that the real poverty line in Kyiv is 175 hryvnias per person per
month,54 then nearly 34% of members of immigrant households are liv-
ing below this level. Meanwhile, the average per capita income of 48% of
members of immigrant households was higher than the minimum wage,
while for some it was significantly higher.
Members of Afghan households (11.6%) and practically one in every five
members of African families were living below the official poverty line;
there were no immigrants from other countries and regions with incomes
below this level.Three-quarters of Afghan households had incomes below
the minimum wage. In African households this figure reached 83%.
Differentiation of level of income results from both the legal status
and employment of immigrants, and the number of dependents per
working member.Thus, one-third of immigrant families with six-seven
members had an average per capita income below the official poverty
line. Average per capita income exceeding the minimum wage was not
recorded in such families. Meanwhile, there were no families consisting
of one or two members with an average per capita income below the
official poverty line.Two-thirds of such families had an average per capi-
ta income above the minimum wage.
Well-being depends both on income size and amount of expenses.The
fact that an overwhelming majority of immigrants, as opposed to indige-
nous Kyivans, do not own homes and are forced to rent apartments must
be taken into account when analyzing their level of well-being.The only
exceptions are those who are married to Ukrainian citizens who have
their own homes, and those who are living with their families.According
to the survey data, 11% of respondents paid only utility bills; others (89%)
also had to pay rent on their apartments. Rent is a significant expense and
leaves immigrants with less money to spend on everyday needs.
Thus, immigrants’ assessments of their families’ level of material well-
being were rather low. Only 2.7% of the principal respondents, i.e., rep-
resentatives of households (incl. those consisting of only one individual)
who provided responses to the survey questions, said that their level was
problem-free.At the same time, nearly 20% considered that their families
were living below the poverty level.
Relative to income amount, ratings of material circumstances markedly
differed according to immigrants’ countries of origin.The lowest ratings are
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given by Africans; Afghans also gave low ratings. The overwhelming
majority of immigrants from Vietnam and China gave high ratings of their
material situation in Ukraine.
Although rent comprises a significant portion of immigrants’ house-
hold expenses, the main expense is food, just as in Kyivan residents’
households. Immigrants from Vietnam have the best diet. According to
our observations, they spend a significant portion of their income on
food, which is a priority for them, compared to other family needs.
Ratings of nutrition by the group of Chinese immigrants, who have
approximately the same income as the Vietnamese, are comparatively
lower than the latter group’s.A possible explanation for this is that more
Chinese families are single individuals and those without children who
are intent on saving money during their stay in Ukraine to subsidize
their further move to the West.
A rather high level of satisfaction with quality of nutrition is observed
among immigrants from India, Middle Eastern countries, and Pakistan.
More than 70% of Afghans and over 80% of Africans consider their diet
to be modest or even inadequate.The majority of Afghan immigrants are
forced to economize on food. Some Afghan families, mostly those with-
out breadwinners, only consume food that is provided through the
humanitarian aid of the UNHCR and other organizations.
The nutrition situation among Africans is even worse. Forty-eight per-
cent said that they are undernourished. For the most part, their children
eat meat only in pre-schools. Often there is no milk at home for children,
who drink sweetened tea. Only 19% of African households have dairy
products as part of their daily diet. Over 40% never consume them. As a
result of malnutrition and the lack of foods crucial to children’s physical
development, children in African families frequently suffer from lym-
phomatosis, dystrophy, and bad teeth owing to the lack of calcium in their
bodies, which stems from the absence of dairy products in their diet.
It would appear that African immigrants’ extremely low ratings of
their families’ diets are not unjustified. As noted earlier, the majority of
African immigrants survive on aid provided by the UNHCR, which
amounts to 20–30 US dollars. Most of this money is used for rent, with
hardly any left over for food.
Similar to diet, respondents gave diverse ratings of the quality of cloth-
ing of their family members. As could be predicted, the highest ratings
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were given by immigrants from Pakistan and Vietnam.The worst situation
is noted among Afghans and Africans (Table 2.9).
ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES
Immigrants hardly ever avail themselves of public or cultural services.
Over 60% of the primary respondents said that neither they nor members
of their families go to movie theatres, performing arts theatres, exhibi-
tions, libraries, or social services. Only school-aged children visit cultural
institutions during organized field trips, and only in those cases where
their parents are able to provide money for such excursions, or if they are
free of charge.The only service establishments that immigrants frequent
are beauty salons and barber shops. Immigrants avail themselves of food
services somewhat more frequently, but only those who have a more or
less decent income.
One important factor affecting the level of well-being is access to
health care.According to the survey data, the majority of immigrant fam-
ily members who participated in the study requested medical assistance
during their stay in Kyiv; practically everyone obtained it. Less that 2% of
immigrants were denied such services. At the same time, immigrants
believe that access to medical services for foreigners in Kyiv is noticeably
more restricted than for Kyiv residents.
According to the survey data, nearly 60% of respondents and members
of their families visited municipal health clinics in their neighborhoods.
However, free medical care was provided only in two-thirds of these cases.
Respondents stated that maternity units and children’s clinics do not deny
services even when the parents of a child have no documents.According
to information reported during the study, more than 90% of medical serv-
ices for infants were provided free of charge; the same applied to 60% of
new mothers. In general, respondents were most satisfied with medical
services for children.
The private medical sector in Kyiv is still not well-developed, and very
expensive. As a result, respondents generally obtain medical services
requiring payment in ordinary medical clinics or offices through friends
and acquaintances, including those who work in such establishments.
Foreigners who have children and avail themselves of services offered by
children’s medical centers often try to resolve problems affecting adult
family members with the assistance of pediatricians—for an additional fee.
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Thirty percent of immigrants paid for medical services; nearly 70% of
Pakistanis paid for medical services, as did 50% of immigrants from
Middle Eastern countries, and 40% of Vietnamese.
Given that most medical services require payment, access to medical
help is quite restricted to a certain proportion of immigrants, primarily
refugees and asylum seekers who do not have documents issued by the
government, nor funds to pay for private medical care. The UNHCR
Office in Ukraine provides some assistance in resolving this problem.
Pursuant to the agreement signed between this organization and the
departmental hospital for oil and gas industry employees in Ukraine,
beginning in 1995 immigrants have been receiving medical assistance
based on a referral from the UNHCR Reception Center. In 2001 alone
nearly 3,000 refugees and asylum seekers visited this hospital. Emergency
intervention and treatment in specialized clinics are financed, whenever
necessary. Children are vaccinated against diphtheria. Within the frame-
work of “Women’s Health” program, clinical examinations of refugee
women are provided by the Kyiv Gynecological Center. Respondents and
members of their families obtained medical assistance paid by charitable
organizations in 13% of all cases.These were individuals who would oth-
erwise be entirely deprived of access to medical care.
Another possible way for immigrants to obtain medical services, like
most public services, turned out to be visits to “their own” doctors, who
at the present time are generally engaged in trading at the market. For
example, the Afghani community has its own male doctor and female
doctor, the latter treating women.The doctor “receives” his or her patients
at the bazaar stall, where s/he prescribes medication, gives massages, and
receives payment.The patients are satisfied.There is no need to waste time
and money searching for medical assistance. “Their own” doctor has a
good grasp of their problems and can always provide help, if not through
treatment, then at least with advice. Nevertheless, in more complicated
medical cases this kind of care would not be sufficient.
HOUSING
Information collected during the study revealed that although immi-
grants’ income on average is somewhat higher than that of Kyiv residents,
their access to many consumer goods and services, including essential
ones, such as education and medical services, is limited. However, this
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conclusion is true only for a certain proportion of surveyed immigrants,
since property diversification and, correspondingly, the difference in con-
sumption within their milieu is a rather pronounced phenomenon.
Our data shows that immigrants in the city of Kyiv live mostly in stan-
dard, multi-family apartment buildings equipped with standard conven-
iences. Over 80% of households live in apartments with telephone serv-
ice.Today, the overwhelming majority of immigrants rent units from res-
idents who live in the city of Kyiv or the suburbs.This accounts for near-
ly 70% of all immigrants. Of this number, 55% rent apartments, 15% rent
rooms or “corners” of rooms, i.e., they share a room with the landlords of
the apartment (Table 2.10).
No one has government housing; 8.7% of households live in dormito-
ries.These are either former students who by agreement with dormitory
administrations continue to avail themselves of this type of housing; indi-
viduals who are married to Ukrainian citizens and were provided with
dormitory accommodations through their jobs; or foreign workers, most-
ly Chinese, whose employers have provided housing dormitories.Thirty-
three respondents (14.3%) live in housing owned by their Ukrainian wives.
Only 3%, mostly Afghanis, continue to live with relatives.
According to respondents, 3.9%, or nine individuals, purchased housing
with their own money earned in Ukraine.These are citizens of Vietnam and
countries of the Middle East, two Afghans, and one Pakistani. Six of these
individuals are businessmen; the others are highly paid employees of private
companies. However, the purchased apartments are quite modest: two are
one-room apartments, six have two rooms, and only one has three rooms.
Finally, two of the respondents turned out to be individuals without a
designated place of residence: one is a disabled war veteran whose
Ukrainian citizen wife left him and disappeared, and the other is a bank-
rupt Indian trader.
Immigrants’ housing accommodations are small. Only a few house-
holds live in two- or three-room apartments: 23.5% and 7%, respectively.
Ukrainian-born wives of immigrants own one in every five two-room
apartments and half of three-room apartments. Sixty-eight percent of
apartments rented by immigrants from local residents are one-room apart-
ments. Only 27% are two-room apartments, and nearly 6% are three-
room apartments. Almost all renters of three-room apartments are entre-
preneurs and employees of private companies.
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The largest group of immigrant households, even households with rather
large families, lives in one-room apartments or rooms rented out in larger
apartments. Nearly 45% of surveyed households live in one room. One out
of every four immigrant households has less than one room because the
family shares a room with other households. Most of these (93%) are single
people (half of unmarried respondents share a room with other tenants),
although this figure also includes families. In some cases, immigrants share a
room with their landlords—mostly elderly pensioners who rent space for a
paltry sum of money in exchange for some assistance from their tenants.
Immigrants who rent apartments from private citizens pay both utility
bills—electricity and telephone—and rent. In general, rent paid by
respondents at the time of this survey was higher, and occasionally signif-
icantly higher, than rent paid by local residents for similar apartments.The
owners of these apartments are often pensioners, unemployed people, sin-
gle mothers, and individuals suffering from alcoholism, i.e., people whose
apartments serve as their main source of income.
In order to reduce their housing expenditures, immigrants were living
rather compactly, renting one-room apartments for families of four to six
people. Single people share housing, two or three per room, or small, one-
room hotel-type apartments.There are cases of several unrelated families
living together. In the words of one female respondent, the housing prob-
lem is the chief worry of immigrant families and the main reason behind
the attempts of foreigners, particularly refugees, to move to Western coun-
tries.Any reduction in wages or unforeseen expenditures, such as illness in
the family, can result in homelessness for the household.
As stated earlier, some interviews were conducted at the respondents’
residences, and interviewers were able to see for themselves the kinds of
apartments that are rented to immigrants.These apartments are usually in
poor condition and require renovations. Forty percent of these apartments
are located on the first or top floors of buildings. Regardless of the fact
that apartments occupied by immigrants are generally in poor condition,
they rarely renovate them because of financial problems and the fact that
they are not sure how long they will stay.At the same time, according to
respondents’ answers, one in every four has made some changes or has
renovated their housing.
Most often immigrants have reinforced doors or installed bars on
their windows.This was done by 12% of surveyed households. It so hap-
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pens that apartments rented to immigrants are often targets of burglary
attempts. On the one hand, this phenomenon may be explained by a
stereotype dating back to the old days, when many average citizens asso-
ciated the word “foreigner” with “rich.” On the other hand, immigrants’
apartments also attract burglars because their occupants belong to the
most vulnerable segment of society. In the event of a burglary, they
could not even go to the police because they have problems with doc-
uments authorizing their stay in Ukraine.
Immigrants rent apartments equipped with furniture, some kitchen-
ware and bed linens, televisions, refrigerators, etc.Thus, landlords who
rent apartments to immigrants own 80% of refrigerators, 43.2% of tel-
evisions, and 39% of washing machines. Immigrants only own such
consumer items as videocassette recorders (82.4%), cassette recorders
(83%), and radios (43%). Sixteen percent of immigrants own cellular
telephones. Immigrants from Vietnam own one in every four cellular
phone, with the same number from Pakistan. Only eight individuals
(3%) own a satellite antenna; these are citizens of Vietnam and Middle
Eastern countries. Respondents who own computers (6%) also come
from these countries.
Only 9% of respondents had cars.Two-thirds of these cars belonged
to immigrants from Vietnam, Middle Eastern countries, and Afghanistan.
Most car owners are businessmen who also used their car on trips to
bring goods from cities like Odesa.
Another important question is the residential distribution of immi-
grants in Kyiv city districts. The press, and even municipal administra-
tors, have occasionally alarmed Kyiv residents by pointing out the dan-
ger of creating ethnic housing projects, i.e., places with compact immi-
grant populations along the lines of the “Chinatowns” and “black” dis-
tricts in large American cities. Leaving aside the question of the danger
level posed by such housing estates, we will focus on whether they actu-
ally exist or are developing in the capital of Ukraine.
Data gathered during this survey, statistical facts, and experts’ opinions
indicate that the issue of ethnic housing projects is a non-starter. First of
all, the number of immigrants from Asian and African countries in Kyiv
is small and does not have a noticeable impact on its ethnic profile.
Secondly, there are no areas with compact foreign populations in the
city, except in dormitories for foreign students.
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Surveyed immigrant households are distributed throughout the city
(Table 2.11).The only areas in the city with no immigrants are the cen-
tral districts. On the contrary, the majority live in newly built, high-rise
“bedroom” communities.
Thus, settlement by residential area is more or less equal.The only dis-
trict that stands out is Troieshchyna, where one-third of surveyed immi-
grant households were living at the time of the survey.This district is the
main residential area of Afghan respondents (66%), and Pakistanis (nearly
41%), i.e., those groups of immigrants whose primary activity is trading at
the market.The fact that they reside in Troieshchyna is obviously linked to
the location of the largest traders’ market in Kyiv, where most immigrants
work.This is also the reason behind immigrant settlement in other districts,
where other large traders’ markets are located, e.g., Borshchahivka,
Sviatoshyn, or Darnytsia.A juxtaposition of the residential area and work-
ing district indicates that over 75% of those working in Troieshchyna also
reside there. Everyone who works in Borshchahivka also lives there.
Certain city districts have a denser immigrant population, owing to the
presence of college and university dormitories where some immigrants
had lived during their studies. These are the districts of Demiivka
(Studmistechko, Chokolivka), Solomianka, and Vidradny. For Vietnamese
immigrants, habitation in the districts of Nyvky and Shuliavka is also tra-
ditional, since this district has workers’ dormitories, where their compa-
triots lived when they came to work in Soviet Kyiv.The higher concen-
tration of African immigrants in Nyvky and Vynohradar is explained by
the proximity of the UNHCR Reception Center, to which they system-
atically apply for assistance.
Besides distance from the city center, those districts where respondents
reside share one common trait: the prevalence of cheaper apartment
buildings.These are districts that in the last decade, with the development
of a real estate market in the city, have been transformed into areas of
“compact” habitation of Kyiv residents with lower incomes, many of
whom are trying to pad their budgets by renting to tenants. Cheap hous-
ing is a defining factor in the selection of residential areas by immigrants.
In examining the distribution of immigrant settlement in Kyiv within
the context of a possible formation of “ethnic” housing projects, we
should keep in mind that the Troieshchyna housing estate is the largest in
the city, with at least 300,000 residents.Troieshchyna has a larger popula-
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tion than some oblast capitals of Ukraine.Therefore, even if all the immi-
grant households surveyed in this study lived in this district, they would
still only account for an insignificant part of the population, and in no way
could immigrants change its ethnic composition.
Thus, even though the areas of immigrant habitation in the city of Kyiv
share certain common characteristics—specifically remote districts with
new high-rises located near large traders’ markets—compact immigrant
housing projects have not been established.
ACCESS TO EDUCATION
Seventy-seven school-aged children (between 7 and 17 years old) were
living in 233 of the immigrant households surveyed in this study. Of these,
41.6% were born in Ukraine. But only 23.4% of the total number had a
right to Ukrainian citizenship by birth.These are children of mixed mar-
riages who have a Ukrainian-born mother. Ninety percent of surveyed
children were under sixteen. In most cases, the father or both parents had
emigrated from Afghanistan (57.1%). The rest were members of immi-
grant households from Vietnam (24.7%), African countries (9.1%), China
(3.9%), India and Pakistan (2.6%), and Middle Eastern countries (2.6%).
In accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine (Article 53), everyone
has the right to an education, and a complete secondary education is
mandatory in the state. Secure access to education and a full tuition-free
secondary education in state and public secondary educational institutions
are the responsibility of the Ukrainian government.55 Accessibility and
equality of educational conditions are the basic principles of education in
Ukraine.56 Foreigners who reside permanently in the country and indi-
viduals with refugee status in Ukraine have the same right to an educa-
tion as Ukrainian citizens,57 i.e., on the legislative level children of immi-
grants and Ukrainian citizens have equal rights to a complete secondary
education.The list of documents required to register a child in school is
also identical both for citizens of Ukraine, and immigrants and foreigners
who live in the country temporarily.
However, equality of conditions governing access to education on the
legislative level is hardly ever implemented in practice. Our research showed
that a host of problems arise connected with the material status of immigrant
families, their legal status, the difference in educational systems, and the par-
ticularities of national psychology, customs, and traditions in immigrants’
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home countries and in Ukraine. In addition, inadequate knowledge of the
language of instruction in schools causes problems for immigrant children.
The survey revealed that only 72% of immigrant households with
school-aged children send their children to school. For a variety of rea-
sons, 19.5% of school-aged children who live in 28% of households can-
not enjoy their legal right to attend school.
Since questions pertaining to the integration of immigrants into
Ukrainian society, as opposed to Western European countries and the
USA, are still not common currency throughout Ukraine, state policy in
the sphere of education does not yet envision any special approaches for
addressing questions related to the schooling of immigrant children.
Immigrant children who attend schools study with children of Ukrainian
citizens and follow the same program of instruction.Thus far, no special
strategies or Ukrainian-language courses have been created for immi-
grants’ children, which would help them to speak and understand the
language of instruction in schools.
The dominant language of children living in immigrant households was
Russian. Over 97% speak it fluently. Ninety-one percent of children speak
the native language of their immigrant parents, and 68.7% know Ukrainian.
Only a few children experience difficulties with learning or speaking the
new language.The parents of 25% of children from Afghan families indicat-
ed such difficulties, and 5.9% of children in Vietnamese households.
Language use at home varies: 86% of children speak their parents’
native language, 31% speak Russian, and 8% speak Ukrainian. For com-
municating with their friends, immigrant children use either Russian or
their native language, but for 20% of them that language is Ukrainian.
Among those who use Ukrainian in the family home were children from
India and Pakistan (50%), Afghan households (9.3%), and Vietnamese
households (5.9%). Children of immigrants from India and Pakistan
(100%), Middle East countries (100%), Afghanistan (18.6%), and Vietnam
(17.6%) used Ukrainian to communicate with friends.
The trend toward significantly more frequent Russian-language than
Ukrainian-language usage has no impact on the selection of a child’s
school. More children attend Ukrainian than Russian schools (58% and
42%, respectively).With the exception of Afghans, the majority of immi-
grants send their children to Ukrainian schools. In most cases, children
from Afghan households attend Russian schools (64.3%).
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As a rule, children who attend Ukrainian schools are able to speak the
Ukrainian and Russian languages fluently or adequately. More than one-
half of children who attend Russian schools speak fluent or satisfactory
Ukrainian, according to their parents.
The majority of school-aged children were attending schools located
within their residential districts. In the case of nearly one-half of school-
children, parental selection of school is predicated on the quality of
instruction and geographic proximity to their homes.This applies partic-
ularly to children who attend Ukrainian schools.The parents of 65.5% of
children chose a school based on location and quality of instruction. Only
18.8% chose a school out of necessity to know Ukrainian in the future.
The various reasons for selecting Russian-language schools are
somewhat more complicated. For 39% of children the school was cho-
sen because of the parents’ better knowledge of Russian. Nearly 22%
stated that the decisive factor was quality of instruction and location;
17% said that their pre-school children had a better knowledge of
Russian; and the parents of 13% of children stated that there is a greater
need to know Russian today.
As a rule, families who came to Ukraine before 1994 usually sent their
children to Ukrainian schools. Among those who arrived in 1995–1998,
81% sent their children to Russian schools. Obviously, this is connected to
the fact that the majority of Afghan children (72% of the total number of
Afghan children) arrived in Ukraine in this very period. Children who
were born in Ukraine attended mostly Ukrainian schools (85.6%).
Of the surveyed children, 76.4% are registered in age-appropriate
grades; 21.8% are in grades with children who are younger than them.
Our study revealed that most children are in lower grades not because
of insufficient linguistic knowledge: 58% of them are fluent in
Ukrainian or speak it adequately, and 67% are fluent in Russian or have
an adequate grasp of this language. The main reason is an inadequate
level of prior school preparedness.
In response to a question concerning immigrant children’s level of
knowledge compared to that of their classmates, a significant majority of
parents said that it is the same or higher than that of their classmates.
Sixty-five percent said that their children receive the same grades as their
classmates, while 31% said that their children were among the best in their
class. A certain number of parent-respondents stated proudly that on a
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number of occasions they had received awards from the school adminis-
tration in tribute to their children’ studies and upbringing.
As a rule, school-aged children of mixed marriages between immi-
grants and female citizens of Ukraine (23.4% of the total number of
schoolchildren in immigrant households) do not have any language prob-
lems at school: they are in classes with their peers and do not experience
any psychological discomfort. Somewhat more complicated is the situa-
tion of schoolchildren whose two parents are immigrants (76.6%). In
many cases such children have language problems, and their level of pre-
paredness, resulting from differences between the educational systems in
their countries of origin and Ukraine, is much lower than their class-
mates’. Some children, regardless of age, particularly a certain number of
those whose parents are from Afghanistan, never attended school in their
homeland before coming to Kyiv because of the civil war and the gener-
al deterioration in the country; they began attending school for the first
time only in Kyiv.
The survey showed that, on the whole, immigrant parents maintain
regular contact with their children’s schools. Only 4% of respondents said
they did not have such contact. For the most part, contact is made at par-
ent-teacher meetings and by parents doing some kind of volunteer work
at the school (cleaning, repairing equipment, construction work); this is
standard practice in Kyiv, and generally throughout Ukraine.
The Kyiv municipal administration provides a whole range of services
to schoolchildren from poor families, including subsidized school break-
fasts, lunches, and free textbooks. Children from immigrant families are no
exception. Our analysis of the material well-being of households with
schoolchildren who receive assistance from the municipal administration
shows that it is targeted at the most needy. Families in dire straits or fam-
ilies who live below the poverty level receive both food and textbooks.
The majority of these recipients consider themselves as belonging to the
category of people “with a difficult economic situation.” Afghan immi-
grant households most frequently receive state support in the form of free
meals and textbooks.
At the same time, 62.5% of children from homes in which the house-
hold heads believe that they are living below the poverty level, and 43.5%
of children from households with a difficult economic situation, have
never received any support.
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As stated earlier, children from 28% of surveyed immigrant households
do not attend schools for various reasons. To a significant extent this
depends on the character of the family in which they were born and are
being raised. Practically all children who live in households of immigrants
from Asian and African countries, who are married to female citizens of
Ukraine, attend school, while non-attendance is typical for children from
households where both parents are immigrants (Table 2.12).
We observed a definite correlation between the legal status of immi-
grants and their children’s school attendance or non-attendance (Table
2.13). There is 100% school attendance of children from immigrant
households with residence permits (without exception, all are married to
female Ukrainian citizens) and work contracts, i.e., individuals who have
national passports or documents issued to stateless people. Those who
attend school least often are children from households of officially recog-
nized refugees in Ukraine, immigrants who have refugee cards, and asy-
lum seekers, who are under international protection and only have a
UNHCR form—individuals who belong to the most vulnerable cate-
gories of immigrants who, as noted earlier, most often experience prob-
lems with employment, housing, and registration by place of residence.
School attendance or non-attendance of children from immigrant
households depends to a certain extent on immigrants’ countries of origin,
their economic well-being, and the particularities of national psychology,
customs, and traditions. One hundred percent attendance is noted among
children from immigrant households from China and Middle Eastern
countries. The lowest attendance is observed among children from
Afghanistan (52%).As the main reason for this, heads of Afghan households
most frequently cited a difficult economic situation, as a result of which
children are also forced to work to help feed their families. In addition, it is
quite expensive to outfit a child for school. On average, the cost (according
to the lowest estimates) of clothing, shoes, and school supplies for one
schoolchild is 425–500 hryvnias ($80–90).58 The study revealed that it is
mostly older school-aged children from Afghan households who do not
attend schools, whereas all younger children attend school.
Some heads of Afghan households believe that schooling for girls is not
obligatory, and for that reason their daughters were not attending school.
Meanwhile, in other Afghani households, only girls were attending school.
In cases where not all school-aged children in a family are able to attend
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school, their parents must choose whom to send to school. Most often
they choose a little girl, since according to custom, she cannot support the
family by working in the market, as her brothers do.
Some heads of Afghan households explained their school-aged chil-
dren’s non-attendance by citing the lack of documents authorizing the
right to reside in Ukraine and Kyiv. However, as the survey of officials
from raion Departments of Education in the city of Kyiv and municipal
school administrations indicated, the lack of documents authorizing resi-
dence and registration in passport, registration, and migration service
agencies cannot be a reason for refusing to admit a child to school.
In complicated cases involving parents who have refugee status in
Ukraine or are seeking asylum and are under international protection,
assistance with processing documents for school admission is provided by
the Social Center for Refugee Women and Children at the UNHCR
Office in Ukraine. In particular, this center organizes centralized medical
exams for children, who are supposed to go to school, at the hospital for
oil and gas industry workers of Ukraine; these exams include laboratory
tests for various infections (AIDS, hepatitis, etc.). In addition, workers at
the center establish contact with administrations of schools that children
of refugees and asylum seekers (who have no birth certificates but are list-
ed in their parents’ identification cards) are slated to attend.They also pro-
vide, free of charge, school uniforms for poor families with many children,
and organize language courses for prospective schoolchildren who have a
poor knowledge of Ukrainian or Russian.
Another reason for non-attendance of schools by children from Afghan
households is insufficient schooling prior to their arrival in Ukraine.This
applies primarily to teenagers, some of whom had never attended school.
They did not start school in Afghanistan because they were still too young,
and later their parents were forced to flee the country.After arriving in Kyiv,
they did not attend school either,mainly because they did not speak the lan-
guage, and because their families needed them to work in order to survive.
Now that they are 14-16 years old, they no longer want to go to school,
since they would have to be in the same class with young children.
Despite the fact that all children from African immigrants’ households
were born in Ukraine, they are not attending school because of their low
level of preschool preparedness.Their parents assured us that if this situa-
tion were to change, their children would go to school the following year.
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Some heads of immigrant households from Afghanistan,Vietnam, and
Pakistan, whose children had reached school age at the time of the study
but did not enter first grade, explained that they were planning to send
their children to study in their homeland in the very near future (Pakistan,
Vietnam) or to other countries (Afghanistan).
During the survey we discovered a distinct correlation between future
migration intentions of heads of surveyed households and their children’s
school attendance or non-attendance (Table 2.14).The lowest percentage
of children’s school attendance is recorded among those household heads
who are definitely or very likely planning to leave Ukraine and Kyiv some
time in the future, while the highest is recorded among those households
that are not planning any further migration—for them, Ukraine is their
country of destination.Therefore, immigrant children’s school non-atten-
dance, regardless of the objective economic, psychological, and language
problems that they are actually facing, clearly attests to the further migra-
tion plans of their parents.
The results of our study indicate that the majority of immigrants’ chil-
dren in Kyiv are being integrated into Ukraine’s school system, and the
markers of their academic success are no worse than those of local chil-
dren. The majority of immigrant parents cooperate with the schools by
participating in teacher-parent conferences and volunteering various
kinds of assistance. It is important to note that more immigrant children
attend Ukrainian schools than Russian ones (especially from those fami-
lies who have lived in Kyiv for more than seven years, as well as those
whose children were born in Ukraine).This is additional proof of the suc-
cessful integration of some immigrants into Ukrainian society.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of our study show that the living conditions of immigrants
from Asian and African countries in Kyiv depend first and foremost on
their legal status in Ukraine.The existence of indispensable documents and
permits affects all aspects of life, and the ability to realize one’s fundamen-
tal human rights, including employment, education, and medical assistance.
The study revealed that surveyed immigrants had various grounds for
residing in Ukraine. More than one-third of immigrants 18 years or older
are legal refugees. Nearly one-third lives in Kyiv with a visa or registra-
tion based on business activities, work contracts, or student status. One in
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every five respondents does not have any official documents authorizing res-
idence in Ukraine.
The study results confirm that even immigrants who have all the neces-
sary documents for residence in Ukraine often fall into the category of vio-
lators of residence regulations, owing to their inability for whatever reason to
obtain registration in the organs of Internal Affairs.This is exacerbated by the
position of the Kyiv authorities, who unjustifiably obstruct the registration
of immigrants with documents for residence in Ukraine and other regions
of Ukraine, including Kyiv oblast.
In many cases, problems with processing documents for immigrants with
regard to their civil status, particularly marriage certificates and their chil-
dren’s birth certificates, have not been resolved.
Some immigrants’ problems with documents not only complicate their
situation, but also have a negative impact on the state of affairs in the city.
These problems lead to crimes, bribes, and human rights violations.
Naturally, in many respects legal status defines the nature of employment and
the source of immigrants’ incomes.
The results of our study indicate that the main sphere of respondents’
activities is trading at the city markets. In many respects, this kind of special-
ization is forced, since other forms of employment, especially qualified work,
are closed to immigrants regardless of their rather high levels of education.
In addition to lack of legal security, this stems from the fact that the immi-
grant community in Kyiv was formed under the conditions of a profound
economic crisis that accompanied the initial period of reforms in Ukraine.
As a result of the increase in recorded and hidden unemployment and the
months-long delays in salary payments, even large numbers of Kyivan resi-
dents who lost their sources of income were forced to engage in retail sale
in order to survive. Among other factors, immigrants’ orientation toward
trading is linked to the fact that this type of activity is not only the most
accessible, but also ensures a higher level of earnings than other spheres.
Immigrants who are engaged in trading are making their contribution
toward ensuring a supply of consumer goods for the city population,expand-
ing the local budget, and creating new workplaces, including those for
Ukrainian citizens. The potential of foreign entrepreneurs for establishing
business relations with their countries of origin is significant. Just like for Kyiv
residents, the fact that highly educated immigrants are engaged in bazaar-
based commerce signifies the loss of qualifications and professional skills.
 
The lack of prospects for this type of activity represents another prob-
lem, for with the growth of the economy and increase in the cost of liv-
ing, bazaar-based commerce will become a thing of the past.The majori-
ty of traders will be forced to seek other opportunities to earn an income,
which is extremely difficult for immigrants.This explains the unusually low
satisfaction among immigrants with their working activity in Kyiv. Nearly
one-fourth of the surveyed immigrants live with involuntary unemploy-
ment and the lack of any stable occupation whatsoever, leading to negative
repercussions for the individual.
A comparison between respondents’ monthly earnings and those of
average statistical Kyivans indicates that immigrants’ nominal earnings are
approximately one-third higher than local residents’. At the same time,
immigrants are not entitled to any social payments or state benefits. In most
cases they have no access to many free services, including those that are
most crucial to quality of life: medical services.As a result, the level of con-
sumption of goods and services in surveyed immigrant households is for
the most part lower than that of Kyiv residents.
Income levels and quality of life vary greatly within the immigrant
community. Entrepreneurs and employees of private firms and interna-
tional organizations earn the highest incomes. Meanwhile, respondents
who do not have stable employment and sources of income survive main-
ly on humanitarian aid, and live below the poverty level.Those who are
most affected in such families are children, who are deprived of the most
essential elements for their growth and development. More than one-
quarter of school-aged children of immigrants do not attend school,
owing first and foremost to their families’ dire economic straits.
There is a correlation between the well-being of immigrants and their
legal status, time of arrival in Ukraine, and type of work activity. Since these
characteristics vary, depending on the immigrants’ countries of origin,
some are better off than others.The direst material circumstances are noted
among refugees (represented in Kyiv by newcomers from Afghanistan and
African countries). Individuals who are living in Ukraine on the basis of
work agreements or as businessmen, the majority of whom are from
Vietnam and the Middle East, are in a better situation.
The largest budgetary expense in immigrant families is rent, which
is customarily higher for immigrants than similar housing for local res-
idents in the same district. Immigrants’ living conditions are quite mod-
Living Conditions of Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv
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est. Often several unrelated individuals or different families live togeth-
er in one room.
Despite the fact that various publications frequently express the opin-
ion that “ethnic” housing projects are springing up in Kyiv, our study
does not confirm this. Immigrant households that took part in the study
are equally distributed throughout the city.
The results of our study reveal the specific problems that immigrants
face in the city of Kyiv. They confirm that the municipal government
must pay more attention to this segment of the population by drafting
and implementing appropriate measures. First and foremost, these meas-
ures should be aimed at resolving the legal status of immigrants (their
documentation and registration), helping them to find employment that
takes into consideration newcomers’ educational and professional level
and the economic needs of the city, and implementing indispensable lan-
guage, informational, and educational programs.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Socio-Cultural Integration 
of Immigrants
In developed Western European countries, the social integration of largenumbers of migrants, most of whom chose to remain permanently inthe host states, was identified as a problem requiring analysis and state
regulation at least forty years ago. In recent decades, European studies ana-
lyzing the social integration of immigrants have focused on the state policy
of various countries, and have sought to compare the results of various inte-
grational strategies and to make recommendations to government agencies
and administrations.59 These issues are being actively discussed in commit-
tees of the Council of Europe not only by scholars,60 but also by heads of
government structures responsible for questions of migration.61
Integration policies in Sweden, Germany, Holland, France, Italy, and
other migrant-receiving countries in Europe were formed as separate, spe-
cific models, and have undergone certain revisions moving them away
from assimilation-based toward more democratic integration approaches.62
To this day Ukraine has not formulated a state policy for social integration
of immigrants. In Ukrainian scholarly literature there are no publications
devoted to the study of medical, ethnographical, anthropological, and other
aspects pertaining to the adaptation of nontraditional migrants, which are
crucial to any comprehensive analysis of the integration process.
The issue of integration of immigrant communities in Ukraine, and
specifically in Kyiv, began with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Foreigners living in Ukraine during the Soviet period generally associat-
ed with a circle of compatriots in their leisure time, while every other
aspect of their lives was strictly regimented and under the control of both
their home state and local government structures in Ukraine. Practically
none of them had the right to make independent decisions concerning
further stay in the Soviet Union, which had granted them entry specifi-
cally as foreign students or temporary workers.The situation changed dra-
matically with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as foreigners living in
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Kyiv chose to stay beyond the completion of the education or work con-
tract and new migrants arrived. However, migration was not a priority
issue for the new Ukrainian state, and the government did not even
broach the issue of integration of migrants until recently.
One of the features of the immigrant integration process in Ukraine is
that the receiving society is undergoing a transformation that affects all
aspects of life, from economic transition to fundamental changes in the
socio-political structure, and even the supplanting of a whole range of
basic cultural traditions and values.The development of a market econo-
my has initiated a process transforming Ukrainian society from a collec-
tivist culture to a culture with a more clearly defined individualism.
One one hand, Ukraine’s transition process has facilitated the arrival of
new immigrants,making Kyiv society open and accessible to newcomers on
practically all levels (the only restriction for non-citizens is government
service). On the other hand, the process of societal transformation has
placed native Kyivans in a similar situation with migrants. Simultaneously,
and in the context of the same urban environment, Kyivans and immigrants
are struggling to adapt to an unfamiliar social and economic environment.
Psychologists call the significant stress loads that individuals experience
when adapting to a new culture “culture shock,” or “acculturaltion stress.”
Researchers who study this phenomenon note that significant lifestyle
changes (both negative and positive) can lead to mental and physical ill-
nesses. Part of the shock is caused by the differences in values between the
country of departure and the country of settlement.The degree of differ-
ence in value systems is directly proportional to the number of difficulties
that individuals experience during the adaptation process. Crucial to inte-
gration are the quantity and quality of differences in core values, tolerance
of differences in values, and the ability to modify one’s system of values.63
One of the most effective methods for reducing this kind of stress is the
creation of immigrant communities. Social support from the community
plays an important role in the process of integrating each immigrant. Such
support may take various forms. By and large the community provides
both emotional support and real assistance to its members in resolving
vital problems (assistance with social behavior). In addition, information is
an important component of community support for each immigrant.
The process of integration into the host society can be divided into
structural and socio-cultural immigration.According to this approach, eco-
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nomic activity, nature of employment, and education are classified as struc-
tural integration (i.e., integration into existing social structures). Contacts
between immigrants and the local population, attitudes toward it, and readi-
ness to enter a new society characterize the socio-cultural aspect.64
In the case of structural employment, successful economic activity is
the major factor in ensuring that an individual will function effectively in
a given society.The overwhelming majority of Kyiv’s immigrants are self-
employed, and their success depends to a large extent on the support and
mutual assistance of the community.Those immigrants who are not self-
employed often earn their living through hired work within structures
developed by their compatriots. In the process of integrating into the eco-
nomic realities of Kyiv, immigrants are not only involved in the work of
existing economic structures, but they have also created their own struc-
tures that are entirely new to the Kyiv landscape. Some good examples of
this are the handful of manufacturing enterprises founded by Vietnamese
immigrants, in which both Vietnamese and native Kyivan workers are
employed; the active participation of the Afghan community in the devel-
opment of Troieshchyna market; and the growing network of Chinese
restaurants that employ a variety of workers.
However, not all immigrants are able to integrate into Kyiv’s economy.
The notable exceptions include a substantial proportion of African immi-
grants and a small group of Afghan immigrants. Without stable and legal
sources of subsistence, they become clients of certain social security struc-
tures, which in Ukraine’s case are non-governmental. Due to the lack of
state-funded adaptation programs and financial support available to immi-
grants in Ukraine, these functions have become the responsibility of inter-
national organizations such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, the International Red Cross, CARI-TAS, and others. For this
group of immigrants, UNHCR assistance is their primary legal source of
income, and their food supply consists largely of food packages from the
Red Cross and other charitable organizations. This phenomenon is not
unique to Ukraine. As Swedish researchers have noted, after twenty-five
years of implementing the new Swedish policy of integrating migrants who
depend to a significant degree on state social structures, the number of
clients are more numerous now than at the start of integration programs.65
The remainder of this chapter will focus on the socio-cultural aspects
of integration among Kyiv immigrants. Given that there is a significant
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difference between opportunities and type of socio-cultural integration of
adults and children, our analysis involved selecting from the total number
of respondents a group of first-generation adult immigrants, i.e., those
who were not born in Ukraine and were at least 18 years old at the time
of the survey.There were 315 such individuals among our respondents.
INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS:
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
The study analyzed four main types of relations among immigrants and
the local population: contacts at work, fraternization during leisure time,
friendly relations, and neighborly contacts.
Contacts at Work
Naturally, only working immigrants have contacts at work.Also includ-
ed in the group of working immigrants are respondents who, according
to the type of activity, considered themselves unemployed or pensioners,
but whose main or secondary source of income are occasional earnings.
There were 216 individuals in the group of working respondents.
The level of working contacts with compatriots turned out to be
much higher than the level of fraternization with the local population
and immigrants from other countries. In general, the number of respon-
dents who maintain working contacts with migrants from other coun-
tries is much smaller than the number of those who associate with com-
patriots or Kyiv residents. In our opinion, the general distribution of the
level of working contacts with compatriots (94%), Kyiv residents (62%),
and immigrants from other countries (23%) is indirect confirmation of
the fact that, in terms of their economic activities, the majority of Kyiv
immigrants do not act as members of a single community of newcom-
ers but as representatives of separate ethnic communities who are par-
tially integrated into the local milieu.
The distribution of working respondents by category based on type
of work enabled us to determine that hired workers have the lowest
level of working contacts with compatriots (88%), and market traders
have the highest (97%). All other categories, from company employees
and private entrepreneurs to the unemployed, have approximately the
same level of contact with their compatriots (92%). At the same time,
only 62% of working respondents have working relations with the local
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population. Private entrepreneurs maintain the most contact with Kyiv
residents (73%), while unemployed respondents have the least (46%).
We observed a significant link between the level of workplace contacts
and period of entry into Ukraine.The indicator of contacts with compa-
triots rises from 92% among respondents who arrived in the first period
to 100% among respondents who arrived in the third period.The level of
work-related contacts with Kyiv residents for respondents of the first peri-
od (69%) is twice that for respondents of the third period (33%). Thus,
there are grounds to assume some linkage between the degree of work-
based contacts with Kyiv residents and the nature of migration and peri-
od of residency in Ukraine.
To a certain extent, the fact that the respondent had studied in Ukraine
had an impact on the line of work-related contacts. With practically an
identical number of contacts with countrymen, those who studied in
Ukraine had a higher level of fraternization with Kyiv residents (71%)
than those who had not studied here (57%).
Affiliation with a certain ethnic group has a more significant influence
on the level and line of work-related contacts than nature of activity. A
more detailed analysis enabled us to determine that all hired employees,
with the exception of African immigrants, have work-related contacts
with their compatriots (100%) and a significantly lower level of fraterniza-
tion with the local population. Among hired workers,Vietnamese (60%)
have the most work contacts with Kyiv residents, and Afghans, least (20%).
Pakistani immigrants do not associate with Kyiv residents at work at all.
One-third of them have contacts with migrants from other countries.
Meanwhile, 100% of hired African workers have contacts with the local
population, half of them with their countrymen, and two-thirds with
migrants from other countries.
Unemployed people serve as another example of the links between
work-based contacts, type of work, and ethnic affiliation.Whereas unem-
ployed Afghan and Vietnamese immigrants who have occasional earnings
maintain workplace contacts exclusively with their compatriots, all three
lines of contact are 100% typical for other immigrants.
The prevalence of affiliation with a specific community over the influ-
ence of other parameters is also noticeable with respect to distribution by
gender. Whereas on the whole there was no difference in fraternization
between men and women among working respondents, there is a rather
 
| 88 |
significant difference within individual communities. Our study revealed
that Vietnamese women, whose working numbers are practically equal to
Vietnamese men, have more contacts than men. Seventy-three percent of
women have contacts with the local population, compared to 60% of
men. Meanwhile, working Afghan women, who have almost the same
work-related contacts with compatriots as men, have almost no contacts
with the local population.This corresponds with Afghan tradition where-
by married women do not work.The fact that an Afghan woman becomes
a trader at the market attests to extreme hardship within the family.
Despite a number of differences in national traits and reasons for entry
into Ukraine, a group of four communities—Afghan, Chinese, Pakistani,
and Vietnamese—share common characteristics of workplace contacts.
Working representatives of this group of communities, regardless of the
type of economic activity, have close (practically 100%) working contacts
with their compatriots.This may be viewed as definite confirmation of the
fact that members of these communities are also united to a certain extent
by a commonality of economic activity. In the workplace, however, they
fraternize less with Kyiv residents. Only approximately one-half of work-
ing Afghans and Chinese said that they have work-related contacts with the
local population. Pakistani (73%) and Vietnamese (63%) have greater con-
tacts in the workplace with Kyiv residents, but even among them contacts
with compatriots predominate. Relations with immigrants from other
countries are much less prevalent among the members of these four com-
munities: approximately 20% of Afghans and Chinese, and only 4% of
Vietnamese. Pakistanis are noted for their high degree of contacts (28%).
A characteristic trait of immigrants from the Middle East is their level of
work-related contacts with their compatriots, which is practically indistin-
guishable from their level of contacts with the local population.The differ-
ence between Arabs and Kurds with respect to two lines of communication
is not significant, but the Kurds’ level of contacts with immigrants from other
countries is almost twice (50%) that of Arabs’ level of contacts (26%).
African immigrants have the lowest level of work-related contacts with
their compatriots: only 58% have such contacts at work, while contacts
with Kyiv residents and migrants from other countries are most wide-
spread and typical among working Africans. Practically all of them coop-
erate with representatives of the local population (92%). The majority
(67%) of them have workplace contacts with immigrants from other
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countries. This is connected with the fact that self-employment is least
germane to immigrants from African countries, even among those who
are employed.There is only one private entrepreneur among them (who
does not work with his compatriots). There are also several individuals
who earn a living at the market by acting as sellers for Afghanis, and they
communicate only with them. Others earn a living by working as hired
workers and employees of Ukrainian companies, offices, and offices of
international organizations, and are thus not dependent on compatriots
for their economic activities.
Therefore, the line of work-related contacts may be viewed to some
extent as confirmation of shared economic activity within the limits of
individual immigrant communities.
Interactions During Leisure Time
Relations during leisure time are more conditioned by the lifestyle of
each individual and of the community on the whole. Marital status, gen-
der and age characteristics, and certain cultural traditions play an impor-
tant role here. Fraternization during leisure time is indicative of the level
of socio-cultural integration. It is rather high among first-generation
immigrants, most of whom came to Kyiv as adults and who have resided
in Kyiv for an average of almost six years.
The proportion of immigrants who mostly associate with their com-
patriots during their leisure time has been increasing with every succes-
sive period, albeit insignificantly—from 76% of those who arrived before
1991 to 89% of respondents who arrived after 1998.At the same time, the
proportion of those who associate with Kyiv residents noticeably decreas-
es with every successive period.They comprise 62% of respondents of the
first period, while the number of those who came to Kyiv in the third
period is nearly two times smaller (32%).
With regard to gender distribution, a difference in fraternization dur-
ing leisure time between men and women was revealed only in their con-
tacts with Kyiv citizens, with whom 47% of men communicate and 31%
of women. Communication with compatriots is equally high for both (a
little over 85%).
Distribution based on age groups of the entire study group did not
reveal any dependence on age. The only exception is the unexpectedly
low level of contacts of the youngest group of respondents, eighteen-year-
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olds: only 20% associate with the local population, and only 40% even
with their compatriots.Although there are very few of these young immi-
grants among our respondents (8.5%), from the point of view of prospects
for integration, identifying the causes behind such a lack of contact among
young people is a very important task.
Friendship
The number of cases of friendly relations among respondents depends on
the period of entry into Ukraine, and correspondingly, on the period of
residence in Kyiv. Sixty-four percent of respondents from the first period
of entry are friends with Kyivans, almost twice as many as those who
arrived in the third period (29%).
The existence of relationships which immigrants describe as friendly is
essential to the process of socio-cultural integration. Even in cases where
these relations are not sufficiently close, they attest to people’s positive atti-
tude towards one another and foster an increase in immigrants’ feelings of
comfort in the new society. Psychologists have noted that during the
close-friendship phase, communication concerning both insignificant and
very important topics takes place; at the same time cultural stereotypes are
being dismantled, and affiliation with different groups no longer plays
such an important role. The influence of group affiliation diminishes as
soon as relations become closer.Although all researchers note that nontra-
ditional migrants are representatives of cultures whose distance from
Ukrainian culture is great,66 at the same time they prove the rule that
friends from “distant” cultures share more common links (mutual acquain-
tances, friends) than mere acquaintances from the same culture.67
Differences in attitude toward acquaintances from close and distant cul-
tures are observed, but there are no differences in attitude toward friends.
Hence, the level of interpersonal relations between individuals, i.e., their
closeness, eliminates inter-group and inter-ethnic barriers. As a result,
affiliation with different groups, and related ethnic and cultural stereo-
types, cease to influence their association.
Therefore, people who do not have warm, friendly contacts either with
their compatriots or with Kyiv residents probably comprise the most vul-
nerable category of individuals whose integration into a new society has
turned out to be truly difficult.These individuals have the lowest level of
psychological comfort. Most of these individuals are found in the Afghan
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community (nearly 19%), although there are a few cases in other commu-
nities. Forty-four percent of people who do not have friendly relations
with anyone are women. Of course, the majority of them are Afghans.
Practically all men who do not have such relations are Afghans; there is
not a single Vietnamese,Arab, or Kurd.
All categories of employment are represented among those who do not
have contacts either during leisure time or friendly relations, although house-
wives and unemployed people comprise approximately half of the group.
Interaction among Neighbors
Neighborly relations are a specific type of fraternization. On the one
hand, they are of a pragmatic character, and on the other, they are not as
forced as contacts during working hours. In Ukraine, as a rule, these rela-
tions play a significant role in the lives of residents of rural areas, where
the rudiments of a traditional village community, based on mutual assis-
tance and regulated by customary law, are still evident. For residents of
large cities, these relations are significantly less typical.
Eighty-five percent of respondents who have neighborly relations with
the local population associate with their compatriots during leisure time,
and 61% with local residents (on the whole, the level of contacts with
Kyiv residents during leisure time reaches 43%).This category of respon-
dents is therefore more active in associating with local residents than the
total number of respondents. For some respondents neighborly contacts
with Kyiv residents are their only form of fraternization.
Respondents who do not have any family in Kyiv associate least fre-
quently with their neighbors.This is consistent with the specific behavior
of unmarried Kyivans and is more likely related to the fact that single peo-
ple spend significantly less time at home than those who have a spouse and
children.As a rule, single people also have fewer domestic problems. It may
be assumed that this is why the highest percentage (48%) of people who
do not have any neighborly relations occurs among single people.
The group of respondents who are in mixed marriages not only has the
highest percentage of people who associate with their Kyivan neighbors
but also those who have no neighborly relations with anyone; to some
extent this may be attributed to the influence of their spouses. On the one
hand, Kyiv-born wives help to expand their husbands’ contacts, while on
the other, the task of maintaining neighborly relations in such families
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may be entirely placed on the women.There is a virtually stable correla-
tion between the levels of neighborly contacts of immigrants from vari-
ous places of origin within each group identified by marital status. In our
opinion, affiliation with various communities is the reason behind the sig-
nificant difference in the level and direction of neighborly relations on the
part of immigrants from various countries.
Our analysis showed that there is virtually no difference between men
and women in terms of neighborly communication.The breakdown by
type of employment indicates that the highest percentage of those who
do not maintain neighborly relations with anyone occurs among unem-
ployed immigrants (75%). Fifty-four percent of office workers, 30% of
traders and entrepreneurs, 27% of hired workers, and 41% of pensioners
and housewives have no neighborly contacts.
With respect to age groups, notwithstanding the insignificant differ-
ence in neighborly contacts, the youngest and oldest strata of the popu-
lation participate the most in neighborly relations. This corresponds to
the general Kyivan trend. Fifty percent of respondents between 19 and
50 years old have such contacts, and a little more than 60% of older ones.
There is a clear-cut link between the existence of neighborly relations
and the period of arrival in Kyiv. Although the level of contacts with
neighbors is not striking, it declines noticeably with each successive
arrival period.This applies both to contacts with the local population, the
level of which changes from 61% among those who arrived in Kyiv in
the first period to 34% among those who arrived in the third period, and
neighborly contacts with compatriots (31% and 21%, respectively).
For all of our respondents neighborly contacts with the local popu-
lation are almost two times higher than such contacts with compatri-
ots, which to some extent may be confirmation of the insignificant
level of immigrant concentration in Kyiv. Since almost 40% of respon-
dents, as well as the largest number of Kyiv immigrants, live in
Troieshchyna, we may assume that the highest percentage of neighbor-
ly contacts with compatriots would be typical for those who live in this
area. But the percentage of neighborly contacts with compatriots (21%
of respondents who live in this microdistrict) turned out to be signifi-
cantly lower than the same indicator in such microdistricts as
Chokolivka—31%, Darnytsia—50%, Pechersk—42%, Shuliavka–83%,
Syrets–45%,Vynohradar–28%, and also significantly lower than the per-
 
The Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants
| 93 |
centage of immigrants’ fraternization with the local population—46%
in Troieshchyna.
A higher level of neighborly contacts among residents of the small,
mostly right-bank river districts may be explained by the settlement
pattern and relative concentration. A significant proportion of immi-
grants living in this area moved to Kyiv at the invitation of institutions
of higher education and commercial firms that rented dormitory
accommodations to their employees. These dormitories were located
not too far from the city center, in unprestigious districts filled with
cramped, five-story buildings, and scores of factory and university dor-
mitories built in the 1960s.A typical example of such a microdistrict is
Syrets, where following the closure of many dormitories, their former
tenants stayed on in the area. Obviously, the level of neighborly rela-
tions in a certain microdistrict is influenced not only by the real con-
centration of immigrants, i.e., not whether compatriots are neighbors,
but whether representatives of these communities generally live in this
microdistrict, and by the frequency of contacts, which is typical of this
particular community.
With respect to the residents of Troieshchyna, the overwhelming
majority of adult respondents from this microdistrict are Afghans (71%).
According to their own estimates, the average number of compatriots per
household is 1.9, and in the neighborhood—5.4. Clearly, they have
opportunities for neighborly relations with their compatriots, but only
7% of them establish such contacts. Even contacts with Kyiv neighbors
are almost six times higher than their contacts with compatriots.
It would appear that immigrants from African countries do not frat-
ernize with each other as neighbors (the average percentage in all dis-
tricts is nearly 8%). Immigrants treasure help proffered by neighbors to
an extraordinary degree, like any other demonstration of friendliness
on the part of Kyiv residents. For many years an Afghan family that
arrived in Kyiv without any household articles kept several cherished
plates and a dishtowel, which a Kyivan neighborwoman gave them dur-
ing their time of hardship. The parents of young Afghan and African
children, who for various reasons do not attend kindergarten, spoke
with great warmth about their neighbor, a female pensioner, who occa-
sionally takes care of their children, emphasizing that she also teaches
the children to read letters and recite poems.
 
| 94 |
Communication Contact Indicators
The level of contact of various communities may be an indicator of both
the cohesion of a given community and the level of its members’ integra-
tion into the receiving society.Therefore, in order to arrive at a compre-
hensive evaluation of the level of fraternization among respondents, the
total contact indicators, both with compatriots and the local population,
were calculated. In determining a compatriot contact indicator, an indi-
vidual with all four types of relations (at work, during leisure time, friend-
ly and neighborly contacts) within the given community, scored the max-
imum points (4) for compatriot communication; for lack of any type of
contact, they scored the lowest number (0). Indicators of contact with the
local population were drawn up in similar fashion.
The average nomenclatures of total contact indicators for representa-
tives of various communities differ significantly. (Table 3.1). For contacts
TABLE 3.1 Indicators of Community Contact with Compatriots
and Kyiv Residents, in points (N=305)
Community
Contact with
compatriots
Contact with
Kyiv residents
Difference in
contacts
Afghan 2.5 1.5 1.0
African
countries 2.2 1.4 0.8
Employed 2.0 2.5  – 0.5
Dependents 2.3 1.0 1.3
Vietnamese 3.4 2.3 1.1
Chinese 3.1 1.6 1.5
Middle 
East
countries
2.4 2.1 0.3
Arab 2.3 1.8 0.5
Kurdish 2.6 2.4 0.2
Pakistani 3.2 2.6 0.6
All Respondents 2.8 1.8 1.0
The Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants
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with compatriots, the difference between the maximum and minimum
value of an indicator was 30% of the possible maximum value.
STRATEGIES FOR INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS
In deciding to relocate from one country to another, a person simultane-
ously makes a decision about his or her future life in the new society. But
very few people can foresee that, besides economic difficulties, they will
face the need to adapt to the socio-cultural norms of the new society.
Until someone actually encounters the reality of a new environment, no
one can fully predict which cultural values and traditions, most of which
people accept as a standard of everyday behavior, will have to be forfeit-
ed or changed, what may be retained, and what will have to be adopted
from the local population.
Readiness to accept a foreign culture and its traditions is linked to a
general strategy of integration on the part of both a single individual and
a community. Preservation of one’s culture, uniqueness, and traditions is
one of the main functions of any ethnic minority. For immigrant com-
munities, whose period of life under new socio-economic conditions is
measured over several decades (only ten years in Ukraine), the problem
of interacting with the culture and traditions of the receiving society is
no less relevant than preserving one’s ethnicity.
By correlating the retention of one’s cultural values with the degree
of inclusion in the culture of the receiving society, researchers have
mapped out four main strategies of intercultural interaction: assimilation,
separation, marginalization, and integration.68
Assimilation is the absorption of one culture by another, which occurs
when a community, willingly or involuntarily, adopts the customs, values,
and living standards of the dominant culture. During assimilation an
immigrant completely identifies with the new culture and rejects the
culture of the ethnic minority to which he belongs.
With separation, representatives of an ethnic minority do not accept
the majority culture but preserve their own ethnic traits (one of the man-
ifestations of separation is a negative attitude toward mixed marriages).
If an immigrant does not identify himself either with the culture of
the ethnic majority or that of his own ethnic minority, the result is
ethno-cultural marginalization, which is essentially the lack of cultural
identification.
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Cultural integration is characterized by the tendency to preserve one’s
own cultural affiliation, together with the tendency to master the cul-
ture of the titular ethnic group; in essence, this is multiculturality.
Our analysis of the main trends of cultural integration among adult
respondents revealed the presence of all four integration strategies
within the Kyiv immigrant milieu.The analysis is based on responses to
the following questions: “Do you maintain your national traditions?”
and “Did you adopt any of the local traditions during your stay in
Kyiv?” Without a doubt, the majority of responses reflected some
doubt, i.e., “Probably” or “Probably not”, but for the purpose of iden-
tifying at least general trends, “Yes” and “Probably” responses were
combined as affirmative ones, while “No” or “Probably not” responses
were considered negative. In establishing an indicator for a strategy of
cultural interaction, affirmative responses to both questions were rated
as a tendency toward integration; the combination of two negative
responses was considered marginalization; and the correlation of posi-
tive with negative responses was the basis for identifying the tendency
of separation and assimilation.
Of course, this type of indicator cannot be viewed as a qualitative
characterization of the individual respondent. A person accepts many
aspects of everyday behavior, which are conditioned by traditions and
societal norms, as natural and appropriate, or does not notice them at all.
Representatives of ethnic groups accept only certain cultural traditions
and particularities as national traditions. Therefore, a negative response
to the question concerning maintenance of one’s national traditions
does not signify the complete absence of traditional behavior. Formed
on the basis of the collected responses, this signifier demonstrates instead
an attitude toward one’s own traditions or the traditions of the local
population. It is this aspect that is particularly interesting from the stand-
point of prospects for socio-cultural integration. Our study revealed that
the character of cultural interaction is closely linked to the period of
entry into Ukraine (see Table 3.2).
Integration strategy is prevalent both in the first and second periods,
but the percentage of respondents for whom this kind of cultural interac-
tion strategy is typical in the period of entry before 1991 is significantly
higher than for those who arrived between 1991 and 1998. Cultural inte-
gration is not prevalent among respondents of the third period of entry.
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The opposite is seen in the tendency toward an increase in separation
and cultural marginalization. Six percent of respondents from the first
period of entry demonstrated a tendency toward separation, and 3%
toward marginalization. At the same time, separation turned out to be
the predominant strategy of interaction for 36% of respondents from the
third period, while the absence of definite cultural identification was
rather widespread (23%).
From the above-cited ratings it is difficult to draw unequivocal con-
clusions about a community’s integration strategy of a community on the
whole, or merely its cultural aspect. Nevertheless, we believe that gener-
al tendencies may indeed be traced. Representatives of the Vietnamese
community assign the greatest significance to the preservation of nation-
al traditions. The percentage of those who actively adopt local cultural
norms and traditions is highest among Vietnamese (64% of Vietnamese
follow the integration strategy), which may be regarded as an argument
in favor of recognizing this community as one that has integrated the
most into the Kyiv municipal milieu.
For Pakistani (60%) and Arab communities (53%), a strategy of cultural
interaction was prevalent. Representatives of the Chinese community
demonstrated the most widespread predisposition toward separation: this is
the only community in which separation prevails over other strategies (50%);
the lowest prevalence was noted among Kurds and African immigrants.
Africans pay the least amount of attention to maintaining their nation-
al traditions. Fifty-five percent of representatives of this community favor
Cultural interaction strategy
Period of
entry Assimilation Separation Marginalization Integration Total
Before 1991 30.6 6.5 3.2 59.7 100
1991-1998 25.0 17.8 16.4 40.8 100
1999-2001 31.8 36.4 22.7 9.1 100
All Respondents 27.1 16.5 13.6 42.8 100
TABLE 3.2 Distribution of Cultural Interaction Strategies among
Respondents with Different Periods of Entry into
Ukraine, in % (N=236)
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the assimilation strategy.The main reason for this is that when they first
arrived in Kyiv,African immigrants were not carriers of their own tradi-
tional cultures. According to them, they are representatives of various
European cultural traditions. For the most part, their native language is
French or Portuguese, while their traditional culture is the postcolonial
culture of large cities (more than 90% are city-born). Among working
Africans the prevalence of the assimilation strategy is even more apparent.
Sixty-four percent of respondents in this group follow this strategy.
Besides the general level and main strategies of interaction, the ques-
tion of which specific traditions are shared by Kyiv residents and immi-
grants is also interesting. The following table shows the distribution of
respondents from various communities based on the level of adoption of
various local traditions.
In studies on the socio-cultural integration of immigrants, researchers
note that some cultural elements disappear during the process of entering
a new society, while others are strengthened.The most distinctive cultur-
al traits, e.g., clothing, gradually disappear, while those of average distinc-
tiveness, such as dietary traditions, are adapted, transformed, and blended
with local traditions. At the same time, the least apparent, internal ele-
ments of culture, such as religious beliefs and moral values, are reinforced
and strengthened.69
On the whole, our research on Kyiv immigrants confirms this view.The
largest number of respondents recognized the adoption of such elements of
the local culture as language (69%) and food (77%), but they were least pre-
pared to adopt religious traditions (9%) and approaches to raising children
(16%).These general tendencies turned out to be typical for all communities.
Language
The integrative role of language is historically important in contemporary
Ukraine for the consolidation of diverse ethnonational communities into
a single Ukrainian political nation. An assessment of the knowledge level
of the language of communication (Ukrainian or Russian) was made on
the basis of respondents’ own ratings. Among adult immigrants in Kyiv,
21.5% do not know either of the languages used by the local population,
61.5% know Russian and at least some Ukrainian, and 17% know both
Russian and Ukrainian well enough to communicate.There are no adult
respondents who know only Ukrainian.
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Immigrants from African countries are most likely to not know either
Ukrainian or Russian well enough to communicate (32%). If we recall
that Africans, unlike other respondents, usually know several European
languages, then such low linguistic competence can hardly be explained
by an inadequate educational level or problems related to the significant
distance between linguistic groups.
Pakistani respondents, none of whom said that their knowledge of
Ukrainian or Russian is inadequate for communication, scored the highest
in linguistic competence. Arabs scored the highest in knowledge of
Ukrainian,while not a single Kurd or Chinese knows Ukrainian (Table 3.4).
The difference between groups of respondents who are oriented
toward different strategies of cultural interaction is quite noticeable.
Twenty-eight percent of those who tend toward separation and margin-
alization do not know either of the languages used in Kyiv, while 14% of
respondents who have opted for the assimilation strategy do not speak
either Ukrainian or Russian; neither language is spoken by 10% of immi-
grants who are oriented toward integration.
The level of linguistic competence depends on the period of arrival in
Kyiv.Whereas there are virtually no respondents from the first period who
do not know at least one of the languages used in Kyiv, 19% of those who
arrived during the second period do not know either language. At the
same time, 67% of respondents from the third period do not know either
Ukrainian or Russian.
In Ukraine, there is no educational network for those who would like
to master the state language.There are practically no Ukrainian-language
courses; it is difficult to buy Ukrainian textbooks, study manuals, and dic-
tionaries, let alone Ukrainian audio and video courses, which are probably
not even available in Ukraine. Not a single TV or radio channel broadcasts
practical conversation courses (admittedly, a series of programs on the cul-
ture of language are broadcast). Lately, free Ukrainian-language courses for
refugees, sponsored by international organizations, are being offered.
Culture
Besides mastering the language of the receiving society, another impor-
tant prerequisite for the successful integration of immigrants into a new
cultural environment is the opportunity to maintain and develop one’s
own culture and native language.At the present time such opportunities
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are very limited in Kyiv. No one forbids anyone to study any language,
history or culture independently or to teach these subjects to their chil-
dren. However, such activities are relegated to the private sphere. Thus,
children of immigrants are able to learn their native language only in the
family, and this depends on the parents. Ukraine is not the only country
where this kind of situation has arisen. In the majority of Western
European countries the development of immigrants’ national cultures are
also a private matter.
One of the most pressing issues facing immigrants is the problem of
obtaining information in their native language, which most communities
find very difficult to obtain. Kurds have the best access to information:
only 17% have no access to printed materials in their native language.To
a great extent the activity of the “Media” National-Cultural Society helps
to ensure the availability of information targeted at this community.
Books, newspapers, and other printed matter are sent to the society from
Kurdish centers in Belgium, Germany, Holland, and Turkey, and are then
distributed among the members of this community.
With regard to learning about the achievements of Ukrainian culture,
Kyiv has a broad network of diverse cultural institutions. Of course, visits
to theaters and museums are not the most urgent problem that immigrants
face in their everyday lives, but it cannot be said that they are completely
cut off from these local cultural institutions.
Arabs and Vietnamese go to theaters and museums most often (more
than 30%), and discos and bars have become popular entertainment des-
tinations for Chinese and Pakistanis, which may be linked to the fact that
young men are predominant in these communities. Sixty-four percent of
respondents do not visit any cultural institutions; the highest percentage
is traditionally found among the African and Afghan communities.This
may be because, like a number of Kyivans, they cannot afford to purchase
a new book, go to the theater, attend a concert, subscribe to newspapers
and magazines, etc.
Religion
Religion is an integral part of culture and plays a vitally important role
in the lives of immigrants in a new environment. Many return to the
religion of their childhood and youth in order to find new strength in
an old tradition.
The Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants
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One would think that Orthodox believers would have the easiest time
satisfying their religious needs in Kyiv, but even these faithful face certain
difficulties in adapting to the specific rites and norms of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church, which differ from their own. In addition to the tradi-
tionally Orthodox Ethiopian Copts and Syrians, one of the respondents
in our study was an Orthodox Afghan, who converted to this religion
after coming to Kyiv.
For Catholics, one of the main centers in Kyiv is St. Alexander’s
Roman Catholic Church, where liturgies are served in four languages:
Ukrainian, Polish, English, and Russian. This community exists mainly
through the support of Catholics abroad, given that this religious com-
munity does not collect donations and does not have any special pro-
grams to assist the needy.
The majority of Catholic respondents (all from African countries)
attend church in Sviatoshyn and the Catholic monastery located in a sub-
urb of Kyiv; the main task of these institutions is spiritual enrichment and
moral support, but not material assistance. Immigrants from African coun-
tries come here to obtain this kind of moral support and to expand their
circle of acquaintances. In the words of one respondent, he was lucky to
find a job in the Catholic monastery. He is proud of his job, which has
opened up new vistas for him.
Unlike Catholics, Protestants combine spiritual aid with material
assistance. Parishioners are expected to donate a canonical “tithe,” and
needy individuals obtain food, clothing, and assistance to resolve their
problems. One of the Protestant religious communities in Kyiv is the
“Peremoha” [Victory] Church, which has an entire range of assistance
programs for immigrants.The majority of Protestant respondents, all of
whom are from African countries, attend this church. For a significant
proportion of these immigrants, associating with the local population
means fraternizing within the confines of this religious community.
Those who have reached a dead end in their lives come here seeking,
and finding, support. As a result, many who in the past were Catholic
and Orthodox believers have become Protestants. Representatives of all
religious groups occasionally change their religious affiliation, but
Muslims do this least often. Nevertheless, there are cases of conversion
among Muslim immigrants from African countries: one Muslim respon-
dent became a devoted Baptist.
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To a great extent joint participation in prayers and other rituals is for
many immigrants a form of communication and self-realization, and a
way to meet people. For Africans, Protestantism’s appeal lies in the fact
that its communities support their members and work with each of
them individually.
Muslims have other kinds of relations with their religious communi-
ty.Today there are nine Muslim religious organizations in Kyiv, includ-
ing seven communities; some of them are part of the Spiritual
Administration of Muslims in Ukraine, which is headed by a Lebanese
citizen. Others do not belong to any religious groups.
Muslims require religious buildings for their rites.Today there are two
mosques in Kyiv. In addition, several public buildings have been con-
verted for their religious needs. Newcomers, however, are establishing
religious centers in areas well situated for their needs. A small building
near the Troieshchyna market was converted into a mosque. With
financing from the community, a building was constructed on an adjoin-
ing lot for gatherings, such as funeral repasts and holiday dinners. The
most active members of this religious community are Pakistanis, several
of whom have the appropriate educational qualifications. Devoted
Muslims are not the only ones flocking to this mosque. This religious
community has become an additional cementing factor for the Afghan
community, and has strengthened ties between the Afghans and
Pakistanis. Many practical problems of everyday life are also being
resolved with the assistance of the religious community.
In the families of several respondents cases have been recorded of Kyiv
wives converting to Islam. Eight spouses (13% of female spouses who are
indigenous to Kyiv) converted to Islam after their marriages to immi-
grants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. On the one hand, this may be
explained by the fact that these Kyiv women, practically non-believers
who are living with people for whom religion is an important part of
their lives, must respect their principles and worldviews.This requires both
knowledge of rites, an understanding of fundamental dogmas, and main-
taining appropriate standards. On the other hand, their conversions may
be viewed as an example of how immigrants, who are striving to create a
typical and acceptable environment for themselves, are adapting the sur-
rounding milieu to their needs. If a Muslim’s wife must be a Muslim, then
a Ukrainian girl who wants to be his spouse must convert to Islam.
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CONCLUSIONS
The process of immigrant communities’ cultural interaction with Kyiv resi-
dents is virtually just beginning.Very few people in Kyiv are aware of the
wonderful work of talented Afghan artists; very few have seen dances per-
formed by the children of immigrants,heard their songs,or read their poems.
Perhaps the next generation of Kyiv residents, who will be living next door
to the children of immigrants, will know more about their culture.
Nontraditional migrants of Kyiv are taking an active part in city life.
The level of their economic activity, legal competence, broad contacts
with the local population, and participation in socio-cultural realities of
the city is generally rather high.
Kyiv and its realities have an impact on immigrants’ lives, while the
presence of immigrants and their dynamic interaction with the surround-
ing milieu is having an impact on city life. This influence is noticeable
both in the development of the economic structure and socio-demo-
graphic spheres, and in the development of Ukrainian society in general.
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Losses and Gains, Intentions and Prospects
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CHAPTER FOUR
Losses and Gains, Intentions and Prospects
An important factor in the successful integration of immigrantsinto a new society is their own positive rating of the migrationexperience. This rating affects the formulation of their further
migration goals, i.e., whether they will build their lives in this city and
this country, return to their homeland, or move on. At the same time,
their further migration intentions influence their social behavior, rela-
tions with the local population, and creation of family priorities.
Therefore, it is important to determine whether Kyiv’s immigrants have
found something positive in their new place of residence and what spe-
cific features of Kyivan life appeal to respondents from diverse regions of
origin.These data are reflected in Table 4.1.
The category of individuals whose migration motive was to improve
their lives includes those who came to Kyiv to find a job, establish their
own business, and re-unite with their families. It also includes those who
remained in Kyiv after their work contracts or studies ended and want-
ed to settle down here, as well as transit migrants who, in their own
words, were heading for Europe to better their lives.The reasons behind
the classification into refugee immigrants and economic migrants were
inadequately formalized and were for the most part subjective. But it is
our view that a person who considers him/herself a refugee often adopts
an appropriate life strategy, and this strategy usually differs from the aspi-
rations of those who identify themselves as economic migrants.This clas-
sification revealed that 45% of the 315 adult immigrants who took part
in the study were seeking asylum.
For those who migrated with the goal of bettering their lives and that
of their family members, the most important attraction of Kyiv was the
opportunity to work: 64% respondents from this group rated this as a pos-
itive feature of their lives in Kyiv, while only 22% of asylum seekers iden-
tified this opportunity and rated it as a positive feature of their new life.
To 37% of asylum seekers, the prospect of obtaining medical care and
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acquiring an education was somewhat more appealing than the possibili-
ty of finding work. However, even in this case the percentage of those
who rated these opportunities as positive features of life in Kyiv is some-
what higher among economic migrants—49%.
An even greater difference between the respondents in these two
groups is noted in the rating of Kyiv as a living environment, which
included positive ratings of climate, urban infrastructure, and opportuni-
ties for marriage and expanding one’s circle of acquaintances. Forty-one
percent of those who wanted to improve their living conditions cited
these as positive aspects of life in Kyiv, while there were nearly two times
fewer refugees who rated them positively—23%.
Sixty-five percent of those whose goal was to improve their living con-
ditions rated their material situation as normal or even problem-free. At
the same time, only 11% of asylum seekers rated their current material sit-
uation as normal, while 36% rated it as being below the poverty level.
For the most part, immigrants hoping to improve their living condi-
tions succeeded, at least in such aspects as material situation, employment,
and opportunities to acquire an education and obtain medical care. It is
difficult to determine to what extent these benefits offset losses in hous-
ing conditions, opportunities to satisfy their cultural needs, and securing
human rights. But since 70% of the respondents in this group have been
living in Kyiv for more than five years, we may assume that living condi-
tions satisfy a significant proportion of them. However, migration meant
significant material losses for refugees.A significant negative score (ratings
of material situation, housing conditions, and employment) indicates a
sharp deterioration in the living standards of this group of immigrants.
With regard to opportunities for acquiring an education, obtaining
medical care, and satisfying cultural needs in Kyiv, both groups of respon-
dents rated them almost equally.The difference in the score between the
two groups results from the fact that at the time of the survey a signifi-
cant proportion of immigrants who consider themselves refugees no
longer had any prospects in their homelands.
Economic migrants rated respect for human rights in Kyiv markedly
higher than refugees, although in comparison with conditions in their
homeland, the rating score was negative. This is readily understandable,
because in any state the situation of newcomers differs somewhat from
that of the local population.
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Among representatives of immigrant communities, Vietnamese
encounter manifestations of unfairness least often: 75% of them have
either never encountered it or did so very seldom.Traditional efforts to
steer clear of potential conflicts with representatives of power structures
and generally to avoid drawing attention to themselves result in the least
number of manifestations of unfairness toward this community. For all
other communities the distribution between those who either witnessed
or were involved in unpleasant incidents that were related specifically to
their foreign origin hovers between 30% for immigrants from Middle East
countries (Arabs, 35%; Kurds, 25%) and 47% for Afghans.The character of
these conflicts involving representatives of all communities turned out to
be rather typical—most were run-ins with the police.
The legal competence of immigrants in Kyiv plays an important role
in reducing conflict situations between immigrants, the local population,
and representatives of governmental structures. Such competence is also
an indicator of integration into society and a positive factor furthering the
process of integration. As a result, legal competence positively affects
immigrants’ general rating of their status in the receiving society.
Legal competence may be examined solely in the context of specific
communities, since every immigrant obtains information and supportive
advice from his/her compatriots.A good example of the legal competence
of communities may be the fact that almost immediately after the passage
of the law “On Refugees,” when few in Ukraine knew exactly how it
would be implemented and migration services were only in the process
of being created, refugees who now had some hope of legalizing their stay
in Kyiv were already waiting at their doors. Even the African immigrants,
whose community is not very cohesive, resolve many problems thanks to
the the community’s competence in Ukrainian and international law.
In addition to competence with regard to purely legislative norms, also
important is the level of competence with regard to bureaucratic instruc-
tions and simple, customary norms, which regulate important aspects of
immigrants’ lives, such as renting housing accommodations, processing
documents authorizing the right to engage in commerce, as well as norms
of behavior in Ukrainian society. In this regard Kyiv immigrant commu-
nities appear to be quite competent, although the level of such compe-
tence differs within each community. It is difficult to establish quantitative
indicators that would assess the level of this competence. But if one
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assumes that an average number of places of habitation for representatives
of different communities and level of rental payments may be a criterion,
then the Vietnamese community, whose high level of integration has
already been identified according to other parameters, is also the most
integrated from this point of view.
A wide range of both positive and negative ratings of the new milieu
merely confirms that depending on the situation, different aspects of life may
be most important for each person. For example, for refugees in the early
stage of migration, security might take precedence over comfort level, but as
time passes, priorities change owing to the absence of a deadly threat.
Therefore, it would be desirable to attempt a comprehensive assessment of
each immigrant’s satisfaction with the results of migration at a specific time.
Material living conditions to a great extent determine satisfaction with
migration results. One-hundred percent of those who stated that his/her
material situation in Kyiv is problem-free believe that their decision to
move was correct. But immigrants who described their situation as difficult
and even below the poverty level also said they would have definitely made
the move even under those conditions. Using our respondents as an exam-
ple, we can state that the category of poor immigrants who have a hard life
in Kyiv but who regard their decision to migrate as correct, is first and fore-
most represented by people who in their homelands were hired workers or
office workers (nearly 30% of this group), military personnel (15%), arrived
immediately after completing school or university (41%), and unemployed
(only 6%). For these people relocation was accompanied by a significant
shift in the sphere of employment. At the time of the survey, 54% of the
respondents in this group were traders and entrepreneurs, who were less
successful than those just beginning this type of activity in their homeland.
It should also be noted that 70% of those who are living a life of poverty
in Kyiv but regard their decision to migrate as correct have not encountered
any manifestations of unfairness toward them, which has perhaps allowed
them to assess their choice positively, notwithstanding all the hardships.
A significant difference in satisfaction with the results of the move is
noted among the representatives of various communities (Table 4.2).The
most satisfied were the Chinese: 100% of them would definitely or prob-
ably have come even if they had known the outcomes. High scores were
noted among the Vietnamese (89%).These two communities are charac-
terized by adequacy of expectations and achievements.
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Immigrants from the Middle East also scored high in terms of satisfac-
tion, but among Arabs the percentage (65%) was higher than among
Kurds (58%). For Afghans and Pakistanis, the correspondence of expecta-
tions to achievements is lower: a little more than half said that they would
not want to come to Kyiv again.
Ninety percent of immigrants from African countries would never have
come to Ukraine if they had realized the consequences of taking such a step.
Even among Africans who work and have a high level of integration,as noted
earlier, only 40% said that they would come again.There are practically no
satisfied immigrants among those who rely on international organizations.
The most important conclusion drawn by both Africans and the city
in which they are living today is the fact that they are badly off here.When
immigrants experience these kinds of feelings, their successful integration
into the new environment is highly unlikely.The reasons behind this sit-
uation are the community’s inconsequential internal ties, limited frater-
nization, and the specific character of their acceptance by the local popu-
lation. But the most important reason is that those who have become
dependents of international organizations cannot become members of
society to the fullest extent.
A general rating of migration results is the primary factor that affects fur-
ther migration intentions. Consequently, it should surprise no one that the
percentage of people who would like to leave Kyiv varies among those indi-
viduals who rated migration as a correct step and those who viewed it as a
mistake (Table 4.3).There were no respondents who intended to improve
their lives by relocating within Ukraine.
Among those who are sure or inclined toward a positive rating of their
move, 45% definitely do not want to leave, while 9% are uncertain.Thirty
percent of respondents in this group are completely certain of their desire
to leave. At the same time, 50% of those who, in their opinion, would
probably not have come to Kyiv had they known how they would end up
living here, were certain that they wanted to leave. Sixty-four percent of
immigrants, even if they were aware of the consequences of a move to
Ukraine and would by no means take such a step, were certain that they
wanted to leave the country.
The influence of the cultural integration strategy, which was not at all
reflected in the formulation of ratings of migration results, is noted, albeit
not very distinctly, in the formulation of migration goals. Thus, 38% of
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those who are oriented toward the strategy of cultural integration, 45%
of those who are oriented towards separation, and 50% of those who tend
toward cultural marginalization are definite about leaving Ukraine.
The link between cultural integration and formulation of migration
goals is evident even in aspects of linguistic competence. Nearly 30% of
those who during their stay in Kyiv mastered not only Russian but also
Ukrainian, 46% of those who learned only Russian, and 56% of those who
do not know either of the local languages want to leave the country.
Forty-two percent of those who want to live permanently in Ukraine
simultaneously want to leave.This paradox is connected, first of all, with
the unsatisfactory situation in Kyiv of 80% of the respondents in this
group, which consists mostly of Afghan and African refugees who, in
their own words, are living in hardship and below the poverty line.They
would like to live in Kyiv but only on condition that their lives will
improve; in the meantime, under the current conditions, they see no
other solution than to move somewhere else. For the majority of them,
however, this desire is more of a dream, and none of them are planning
to leave in the very near future.
Citizenship is an important prerequisite for an immigrant’s full inte-
gration into the receiving society, as well as the best guarantee of secur-
ing rights. A desire to obtain Ukrainian citizenship clearly indicates the
nontraditional immigrant’s intention to remain living in Kyiv.
Do you want to leave Ukraine?Would you have
come if you had
known the
consequences? Yes Probably
Probably
not No
Not
sure Total
Definitely yes 30.2 11.3 17.0 28.3 13.2 100
Probably 30.3 18.2 19.7 25.7 6.1 100
Probably not 50.0 18.8 12.5 18.7 0.0 100
Definitely not 63.4 14.0 3.2 18.3 1.1 100
Not sure 50.0 0.0 50.0 - - 100
All Respondents 45.3 14.5 12.8 22.2 5.2 100
TABLE 4.3 Distribution of Immigrants Who Want to Leave
Ukraine, Based on the Level of Satisfaction with
Migration Results, in % (N= 234)
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Table 4.4 illustrates the aspirations of Kyiv immigrant communities
to live in Kyiv, depart to another country, obtain citizenship, and make
plans for the very near future. In most communities the number of
immigrants who want to become citizens is higher than those who want
to live here permanently.
Ninety-two percent of those who would like to obtain Ukrainian cit-
izenship but do not want to remain living here do not have valid pass-
ports, or any passports whatsoever; for them the main appeal of citizen-
ship is the opportunity to receive a Ukrainian passport, which they believe
will help them move to Western Europe.
Although the desire to move to Western Europe or the United States
is unambiguously prevalent in respondents’ answers, the presence of rela-
tives in their homelands is a definitive consideration in their desire to
return home. Some respondents would like to join relatives who do not
live in their homelands.Among these are Afghans who brought their par-
ents to Pakistan, and Africans whose relatives moved to neighboring
countries to be farther away from military actions. One respondent hopes
to move to Russia to join his brothers, who have created a better life there
than in Kyiv. But most importantly, there are three times fewer individu-
als among respondents with relatives in their homelands who want to
move no matter where but have no place to go.
Unlike relatives in the homeland, the presence of relatives in Western
countries also has some impact on the desire to leave Ukraine (Table 4.5)
Table 4.4 shows that nearly 9% of respondents are ready to act on their
intention to leave the country within a year. It is interesting to note that,
with regard to immediate intentions, the difference between destinations
is much smaller than with regard to desires in general, because 49% of this
group are planning to move to Western European countries within a year,
while 41% are planning to return to their homeland; incidentally, 12% of
those who are planning to return to their homeland consider themselves
refugees. Among economic migrants who have decided to leave Kyiv
within a year, 58% will be heading for their homelands.
Instead of drawing conclusions here, we shall examine the hypotheti-
cal assumption that all those who have an intention or doubts about leav-
ing the country within a year will act on this intention. How will this be
reflected on the general characteristics of the respondents? The percent-
age of women will noticeably decline from 25% to 11%.The average age
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will slightly increase from thirty-four to thirty-five.At the same time, the
age of Chinese immigrants will drop, because only families from this
group are planning to leave, not single men.Africans’ and Pakistanis’ ages
will remain unchanged because few of them are planning to leave; but
Afghans,Vietnamese, and Arabs will be older by one year. In general, the
number of individuals under thirty will decrease from 30% to 22%. Half
of immigrants with Ph.D.s will leave the country, although the proportion
of people who studied in institutions of higher learning will increase by
2%.The absolute number of children will decrease, but the percentage of
families with children will increase from 44% to 53%. Among different
categories of employment the number of market traders will increase by
1%, the number of unemployed will increase by 3%, while the number of
entrepreneurs will decrease by 2%.The number of people who depend on
the assistance of international organizations will increase by 4%.The rat-
ing of the material situation of those who remain in Kyiv hardly differs
from that of the total number of immigrants.
Among those who have no intentions of leaving Ukraine at the present
time, there is a high percentage of immigrants who are dissatisfied with the
nature of their activities. In this group there is a noticeably higher percent-
age of immigrants without essential documents and those who have already
used illegal immigration channels than among immigrants in general. All
this goes to prove that in the near future most of them may formulate an
intention to leave Kyiv and Ukraine, especially since 57% of people who are
staying for the time being no longer have the desire to live here.
A further outflow of people from Kyiv may indeed take place.
Channels for the transit transport of migrants through Ukraine have not
disappeared, and it is doubtful that they will vanish even after the expan-
Do you want to leave Ukraine?
Do you have 
relatives? Yes Probably
Probably
not No
Not
sure Total
Yes 55.1 19.1 8.9 12.4 4.5 100
No 39.8 10.5 15.4 28.7 5.6 100
All Respondents 45.7 13.8 12.9 22.4 5.2 100
TABLE 4.5 Presence of Relatives in Western Countries and Desire
to Leave Ukraine, in % (N=232)
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sion of the Schengen zone. In other words, new emigrants will appear,
taking the place of those who, after living here for many years, adapted
and were to some extent integrated, at least through marriage and chil-
dren. From the point of view of the city’s growth, the loss of the youngest
and most economically active representatives of immigrant communities
does not appear to be the best scenario.
With respect to the direction of the hypothetical departure, those who
hope to act on their intention to make it to Germany, Netherlands,
Sweden, Canada, or another Western country associate it not only with
the desire to improve the material conditions of their lives, but also with
the fact that more clearly defined and hence more readily understandable
living conditions await them there.70
Immigrants through the Eyes of Kyiv Residents
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CHAPTER FIVE
Immigrants through the eyes 
of Kyiv Residents
The local population’s attitude toward newcomers, others, or “for-eigners” is an important indicator of the maturity, development,and tolerance of a society, a people, and a state. In recent years
both Ukraine and its capital city Kyiv have encountered a new problem—
one that was unknown in Soviet times: the settling, employment, and
adaptation of both legal and illegal immigrants and individuals seeking
asylum. For the most part, Kyiv residents are prepared to understand and
accept the representatives of nations that comprised the former Soviet
Union, since, thanks to seventy years of common history, they resemble
the local population in quite a few respects. Throughout the twentieth
century, Soviet citizens, in one way or another, migrated to Ukraine, and
many Ukrainians also worked alongside the representatives of other Soviet
nations in different parts of a once unified state or in their homeland. For
them these people are both “others” and “our own people.”71
Immigrants from Asian and African countries are a different matter,
although perhaps Kyivans, out of all the people in Ukraine, are most ready
to associate with the representatives of these groups. After all, beginning
in the 1960s, foreign students were an integral part of the student body in
such leading Kyiv schools as Taras Shevchenko National University,
National Technical University of Ukraine (Kyiv Polytechnic Institute),
and National Aviation University. However, it is one thing to have stu-
dents arriving for a designated period of time, associating mostly with fel-
low students in university lecture halls and on campuses, and then leaving
after graduation. It is an entirely different matter when average Kyiv resi-
dents encounter immigrants from Asian and African countries in various
corners of the city: in the markets as colleagues or competitors; in their
places of habitation as neighbors; public places; restaurants and cafes; and
on public transportation.Therefore, today we may speak about the forma-
tion of an entirely different type of interpersonal relations, as well as a dif-
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ferent attitude of the local population—Kyiv residents—toward newcom-
ers from Asian and African countries, who in the past ten years have been
appearing in Kyiv as students, immigrants, and refugees. As the noted
Ukrainian sociologist Nikolai Shul’ga writes:“The number of individuals
who declare that they are refugees increases with every year.At the same
time there is an increase in the number of problems associated with these
people: legal, economic, social, ethnocultural, religious, and psychological.
Even so, they are not only remaining unsolved, but practically no one is
even studying them.”72
Historically, Kyiv was always a multinational and multicultural city
where several cultures coexisted, evolved, intermingled, and mutually
enriched each other peacefully and sometimes not so peacefully. It is
worth noting that Kyiv was always an important crossroad of several
trade routes linking the East and West, and the North and South. It was
always a multiethnic city. When Kyiv was part of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania and the Polish Commonwealth (Rzecz Pospolita), the city
already had established trade relations with almost all of Europe. The
same is true of the more recent period of the turbulent growth of cap-
italism, when not only Russians and Poles made their way to the great
industrial and cultural center of Kyiv but also Germans, Czechs,
Karaims, and others. Like the Ukrainians, a significant Jewish stratum
always formed an organic part of the indigenous population of Kyiv.
According to statistical data of the twentieth century, Kyiv was the
place of habitation of many newcomers in varying numbers from differ-
ent parts of the world, and above all from the Russian Empire and its
successor, the Soviet Union. Thus, according to the 1926 census, the
population of Kyiv was comprised of 43% Ukrainians, 28% Jews, 25%
Russians, and 0.26% Poles.73 In the post-war period, as Soviet sources
confirm, a varying number of representatives of almost every nationali-
ty in the Soviet Union lived in the city.
In addition to studying the problems that are connected with the
arrival of immigrants in Kyiv and their settlement in the city, it is impor-
tant to clarify and analyze the attitude of Kyiv residents toward the fact
that new residents have appeared in the city—newcomers from Asian
and African countries. Do they see it as a problem? How do they assess
their impact on city life? What do they know about their relations with
the organs of state power?
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VIEWS ON IMMIGRANTS: SURVEY DATA
In order to clarify these and other questions, we conducted a representa-
tive survey of Kyiv residents.The sampling size, which consisted of 1,000
respondents, was based on the principle of multilevel quota sampling.
These quotas represent the adult population of Kyiv divided according to
gender, age, and level of education, as well as territorial features (Kyiv city
districts). Streets in each district were selected and used as an itinerary for
the survey. Interviewers were instructed to conduct surveys with no more
than three respondents from each building. Refusals to participate in the
survey were not recorded.The survey itinerary forms included the address
and full name of the respondent (if s/he agreed to provide such informa-
tion). Thus, the sampling size incorporated relevant socio-demographic
characteristics. Women comprised 53.9% of the survey participants, and
men, 46.1%, which generally corresponds with the gender/age composi-
tion of the city population in 2000.74
TABLE 5.1 Place, and Frequency of Encounters and Fraternization
of Kyiv Residents with Immigrants, in %*
* The total percentage exceeds 100 because respondents gave more than one
response.
Frequency of encounter and fraternization
Place of encounter
and fraternization
Have you ever
encountered
immigrants?
(N=998)
Have you ever
fraternized with
immigrants? (N=991)
At work 7.4 5.7
At place of
habitation 9.7 6.4
In public places 32.2 11.1
At the markets 25.3 14.8
In children' s and
learning institutions 4 2.3
In medical
institutions 2 1.2
Other 0.5 0.8
No 48.0 67.8
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The survey addressed the following questions:
• How often do Kyiv residents encounter immigrants and associate with
them?
• Where do those encounters take place?
• Do encounters differ based on the type of activity or level of well-being
of the Kyiv residents?
• Do Kyiv residents believe that the number of migrants in the city is
increasing or decreasing?
• How do Kyiv residents and immigrants rate the reasons behind the
migrants’ decision to choose Kyiv as their place of habitation?
• What problems do immigrants come across (in their opinion and that of
Kyiv residents)?
• Do immigrants want to adapt to the new conditions of life and integrate
into the Ukrainian milieu?
• Are they prepared to engage in the process of socio-psychological assim-
ilation while preserving their national identity?
Based on the acquired information, we were able to compare the rat-
ing of the socio-economic living conditions, which Kyiv residents and
immigrants provide concerning both their own life and each other’s.The
frequency of Kyiv residents’ encounters with immigrants from Asia and
Africa confirms that as of today a significant number of Kyiv residents
have experience with associating with immigrants in Kyiv (See Table 5.1)
Kyiv residents mostly encounter immigrants in public places and at the
markets, 32.3% and 25.4%, respectively, which also corresponds to the sur-
vey data on the main workplaces of immigrants. (Table 5.2).
Immigrants are least frequently encountered at children’s and learning
institutions. However, according to this marker, there are four districts
where immigrants either live, study, or work: the Pechersky and
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Shevchenkivsky districts (15% each), which have a concentration of
numerous institutions of higher learning where foreign students study,
and a number of elite schools attended by children of businessmen and
members of the diplomatic corps; and the Desniansky and Dniprovsky
districts (25% and 17.5%, respectively), where a significant proportion
of immigrant residents live with their families, and whose children
attend secondary schools and preschool establishments in the district.
It should be kept in mind that native Kyivans do not associate that
often with migrants from Asia and Africa. Only one-third of surveyed
respondents (32%) said that they have first-hand experience with
immigrants from these continents. With regard to the frequency with
which residents of various Kyivan districts associate with immigrants,
as could be expected, residents of the two largest left-bank districts
closest to the Troieshchynsky market—Dniprovsky and Desniansky
(14% and 13% of respondents, respectively), most often associate with
immigrants.After comparing the frequency of encounters with the fre-
quency of fraternization, we noticed that the percentage of respondents
who associate with immigrants in certain places directly correlates with
the percentage of respondents who encounter immigrants in the very
same places.This tendency is particularly typical for children’s, learning,
and medical institutions, where the frequency of encounters and asso-
ciation is almost identical.
Aspiring to secure at least some minimal living conditions, newcom-
ers must look for work. Under contemporary conditions, the main
places where they apply their efforts are petty commerce and trading.
Thus, their fraternization with citizens of Kyiv takes place most often
in this sphere. Individuals who have their own business and employees
of private firms (8.5% and 19.4%, respectively) associate with immi-
grants most frequently at work. Students most often associate with
immigrants in public places (22.4%) and at the markets (13.4%).
Unexpectedly, little fraternization occurs in learning institutions—6%.
This clearly attests to the insignificant number of representatives of
Asian and African countries among the Kyiv student population.With
respect to place of habitation, the picture is almost identical for the
majority of identified categories. However, as expected, with the
exception of employees of state enterprises and private companies, peo-
ple who do not work and the unemployed predominate.
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The reciprocal fraternization between immigrants and Kyiv residents
may be indicative of the level of the latter’s well-being.Thus, those who
live well fraternize most often with immigrants at the markets (26.3%),
where many of those who rated their well-being as normal (18%) also
associate with immigrants. It is noteworthy that even those who rate
their living conditions as falling below the poverty line fraternize with
immigrants at the markets, for quite often they look for occasional jobs
in these very places, with migrant traders becoming their employers.
Such individuals account for 16.1% of the poorest respondents.Among
those who live well, the percentage of people who in one way or
another fraternize with immigrants is 10-15% higher than among citi-
zens with a lower level of well-being.
The study revealed that neither the material status of Kyivans nor the
place of fraternization with migrants has any critical effect on the dis-
tribution of their attitude toward immigrants.Thus, 66.1% of Kyiv resi-
dents who are favorably disposed toward immigrants have never associ-
ated with them, while 62.3% of those who believe that Kyiv residents
are hostile toward immigrants have also never associated with migrants.
As could be expected, this percentage is even higher among those who
are indifferent or unsure (73% and nearly 68%, respectively). But accord-
ing to the collected data, fraternization with immigrants or its absence
does not significantly influence Kyiv residents’ attitude toward them.
Questions to Kyiv residents on whether they have noticed an
increase or decrease in the number of immigrants in the city within
the last ten years showed that in general the majority of respondents
(70%) were unsure. Seventy-five percent of those 30% who have at
least some idea said that there are many immigrants in the city.
Although such responses as “few”, “not many”, “many”, “average” are
not expressed numerically, in our opinion they seem to have quite an
explicit, emotionally laden content. Therefore, after calculating the
results of the survey, we found that 3.7% of respondents think that we
have few immigrants, and 4% of those who answered the question
believe that there are not many. Therefore, it may be stated that the
preponderant majority of Kyiv residents actually do not have an objec-
tive idea of the number of immigrants in the city, while those who
answered the question are governed more by their attitude toward the
problem than informed opinion.
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However, it can also be said that the majority of respondents (56.4%)
who do not have a clear-cut idea of the number of immigrants in the
city believe that the presence of immigrants has a negative effect on the
situation in the city, while 26% are not sure. Thus, generally less than
20% of respondents are neutral (“no effect”—13%) or positive—4.5%.
Here it should be clarified that after having been transformed into
the capital of an independent state, Kyiv in the last ten years has almost
completely lost its “provincial” coziness that was so dear to many Kyiv
residents; its pace of life has changed, and many new people have
appeared, owing primarily to migration to the city from other regions
in Ukraine. In our opinion, this is precisely why the majority of Kyiv
residents have a negative attitude toward the prospects of a further
increase in the city population, number of cars on the streets, level of
exhaust pollution, etc.The attitude of Kyiv residents toward both new-
comers in general and immigrants in particular should also be assessed
against this background.
We also analyzed the opinions of Kyiv residents concerning trends in
the number of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Respondents fre-
quently expressed contradictory opinions.The majority of Kyiv residents
(65%) believe that the number of immigrants is constantly growing,
regardless of the fact that objective data confirm the opposite tendency.
Another 15.8% believe that even if their numbers have increased, they
have not done so significantly. At the same time, 14.5% hesitated in
answering this question, and even fewer (4.6%) tended to believe that the
numbers of immigrants is not increasing in the city.
In identifying their countries of origin, the majority of respondents
named three countries from which, in their opinion, most immigrants
had come to Kyiv.Thus, Kyiv residents believed, not unjustifiably, that
the majority of immigrants in Kyiv are from Afghanistan (49% of
respondents) and China (48%). According to respondents, these coun-
tries are followed closely by Vietnam (41%). Only 20% of respondents
believe that the overwhelming majority of immigrants in Kyiv are from
Pakistan;Turkey and India were the next most commonly named coun-
tries (17% and 11%, respectively).African countries, Iran, and Iraq were
identified as the home countries of a significant proportion of immi-
grants by fewer than 10% of Kyiv residents.An insignificant proportion
of Kyiv residents named Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (2–3%).
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In the perception of Ukrainian citizens, the main factors that led to the
migration of immigrants from Asia and Africa to Ukraine are wars and a
variety of interethnic conflicts.As the following table indicates, almost half
of Kyiv residents believe that the main reason behind immigration is mil-
itary conflicts, which lead to destruction and human victims.Almost 40%
of respondents think that one of the defining causes of migration is that
life is better in Ukraine in general, and in Kyiv in particular. However,
there is no denying that in 2000 Ukrainians gave a rating of 1.88 to the
economic situation in their state on a ten-point scale.75 (See Table 5.3) 
For immigrants, adapting to daily life in a foreign country is always
associated with a broad spectrum of problems.This means obtaining a
residence permit and searching for a job, not to mention adapting to
the living conditions in each specific country.Yet, according to the sur-
veyed Kyiv residents, the most important problem that immigrants face
in Kyiv is their dealings with law enforcement agencies. Every second
surveyed resident shared this opinion (54%).
In this case, it is significant that the opinion of Kyiv residents is prac-
tically identical to the opinion of immigrants themselves. Responding
to the question, “Where did you most often witness unfairness toward
Main factors of immigration
Kyiv
residents’
ratings in %
Immigrants’
ratings in %
Education 32.5 22
Marriage 25.4 11
Life is better in Ukraine 38.8 38
Were escaping war 46.0 26
Transit 28.9 3
Other 4.0 -
Not sure 10.0 -
TABLE 5.3 Main Factors of Immigration from Asian and 
African Countries according to Kyiv Residents 
and Immigrants, in %*
* The total percentage exceeds 100 because respondents gave more than one
response.
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you?” nearly 62% of immigrants mentioned the police, while 44% indi-
cated public places, where such encounters actually occur most often.
For the purpose of comparison, only 18% of respondents have problems
at work, while a little over 3% have problems with neighbors or in
medical institutions. Migrants encounter the least number of problems
in educational institutions—1%.
Many Kyiv residents believe that immigrants’ social and legal vulner-
ability is manifested in such problems as difficulties in obtaining resi-
dence documents (40%), searching for housing (42%), and ability to
find work (32%). Few Kyiv residents view issues like children’s educa-
tion and the ability to obtain medical care as being problematic for
immigrants from countries of the above-cited regions. With regard to
immigrants’ socio-economic conditions, Kyiv residents’ ratings are
rather contradictory. Kyiv residents believe that immigrants are much
worse off than the local population.At the same time, they have a rather
high opinion of their material situation or, to put it simply, their earn-
ings.The majority of respondents are genuinely convinced that immi-
grants have significantly more money than the Ukrainian population.
(See Table 5.4)
Today, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens are facing
the urgent problem of employment, which is also a pressing issue for
immigrants. Kyiv residents spoke of limited opportunities to find a job
both for themselves (median rating of 2.7) and even more so for immi-
grants from Asian and African countries (2.4). However, Kyiv residents
believe that they still have more chances for success than immigrants.
Our analysis of median scores of job opportunities for Kyiv residents
and immigrants of various social strata revealed that the category of
unemployed respondents perhaps feels some competition from immi-
grants, since their median score was 2.4, while immigrants had a medi-
an score of 2.5. For the remaining social categories of respondents,
there were no appreciable differences in the rating of opportunities to
find a job, if one excludes businessmen, who account for a fundamen-
tal gap in the compared ratings.
The completed survey permits us to confirm that Kyiv residents’ per-
ception of immigrants from Asia and Africa is quite ambiguous.
Nevertheless, half of respondents (56%) believe that the presence of immi-
grants from these countries, who are living on the territory of Kyiv, has
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more negative than positive consequences for the situation in the capital.
Their presence leads to a decrease in the number of jobs for Kyiv resi-
dents, provokes interethnic conflicts, weakens the housing pool, etc.The
remaining respondents (44%) are either indifferent to immigrants or even
positively disposed toward them. Obviously, in this case we have a rather
high level of openness on the part of Kyiv residents toward other ethno-
cultural groups.This opinion is also shared by immigrants, who in their
leisure time are equally likely to socialize with representatives of the local
population as with their compatriots and other immigrants.
A proportion of respondents believe that immigrants have a negative
impact on the level of crime in the capital. Almost half of the respon-
dents (49%) believe that immigrants who are involved in criminal
activities are creating a high-crime situation where they live and work.
A rather significant number of Kyiv residents expressed the conviction
that all immigrants are somehow linked to the criminal world.
However, police statistics show that such statements are exaggerations.
Not infrequently the Ukrainian press blames a variety of crimes on
immigrants. Meanwhile, according to data of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, approximately 600,000 different crimes in the space of one year
were officially recorded in Ukraine,76 out of which nearly 3,000 were
attributed to foreigners, i.e., no more than 0.5%.
An unbiased analysis of Kyiv residents’ rating of the presence of
immigrants in the city confirms that among those who are in constant
contact with immigrants, there is a markedly higher percentage of peo-
ple who believe that Kyiv residents are positively disposed toward them
than those who associate with immigrants infrequently.This difference
is even more pronounced among those who believe that Kyiv residents
are hostile toward immigrants—a difference of 7% in the responses of
those who only have occasional dealings with foreigners.
In our view, the aloof attitude of some Kyiv residents may also be
explained by the fact that one-third of respondents (34%) are convinced
that newcomers from Africa and Asia have an unfriendly attitude toward
local residents.At the same time a significant proportion (43%) of respon-
dents were utterly unable to rate the behavior of immigrants from Asia
and Africa in Kyiv or their outlook on the local population. In other
words, we are speaking not so much of unfriendliness or lack of mutual
understanding as ignorance demonstrated by a significant proportion of
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Kyiv city residents who have no experience in dealing with immigrants.
For that reason the question,“What did they bring with them when they
came to our country, and what can be expected of them?” was not com-
pletely answered, because the attitude of the majority of Kyiv residents
toward immigrants is formed not so much on the basis of personal expe-
rience as on external influence, particularly the mass media.
A rather high level of readiness on the part of city residents to coexist
with foreigners from Asian and African countries is further corroborated
by the response to questions that were posed to respondents with the goal
of determining how much they are prepared to let representatives of other
cultures into their lives. The collected data indicate that the majority of
Kyiv residents are either ready to see immigrants as residents of their city
or do not have a clear-cut answer—37.3% and 21.8%, respectively. For
more detailed information, see Table 5.5.
An increase in the level to which Kyiv residents are prepared to admit
immigrants from Asia and Africa to their milieu is observed concomitant-
ly with an improvement in their material situation.The higher they rate
their own well-being (“We live well,”“We live okay.”), the more positive
the respondents’ attitude toward the prospect of having personal relations
with immigrants, including accepting them as friends, work colleagues,
and neighbors, and even members of their families.
Of the various social strata, the most positive attitude toward immi-
grants is observed among young people (students, schoolchildren), as
 Are you ready to accept
 immigrants as: Yes Not sure No Total
 City residents 37.3 21.8 40.9 100
 Microdistrict residents 34.7 22.2 43.1 100
 Work colleagues 26.3 22.4 51.3 100
 Neighbors 23.1 18.9 57.9 100
 Close friends 17.0 16.5 66.5 100
 Family members 5.0 14.3 80.7 100
TABLE 5.5 Readiness of Kyiv Residents to Accept Immigrants from
Asia and Africa, in % (N=998) 
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well as those who have their own businesses, i.e., those citizens who
have the most contact with immigrants. On the one hand, the defining
factor in this case is type of activity, and on the other—the fact that the
former are the most communicative and inquisitive members of socie-
ty. Respondents who have never had any personal contact with immi-
grants or who have had such encounters only at the markets would pre-
fer not to let foreigners into their microdistrict or do not want them as
neighbors. In other words, these are the people who are buying cheap,
mass-produced consumer goods from immigrants. In our opinion, this
attitude has more of a social than ethnic basis.At the same time, respon-
dents who have prior personal experience of associating with immi-
grants, i.e, they have already worked with immigrants or have socialized
in their places of habitation, have an entirely tolerant attitude toward
immigrants as work colleagues, neighbors, or friends.
During the survey we recorded a rather high level of readiness to
allow immigrants into the capital, associate with them, or live next door
among those respondents who gave a relatively low rating of their
material situation. Respondents who gave a high rating of immigrants’
material well-being demonstrated more of a hostile attitude toward
them, and were completely opposed to the idea of Asian and African
immigrants being in Kyiv.
Public opinion and the municipal government’s treatment of immi-
grants has an impact on the local population’s perception of immigrants
as equal members of society. Our analysis showed a direct correlation
between Kyiv residents’ attitude toward immigrants from Asia and
Africa and their likelihood to admit immigrants into their milieu. In
general, those who are prepared to accept immigrants as members of
their family, close friends, and city residents believe that local residents
have a positive and friendly attitude toward immigrants.
The survey revealed that only 8.4% of respondents believe that the
government is doing something to improve immigrants’ lives, demon-
strating concern for recent newcomers to the city, and trying to resolve
their social problems. Nearly one-third (33.6%) believes that the
authorities are indifferent to immigrants and in fact not doing anything
to help them adapt in the city. A little more than one-third (36.6%) is
completely unaware of any actions that the government is undertaking
to overcome real or non-existent problems connected with immigrants.
 
Immigrants through the Eyes of Kyiv Residents
| 133 |
In their opinion, the authorities are indifferent to the immigrants’ pres-
ence on the territory of Kyiv, and are not implementing any designat-
ed policy with respect to immigrants.This is indeed the case.To this day
the state has not developed a concept of migration policy; no efforts
have been made to generalize experience amassed in this sphere, and no
migration legislation is being implemented (for more detailed informa-
tion, see Table 2.1). One-fifth (21.4%) of Kyiv residents believe that the
authorities are somehow trying to eliminate immigrants from the city.
At the same time, socio-legal measures concerning legal and illegal
immigrants are not being discussed in the mass media. Perhaps for that
very reason a majority of respondents were unable to identify any
actions that the authorities are implementing with regard to immi-
grants or to define the government’s attitude to people who have come
to Ukraine from Asian and African countries. Hence, it was logical to
ask the average Kyiv resident: what should the municipal government
be doing about immigrants? 
One-fifth of the respondents (21%) are convinced that the munici-
pal authorities should treat immigrants the same as their own citizens,
and help them. Over 40% believe that there is no need to do anything
special, but encouraging any increase in the influx of immigrants is not
desirable either. Nearly 15% of respondents are indifferent to this issue
or fail to see any problem. Only 17% hold extremist opinions and think
that immigrants should be expelled from the city.
Native-born Kyiv residents are most in favor of halting immigration.
Citizens of practically every country in the world are critical of the grow-
ing numbers of immigrants, regardless of their skin color or country of
origin. As for Kyiv residents, the situation in this city is unique: during
World War II the city lost over half its population, and in the post-war
years Kyiv’s population grew mostly as a result of the influx of migrants
from different regions of Ukraine and other Soviet republics.
The survey goes a long way to proving that Kyivans are renowned for
their high level of tolerance. In the past few centuries both native-born
and foreign ethnographers have frequently singled out this Ukrainian
trait. In general, we see that the Kyivan population, not burdened by any
special psychological problems, is prepared to accept the migration
processes that have been taking place in recent years. Kyivans are tolerant
toward the representatives of other races and cultures.They are, at one and
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the same time, sufficiently self-critical and critical of factors at work in
their own country. It is therefore possible that a positive resolution may be
found to migration problems that have arisen in the last decade, and
which will continue to be urgent problems for Ukraine in the future.
VIEWS ON IMMIGRANTS: INTERVIEWS WITH SPECIALISTS
One of our sources of information on immigrants from Asian and African
countries in the city of Kyiv was interviews with government representa-
tives, law enforcement agencies, civic organizations, as well as teachers and
medical personnel, who through their everyday work have firsthand con-
tact with this segment of the city population.The opinions of experts are
particularly interesting because, unlike average Kyiv residents, these special-
ists possess broader and more objective information about immigrants. In
his/her own area of expertise each can influence, and indeed does influ-
ence, the formulation and implementation of migration policy in the city.
Of the forty-six experts who were interviewed, thirty-eight were Kyiv
residents.Among them were twelve government bureaucrats who work in
the central organs of state power, municipal and raion state administra-
tions; seven employees of the police at the municipal and raion level; ten
medical workers and teachers who work with immigrants; and nine rep-
resentatives of non-governmental, religious, and charitable organizations
who are implementing programs serving immigrants.
The general impression created by these experts’ interviews is that even
specialists, who in their line of work have the most frequent contact with
immigrants, have very limited knowledge of immigrants.A significant num-
ber of questions about the presence of immigrants in the city, their numbers,
dynamics of migration, and governmental policies and measures toward
immigrants were left unanswered. In some cases their answers reflected the
stereotypes being circulated in the press. For example, some experts would
shift the subject of the conversation away from Asian and African immigrants,
who were the focus of our questions, to immigrants from the Caucasus
region; and from immigration issues in general to illegal migration. Again,
this corroborated the fact that in the public’s mind, thanks to the mass media,
the concept of migration is associated above all with illegal migration, and
the concept of migrant with “individuals of Caucasian nationality.”
The people who turned out to be the most knowledgeable were police-
men.This proves that, just as in Soviet times, foreigners and immigrants are
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a point of interest primarily to law enforcement agencies—the state’s rela-
tions with them take place mostly in the sphere of registration and control.
The least knowledgeable about immigrants within the general city context
turned out to be medical personnel and a few representatives of NGOs.
Their knowledge was mostly limited to a specific area of daily activity.
The dearth of published composite statistics on the number of immi-
grants in the city, including those from Asia and Africa, is reflected in the
experts’ diverse range of responses to questions concerning their numbers.
Experts’ ratings of the number of African and Asian immigrants who are liv-
ing in the city of Kyiv were broken down in the following way: one in five
believes that there are approximately 10,000 immigrants from Asian and
African countries living in the city; the majority (42%) gave a rating of
between 10,000 and 20,000; four experts said that there are between 20,000
and 30,000 immigrants in Kyiv from those countries; and the remaining four
gave a rating of between 50,000 and 200,000 immigrants.
Out of those who gave a rating of 50,000 to 200,000 immigrants,
there was only one government bureaucrat, whose work was related to
general economic questions; thus he did not deal with the immigration
problem to any great degree. Other individuals who gave high ratings
were teachers, medical personnel, and representatives of NGOs, i.e., indi-
viduals who, inasmuch as they have fewer opportunities to come across
various types of statistical data and are thus less able to evaluate them,
form their views mostly on the basis of information from the mass media.
Thus, in the opinion of most experts (66.6%) approximately 20,000
Asian and African immigrants are living in Kyiv; this figure generally par-
allels the data collected by the authors by means of calculations based on
statistical data from various sources. It should be recalled that the survey
of Kyiv residents revealed that over one half (53.5%) of respondents (city
residents) gave the same kind of rating.
The experts also gave guarded responses to the question whether
immigration to Kyiv from Asian and African countries has increased in the
last ten years.Their position on this question does not match the opinions
of Kyiv residents, over 65% of whom said that immigration to Kyiv has
increased significantly in the last decade.The experts’ views are more sim-
ilar to the results obtained during the polling of immigrants themselves:
60% of immigrant respondents believe that the number of their compa-
triots who are living in Kyiv has decreased within the last few years; 13%
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said that the number had not changed; and only 9% thought that the
influx of their countrymen to the city had increased (18% were not sure).
As for the reasons behind the arrival of immigrants in Ukraine, one-
third of the experts stated that it depends on the country of origin and on
other factors, including economic and political reasons. Over 20% of the
experts considered that economic reasons are predominant. Immigrants
had come to Ukraine expecting that they would be able to make money
here, and thinking that the economic situation was better than in their
homeland. Five experts noted that the reasons for immigration are polit-
ical. In the opinion of six experts, immigrants had no intentions whatso-
ever to come to Ukraine: they were simply transiting through the coun-
try, and had stayed here by happenstance for a short period of time.
On the whole, experts’ opinions corroborate information which was
obtained from the immigrants themselves.As the survey of Kyiv residents
revealed, the urban population grasps the reasons in a similar fashion. It is
also worth noting that most Kyiv residents/respondents thought that
immigrants were escaping wars; in other words, they were refugees, which
suggests a certain amount of sympathy toward them.
The experts more or less concurred in their identification of immigrants’
main activity—trading in the markets. However, their responses differed as
to the reasons why they engage mostly in this type of activity: some thought
that immigrants had come to Kyiv only for the purpose of trading; others
believed that immigrants have no other employment opportunities.
Ratings of immigrants’ impact on the socio-economic development of
Kyiv varied. On the whole, the impact of immigrants on the municipal
economy was rated as positive by teachers and medical personnel, who in
this particular context were acting primarily as consumers of goods and
services offered by immigrants. In the group of government functionaries
and NGO representatives, ratings were divided approximately equally
between positive and negative. At the same time, employees of law
enforcement agencies gave uniformly negative ratings. They blamed
immigrants for contributing to the development of the shadow economy
and taking jobs away from Ukrainians.
The majority of experts also did not cite any obvious impact of the pres-
ence of immigrants on the municipal infrastructure, i.e., the housing situa-
tion, medical and child-related establishments, educational institutions, etc.
Only one-quarter of the experts acknowledged such an impact, which is
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mostly negative. In their opinion, immigrants’“faults” stem from the tempo-
rary nature of their sojourn in Kyiv,which means that they do not care about
the conditions of apartments and buildings. At the same time, they live in
highly dense, unsanitary conditions that lead to the spread of diseases, there-
by creating an additional burden for the municipal health system.
The majority of experts agreed that immigrants from Asian and African
countries do not have any impact on the linguistic and cultural environment,
or on interethnic relations in the city. They did, however, note that only
Russian immigrants, who bring their language and culture to Ukraine, are
making a real impact. In contrast, nontraditional immigrants are trying as
quickly as possible to learn the language and traditions of the local popula-
tion, since this is one of the prerequisites of their survival.At the same time,
the experts warned that even though there is no ethnic conflict in the city,
the mass media are inflaming the situation by setting Kyiv residents in oppo-
sition to immigrants, and creating a negative reputation for the latter.
At the same time, ten out of thirty-eight experts, i.e., one quarter, cited
the impact of immigrants on diversification of city life: restaurants that
serve an array of national cuisines are springing up, and the urban popu-
lation is becoming more diversified. At the same time, some experts said
that the presence of people with different languages, traditions, and phys-
ical appearance is irritating, and creating a certain tension. Furthermore,
this is harmful to the preservation and development of national values.
None of the experts stated that immigrants are causing ethnic conflicts,
but some believed that in the future such conflicts might arise as a result
of an increase in the scale of immigration and the number of Ukrainian
citizens born of mixed marriages.
As the survey of Kyiv residents revealed, negative ratings of the impact
of immigrants on the situation in Kyiv are mainly connected with an idea
that is gaining currency: that the worsening of the criminal situation in
the city is linked to the arrival of immigrants. It should be kept in mind
that nearly 49% of city residents believed that immigrants are perpetrators
of illegal activities, while 11% thought that, while immigrants were usu-
ally victims of criminals, they were occasionally also contributing to the
worsening of the criminal situation.
Did the experts share the Kyivans’ opinion concerning the negative
impact of immigrants on crime levels? Six of them were unable to answer
this question. Over one-third (twelve experts) said that there is no such
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impact, and brought up various arguments as proof: from the insignificant
number of immigrants to the division of spheres of influence between
the national crime bosses, who are not allowing foreigners into their
“business.” This group of experts generally agreed that criminals in
Ukraine are not of the imported variety.
The experts’ rating of the impact of immigrants on the situation in the
city is amplified by their response to the question whether the presence
of immigrants is creating any problems for Kyiv residents, and if so, what
kinds of problems.Twenty-eight out of thirty-eight experts, i.e., the over-
whelming majority, did not see any problems. Two said that immigrants
are taking jobs away from Kyiv residents; four noted that they are causing
an increase in crime and drug trafficking; and another four said that they
are causing discomfort for Kyiv residents, have no experience of living in
a big city, and occupy housing where they live in unsanitary conditions.
In many respects the attitude toward immigrants depends on local res-
idents’ perception of them. During their interviews the experts were asked
how they rate the material situation of Asian and African immigrants in
Kyiv. The majority believes that the material situation of immigrants
varies; but they are not very well off, like local residents. One-quarter of
the experts rated the well-being of immigrants as lower than that of Kyiv
residents. Only one in five thinks that in terms of material well-being,
immigrants live not too badly—somewhat better than Kyiv residents.
Experts gave a high rating to the educational level of immigrants and
their knowledge of languages, i.e., their objective ability to appreciate the
values of the local population and to integrate into the receiving society.
The majority of experts (80%) believe that the educational level of immi-
grants is high or average; they gave the same rating to their interest in
learning languages and educating their children in Ukraine. Only one-
fifth thought that immigrants are generally poorly educated.
According to the opinion of sixteen experts, immigrants generally
feel comfortable in the city (with arguments ranging from “They
shouldn’t be offended, since no one invited them here” to “Kyiv is a
beautiful city”). At the same time, eighteen experts stated that immi-
grants do not feel comfortable in the city.
The next group of questions that were discussed with the experts con-
cerned the municipal government’s attitude toward the arrival of Asian and
African immigrants in the city and the directions, mechanisms, and results
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of immigration policy in Kyiv. Four experts were not sure how to answer.
Two thought that the municipal government has a negative attitude toward
immigrants, and is trying to get rid of them. Meanwhile, eight experts
thought that the government’s attitude toward immigrants is normal and
loyal, and that it is doing everything for them that the law requires. As
could be expected, this group of experts consisted of employees of the
municipal and raion state administrations and law enforcement agencies.
When asked to elaborate on their answer, they mentioned discussions of
pertinent questions during meetings, the collection of statistical informa-
tion, and the organization of festivals for ethnic minorities.
Therefore, the majority of experts came to the conclusion that local
government agencies pay almost no positive attention to immigrants.
There is no appreciation of the need to implement specific, targeted
actions, nor understanding that specific problems of immigrants exist. In
keeping with old stereotypes, immigrants are viewed only as violators or
potential violators of the law.
The experts offered quite a few suggestions concerning what they
believe the municipal government should be doing about immigration to
Kyiv.They may be divided into three groups. Suggestions made by NGO
representatives, teachers, and medical personnel were surprisingly similar
and boiled down to drafting appeals to the municipal government to
respect and understand the needs of all city residents, regardless of skin
color; to take into account the interests of both local residents and immi-
grants; to show more tolerance; and to understand that immigrants are also
people, who live, and will continue to live, in the city of Kyiv.
The group of experts who work for law enforcement agencies comprised
the largest number of people who are in favor of strengthening control meas-
ures and the struggle against illegal migration; fortifying border security and
restricting the entry of foreigners; and creating a system for deporting for-
eigners who have no grounds for remaining on the territory of Ukraine.
However, policemen were in favor of a more flexible approach to the prob-
lem of immigrants who are in Ukraine without documents, but cannot be
sent back to their homelands. They suggested that they should at least be
issued temporary documents, and that they should be registered in internal
affairs agencies. On the one hand, this would ensure control over such peo-
ple, and on the other, would give them an opportunity to find employment
and live normally during their stay in Ukraine.
 
| 140 |
One-third of the experts, mostly government bureaucrats, said that the
municipal government should act in accordance with current legislation,
i.e., for the most part they did not suggest any special measures targeting
immigrants and immigration. At the same time, these experts cited the
need to develop a concept of a state migration policy; establish permanent
monitoring of migration processes; learn from the experience of countries
that accept significant numbers of immigrants; create special programs for
housing, employment, education of immigrants; and create a government
body that would be responsible for finding solutions to an entire range of
migration problems.There were also several experts who championed the
need to adopt a special immigration policy for Kyiv, which would most-
ly be of a restrictive nature. Nevertheless, the majority of surveyed gov-
ernment bureaucrats were fully aware of the impossibility of separating
Kyiv from Ukraine, and completely cognizant of the need to resolve these
issues on the general state level.
Our analysis of the experts’ interviews confirms that specialists who
possess complete and accurate information on immigration in the city of
Kyiv generally do not give a negative rating to the impact of immigration
on city life. At the same time, our interviews with the experts provide
convincing proof that limited and one-sided attention is being paid to this
phenomenon. With the exception of law enforcement agencies, the
municipal authorities are in fact keeping their distance from the problems
of immigrants. What is more, they are doing nothing to influence the
development of tolerant and constructive relations between the city pop-
ulation and the immigrant minority.
CONCLUSIONS
The most important conclusion of this study is that the generally peace-
ful and calm interethnic relations which have been typical for Ukraine
and its capital city, should not be a source of comfort for the public,
scholars, or government officials who are developing state migration and
ethnonational policies.The situation requires close attention and contin-
uous monitoring.This will enable the authorities to discover undesirable
tendencies and their causative factors in a timely fashion, and to imple-
ment necessary preventive measures.
The results of the survey of Kyiv residents provide grounds for making
a positive—under certain conditions—assessment of the prospects for the
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development of relations between indigenous residents and immigrants.
Thus, both stages of the survey showed that the majority of the city pop-
ulation does not see a big problem in the arrival of Asian and African
immigrants. For the overwhelming majority of people immigrants do not
represent any competition or impediment preventing them from taking
advantage of municipal benefits.
Another argument in favor of an optimistic scenario for the continu-
ing improvement in relations between Kyiv residents and immigrants is
suggested by the significant number of respondents who, despite the fact
that they do not have positive views on the arrival of immigrants, did not
express a negative attitude toward them and refrained from answering the
question. Given that there are numerous individuals who have no clear-
cut opinion either way, there is ample opportunity to develop construc-
tive relations between these two groups of the population. At the same
time, this fact indicates an urgent need to adopt active measures in this
area, aimed at instilling mutual respect and developing cooperation and
the spirit of unity. The government, NGOs, and the mass media should
consistently implement such measures.
Scholarly research, primarily monitoring, would provide civic organi-
zations and government structures with objective data on the dynamics of
immigration, the process of immigrant adaptation, and the attitudes of
local residents, and can play an important role in promoting interethnic
tolerance. The dissemination of information may serve as an effective
counter-measure against distrust, bias, and xenophobia, for the protection
of human rights, regardless of race, nationality, or origin.
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CHAPTER SIX
Joining the World: Why Kyiv’s Migrant
Communities Matter
Kyiv and Ukraine in many ways are but minor way-stations ina much larger European migration system, an interesting side-bar to the voluminous empirical and theoretical studies of
international migration.77 The story told in this volume is hardly
unusual in a world inhabited by somewhere on the order of 100 mil-
lion international migrants (around a fifth of whom are refugees).78
Human beings have always moved around, no more so than the pres-
ent. During the past five hundred years alone, Europeans began to
inhabit the rest of the world between 1500 and 1800; nearly ten mil-
lion African slaves were forced to migrate to the Americas during the
seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries; another 48
million people left Europe for the Americas, Australia, and Canada
between 1800 and 1925; while tens of millions of people have migrat-
ed across national boundaries, continental divides and oceans during
the past half century. 79
Observers no longer view migration as a “singular” event tied in
some manner or other to a “crisis.” Rather, migration is simply part and
parcel of human existence.80 Great migrations of the past are being re-
examined and re-interpreted in light of new perspectives which view
even mass migration as more or less normal states of being.81
The Kyiv story nonetheless commands special attention, especially in
relation to the city’s tormented twentieth century, during which Kyiv was
isolated from the rest of the world.With very few exceptions, Soviet citi-
zens did not move abroad; with even fewer exceptions, non-Soviet citizens
did not live in Kyiv. Consequently, the growth of migrant communities
within Kyiv during the 1990s provides a highly unusual opportunity to
explore a metropolitan community at the moment when significant num-
bers of new residents begin to arrive from abroad.
In a comprehensive 1998 review of the analytical and descriptive liter-
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ature on international migration—Worlds in Motion. Understanding
International Migration at the End of the Millenium—Douglas S. Massey,
Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouauci, Adela Pellegrino and J.
Edward Taylor identified various theoretical approaches to the initiation
and sustenance of international migration.82 Each approach failed to deal
adequately with the complexities of present migratory patterns in isola-
tion from one another.These theories, they argued, left insufficient room
for population movements that were not economic in nature. Moreover,
analysts viewed migrants as similar in “taste and risk.”83
Massey and his colleagues suggest that theoretical thinking about pop-
ulation movements “has moved away from reified, mechanical models
towards more dynamic formulations that allow micro-level decisions to
affect macro-level processes and vice versa.”84 This is a welcome develop-
ment as researchers operating at differing levels of analysis have often been
seeking to explain the behavior of the very same migrants.85 In fact, vari-
ous theories employed to date to explicate international migration are not
necessarily mutually exclusive as they operate at very different levels of
analysis (individual, household, national, and international).86
Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino and Taylor continued on
to propose their own, more synthetic approach to migration that located
the origins of movement in “the social, economic, and political transfor-
mations that accompany the penetration of capitalist markets into non-
market or pre-market societies.” Migrants emerged from communities
that were undergoing rapid change as they were being integrated into
global networks rather than from poor and isolated regions and nations.
Households used migration of some of their members as a means for gain-
ing both more wealth and greater predictability in economic life, drawing
on the social capital of “family and friends” to connect with more stable
and predictable economic networks.87
Kyiv’s non-traditional migrants represent an interesting case supporting
some of the contentions set forth by Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci,
Pellegrino, and Taylor. They arrived in Kyiv largely because of factors
which transcend wage considerations in the narrow sense. A substantial
portion of Kyiv’s migrants fled to Ukraine to escape greater social disloca-
tions elsewhere (thus conforming to propositions derived from the new
economics of migration), while many are pursuing higher wages and eco-
nomic gain in Europe (thereby falling into line with neoclassical micro-
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economic and macro-economic expectations). Kyiv emerged as a migra-
tion destination in conjunction with Ukraine’s emergence from Soviet
autarky and entrance into global networks (hence supporting some of the
contentions of segmented labor market and world systems theory), aided
by previously established social contacts (in accordance with social capital
theory). Finally, no single explanation is sufficient for understanding the
emergence of migrant communities in the Ukrainian capital (a proposition
forming the base of cumulative causation models).
Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield stimulated a dialogue con-
cerning international migration across disciplinary boundaries in an edited
volume—Migration Theory. Talking across Disciplines—which appeared in
2000.88 Bretell, Hollifield, and their colleagues evaluate different discipli-
nary approaches and foci of migration research. By doing so, their concep-
tualization of migration is one of a dynamic process in which researchers
pay less attention to specific countries of origins and destinations.89
This new sensibility is particularly appropriate for studying Kyiv’s non-
traditional migrants. Traditional labor market analysis adds little value to
the study of communities for whom Kyiv may have been intended as
merely a stop-over on a longer trek into Europe. Brettell, Hollifield and
their colleagues argue against regarding migration as a permanent move
from one specific location to another. Historically, migrants have more
typically understood their settlement in any one new community as
merely a temporary convenience than is posited in the academic litera-
ture.90 Migrants often intend their sojourn to be temporary, even as life
conspires to make their new abodes permanent.91 A study of Kyiv’s new
migrants contributes to this new sensibility in migration research, one
which views the presence of a particular migrant in any given city or
community as merely one transitory outcome in a larger migration sys-
tem which constantly changes and evolves.
These new directions in migration research and theorizing are a conse-
quence of the field’s expansion from the study of the American experience
to a more global perspective.Research on the process by which internation-
al migrants were assimilated into American life had come to dominate the
writings of sociologists in particular.92 Sociological researchers in the United
States and elsewhere over the past quarter century have re-directed their
attention from the adaptation of migrants to their new environment toward
the dynamic interaction between migrant and society.93
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THE “CITY AS CONTEXT”
The growing trend in migration research to focus on adaptation encour-
ages exploration of the two way relationship between international
migrant and host society, which Nancy Foner elegantly demonstrates in
relation to New York City in both New Immigrants in New York and From
Ellis Island to JFK. New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration.94 Foner’s focus
on New York City is hardly accidental. As Larry S. Bourne observes in
relation to another great migrant metropolis,Toronto (a city in which an
estimated forty-eight percent of the metropolitan population is foreign
born),“Cities, especially large metropolitan areas, sit at the intersection of
transitions in the economy, demography, and social order, as well as in cul-
ture, technology, and politics.They are, in effect, the local venues where
most innovations occur and where the impacts of external forces are most
prominently expressed.They are the arenas in which economic linkages
and social networks are constructed and deconstructed, and where polit-
ical conflicts that invariably occur within and between these forces of
change are worked out.” More specifically, Bourne continues, “The most
obvious example of globalization, in the sense of being tied to the rest of
the world, is foreign immigration.”95
Cities become the locus of migration chains and economic networks in
which brokers move easily between minority communities and societies at
large.Those brokers—ranging from street market vendors to international
bankers—who integrate migrant communities into the host society are
most often concentrated in just a few cities.96 Urban life transforms migrant
groups into ethnic communities with shared memories and perceptions, as
it is on city streets that migrants discover their own similarities in opposi-
tion to the world around them.97
The role of the city as the venue of exchange between migrants and
host societies has been the subject of scholarly debate within anthropol-
ogy. Caroline Brettell concisely summarizes a quarter century of high
scholarly discourse by noting that,“The concept,‘the city as context’, was
formulated within anthropology when the sub-field of urban anthropol-
ogy was still in its infancy and was part of the challenge to distinguish
between anthropology IN cities and the anthropology OF cities, or, as
Ulf Hannerz phrased it, the city as the locus rather than the focus of
anthropology.”98 Anthropologists contributing to the journal Urban
Anthropology refined the notion of “city as context” by arguing that all
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cities would have to be identical in order for local urban context not to
have a bearing on migrant life.99
Bretell continues on to suggest how this notion of “city as context” fell
out of vogue before being resurrected by Nancy Foner in her work on
New York.100 Foner’s studies explore the manner in which New York as a
migrant city shapes the realities of its new migrants in various and pro-
found ways. Bretell similarly points to Louise Lamphere’s 1992 edited vol-
ume, Structuring Diversity: Ethnographic Perspectives on the New Immigration,
as playing a critical role in reintroducing the city into anthropological dis-
cussions of migrant life.101 Bretell highlights the manner in which
Lamphere and her co-authors “explore the changing relationships
between newcomers and established residents in different urban contexts,”
thereby accenting the interrelationship between micro-level factors and
macro-level forces in shaping the migrant experience.102 Brettell—draw-
ing on the works of such anthropologists as Hannerz, Rollwagen, Gulick,
Foner, and Lamphere—argues that cities and their metropolitan regions
should become a fundamental “unit of analysis in immigration research”
as the city is a primary destination for migrant newcomers.
Brettell makes the case for the city as an appropriate unit of analysis for
migration studies by recounting recent research on the migrant experience
in New York, Dallas, Washington, Montreal, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Los
Angeles, Las Vegas, Providence, and a number of other North American
communities. She concludes that, “The argument is based on the premise
that these contexts differ, in their history of immigration, in their spatial
dimensions, in their political economies, in the nature of social relations
within and between different ethnic groups (including African Americans),
and in their dominant culture or ethos. Cities may also be differentially
affected by state (or provincial) and national policies and institutions.All these
differences can shape profoundly the experience of migrant populations and
they should therefore be a fundamental part of our analysis.”103
Brettell is primarily concerned with the migrant experience. By pos-
ing the interrelationship between migrant and urban community as an
important “unit of analysis in immigration research,” she identifies
migrants as a subject for urban research.The same studies demonstrating
the impact of local urban culture, tradition, economic vitality, and spatial
patterns on migrants reveal the influence that migrants exert over urban
communities in return. New York not only shapes its migrants; migrants
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shape New York. Brettell’s work reveals a dynamic inter-relationship that
demands further exploration.
Research on Kyiv gains a new significance in light of these recent trends
in migration research. From the perspective of migration flows, as noted
above, the Ukrainian capital represents a minor side-bar to a much larger
story of migration into Europe. From the perspective of urban studies, the
case of contemporary Kyiv reveals some of the ways in which migrants can
transform a city and its life. Post-Soviet Kyiv becomes an excellent venue for
exploring the interrelationship between migrant and urban community pre-
cisely because Soviet-era Kyiv was so isolated from the world at large.
Such an examination of the impact of migrants on their new home is a
subject of particular interest in relation to migrants in the Ukrainian capi-
tal. One goal of this study thus becomes an exploration of the various ways
in which migrants change Kyiv even as the city changes migrants in return
through assimilation into Ukrainian life.104 This book thereby seeks to build
on the more fluid, dynamic, multi-directional nature of the interaction
between migrant and host society highlighted in the work of Brettell,
Hollifield, Foner, and the other scholars mentioned in this chapter.
THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE AS A MODEL FOR KYIV
Another way of thinking about the significance of this volume’s findings,
one which is perhaps more grounded in empirical and practical realities
than social science theory, is to approach the contemporary experiences of
Kyiv and Ukraine in relation to west European international migration
patterns over the past half-century.Unlike the great migrant societies of the
Americas and the Australo-Pacific Region, the European continent was,
prior to the late twentieth-century, long held to be a source for—rather
than as a recipient of—migrants. Europe was somewhere millions of peo-
ple left to populate other regions around the world.
Twenty-first century Europe is no longer such a place. Cities and states
across the continent have become home to strikingly diverse societies as a
consequence of a half-century of steady migration into northern and west-
ern Europe (with many migrants stopping along the way in such cities as
Kyiv, and such states as Ukraine).This dramatic reversal of centuries-long
migration patterns has reshaped both social science research and European
politics, with the realities captured by researchers proving more textured
and complex than those suggested by the speeches of politicians.105
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A fundamental contradiction confronts European states as a consequence
of these dramatic trends. Europe, like Ukraine, has always been a home to
migrants. Thomas Archdeacon correctly observes, “Despite the myth of
European homogeneity, the European continent has had a long history of
internal migrations.”106 Ukraine fits comfortably into Archdeacon’s formula-
tion as the Soviet era was marked by the massive (often forced) movement
of local populations across the face of a dozen time zones. Ukrainians are to
be found throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union; the various
peoples of the Soviet state are almost all to be found living within the
boundaries of contemporary Ukraine.The twentieth century simultaneous-
ly witnessed a tremendous outflow (once again, often forced) of peasants
from Ukrainian villages to nearby towns and cities.107 What is now different,
Archdeacon adds,“is that there is external migration which presents Europe
with some of the same issues of how to manage diversity that confront the
U.S., Canada,Australia and other immigration-dependent nations.”108
William Rogers Brubaker’s 1989 study of the theory and practice of cit-
izenship and membership in the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, France,West Germany and Sweden—Immigration and the Politics of
Citizenship in Europe and North America—formulates the challenge before
European states. Postwar migration eroded notions of the modern state,
compelling “countries to reinterpret their traditions, to reshape their institu-
tions, to rethink the meaning of citizenship—to reinvent themselves, in
short, as nation states.”109 This task was made all the more complex in
European societies which had no founding myth linked to assimilating
migrants from abroad, as is the case in the classic migrant-receiving societies
across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. European societies and states face dis-
tinctive tasks all their own even as they share some the characteristics of
expanding diversity with the United States,Australia, Brazil, and Canada.
James F. Hollifield summarized the central European migration conun-
drum shortly following the collapse of the Soviet Union, identifying a
potential contradiction between a “modern world order” in which inter-
national migration and trade are “quintessential features,” and older
notions of sovereignty, citizenship, labor markets, and tolerance.110
Hollifield argued that the large-scale disruptions of the European system
during the 1990s—breaks brought about by the fall of the Iron Curtain
and collapse of the Soviet Union, the Balkan conflicts, economic compe-
tition with the United States, heightened concerns over loss of national
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identity within the context of an ever stronger European Union—would
give rise to racist rhetoric and xenophobia in nearly every state and soci-
ety on the continent.111 Such anti-foreign backlash ignored fundamental
economic realities. Given Europe’s aging population and slow-yet-steady
natural population decline, continued economic well-bring depends on
the presence of large-scale migrant communities.
Martin Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry explored the economic under-
pinnings of contemporary migration patterns in a 1993 essay examining the
linkages between migration policies and societal security within Europe.
112
Migrants and the descendants of recent migrants are a major source of labor,
especially for menial, low paid, and more dangerous jobs.“The huge con-
centration of industrial infrastructure and investment in Western Europe,”
Heisler and Layton-Henry write further,“makes continuing migration the
most effective means of exploiting [the continent’s] resources.Transferring
them via investment and reallocation to areas of labor surplus would be
both an expensive and high risk strategy for Western European capital. It
would have no immediate effect on stopping migration, and in the short-
to-medium term would increase it as more people would acquire skills and
money that would enable them to migrate more easily.”
113
Europe’s unquenched demand for the labor that only migrants can
provide has stood for a half-century at the center of patterns from south-
to-north within the continent, and from the outside into Europe.
Migrants became a critical ingredient in Europe’s postwar economic
recovery, creating a structural dependence which offered employers con-
siderable benefit so long as economies boomed and migrants remained
outside the political system, unorganized and poorly paid.114 Postwar
migration within Europe grew throughout the 1950s and 1960s as north
European states sought contract workers from southern Europe.115
Germany, for example, signed its first recruitment agreements with Italy
in 1955. Further accords were soon signed with other Mediterranean
countries.116 France and the Netherlands quickly followed suit.117
Northwest Europe’s migration “footprint” spread into North Africa,
Yugoslavia and farther afield as the European economy raced full throttle
through years of unprecedented economic growth.
Tens of thousands of residents from various European colonies came to
their imperial metropolises more or less simultaneously, especially in Great
Britain, France, and the Netherlands.118 By the early 1970s, millions of
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migrants—including hundreds of thousands of persons of color—had lit-
erally changed the complexion of European cities and societies. Native-
born indigenous populations rode a tidal wave of exploding prosperity,
leaving more unpleasant chores to “invited” workers who, it was thought,
would return home once their contracts had been fulfilled.
The illusion of endless prosperity fueled by workers who were only
“guests” came crashing down around the French, Dutch, Belgians, Swiss,
Germans, and Scandinavians with the deep recession of 1973-1975.119 The
traditional European working class felt the first painful bite of post-indus-
trial transition, with factories and mines closing never to reopen. Migrants
from abroad who had built their lives and families in the wealthy coun-
tries of northwest Europe chose not to return home as their hosts had
anticipated. By the early 1980s, nearly every European state had formulat-
ed tough new regulations and restrictions in response, limiting access to
labor markets and residency permits.120
More stringent regulations and border controls failed to stem growing
cultural and racial diversity so much as they nurtured a new category of
migrant and minority—the illegal resident living on the edge of the offi-
cial societies and economies in and around major European cities.121 A
growing presence of undocumented aliens, illegal workers, transient stu-
dents, and various other “outsiders” for whom assimilation was impossible
contributed to a broad societal sense of insecurity in many European cities
and countries.The resulting social unease encouraged a political backlash
that has become increasingly visible in recent years.122 Seemingly “unau-
thorized” migrants forced to live and work at the outer edges of
respectability confronted the bourgeois smugness of many European
urbanites.123 The unease of many indigenous Europeans with the
“strangers” in their midst was heightened during the 1990s by a new wave
of refugees and displaced persons arriving as a consequence of wars in the
Balkans as well as the disruptions arising from the 1989 collapse of the Iron
Curtain and the 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union.124
By 2000, somewhere around 30 million people had migrated to Western
Europe during the previous half-century, transforming European societies
in the process.125 Nearly a third of that number were legal foreign residents
of European Union nations (with Germany being home to 4.6 million for-
eign residents in 1990, France 3.7 million, and Britain, nearly 1 million).126
By century’s end, the non-citizen population of Switzerland hovered
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around 16%, Belgium, 9%, Germany 8%, France, 6%, Austria 5%, Sweden
6% and the United Kingdom,over 3% (figures which are somewhat deceiv-
ing given the relative ease of obtaining citizenship in Britain as opposed to
the difficulties in becoming Swiss or German citizens).127
New Europeans have concentrated in a few of the continent’s major
urban centers, with cities as varied as Geneva, Brussels, Rotterdam and
Stuttgart emerging as centers for large foreign migrant communities.128
London and Paris embrace multiethnic communities just as diverse as some
neighborhoods in the quintessential migrant city of New York.129 Local
patterns of assimilation vary considerably from country to country and city
to city. Residential segregation and labor market segmentation are emerg-
ing as serious concerns in several European cities.130 Many migrants have
successfully organized associations to sustain contacts with home, preserve
homeland culture, and secure jobs, housing, education opportunities, and
public services; others have not.131
Policies affecting migrants have become increasingly standardized across
Europe in recent years as a consequence of the growing authority of the
European Union. Europe’s primary concern in the area of migration pol-
icy has become how to best facilitate the movement of people within the
European Community while controlling access from the outside.132 By the
early 1990s, the Community had become, to paraphrase James F. Hollifield,
internally liberal and externally protectionist.133
Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder critique the European Community’s
stance in their powerful book The Wall around the West.Andreas and Snyder
argue that North American and European “border control strategists” both
faced “the same awkward and inescapable dilemma: how to make their
borders more secure while simultaneously making sure that they remain
business friendly. Rather than barriers that halt all movement, today’s bor-
ders are supposed to function more like filters that separate out the
unwanted from the wanted cross-border flows.”134
A treaty signed in the Luxemburg town of Schengen on June 14,
1985 provided European Union member states with a mechanism for
maximizing the internal movement of people while minimizing unde-
sirable arrivals. On March 26, 1996, all EU members save the United
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland implemented a new internal
border regime liberalizing travel regulations among participating states
in accord with the Schengen and the more general Maastricht
 
| 153 |
Joining the World: Why Kyiv’s Migrant Communities Matter
treaties.135 Under the Schengen accords, participating member states
agreed to a series of joint measures to enhance security at their exter-
nal borders, combat illegal migration, and expand police cooperation.
Those states participating in the Schengen process have established
national offices to administer the treaty’s policies and worked to estab-
lish unitary visa and asylum regulations.136
Milada Anna Vachudova proposed that the Schengen regime turned
those countries and regions surrounding the European Union into a broad
“migration buffer zone” in which states aspiring to eventual Union mem-
bership have little choice but to do their best to safeguard Union borders
“in order to stay in the good graces of EU governments.”137 Migrants seek-
ing illegal entry into Europe are thus unable to advance beyond the near-
est neighboring state.
One particularly pernicious affect of the Schengen controls has been
this transfer of responsibility for dealing with expanding migrant popula-
tions from the wealthy European Union member states to their much
poorer neighbors. Aspiring member states such as Poland and the Czech
Republic tightened their eastern borders in response to Union concerns,
pushing the problem further east.As the wars in the Balkans closed off legal
and illegal migration routes through Yugoslavia, those wishing to find their
way into Europe took advantage of the relatively porous border regimes
within the former Soviet Union to travel into Ukraine,Belarus, and north-
western regions of the Russian Federation.They could not travel further
given the strengthened boundaries to the west.138 As a result, the presence
of large and growing communities of non-traditional migrants in Kyiv and
Ukraine is, in part, a consequence of Schengen policies.
The European experience with absorbing millions of foreign residents
over the past half-century provides a suggestive comparative context for
considering the potential place of non-traditional migrants in Ukraine.
Like Europe, Ukraine has more often been considered as a point of ori-
gin for international migrants rather than as a recipient society. As in
Europe, the presence of significant numbers of non-traditional migrants—
and especially of new “visible minorities”—provides daily challenges to
long-held conceptions of Ukrainian identity. Brubaker’s admonition that
migration forces a variety of countries to reshape their institutions and to
rethink the meaning of citizenship is of direct relevance to the burgeon-
ing migrant communities in Ukraine’s capital.139
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The reception of international migrants in Ukraine is different from
the European experience of the past half-century in three significant
respects. First, Ukraine is already a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional,
multi-linguistic society which must rely on civic rather than ethnic
identity to sustain independent statehood. Legal frameworks, social pro-
grams, and cultural rights categories predicated on the co-existence of
diverse communities exist which can accommodate migrants. Moreover,
as discussed earlier in this volume, post-Soviet Ukrainian society has
proven itself to be remarkably tolerant of cultural difference. Modes of
thought and discourse already existed in Ukraine that were able to
accommodate the presence of Afghan, Kurdish, and African Ukrainians
to an extent not possible in some post-war Western European societies.
Second, migrants began to emerge at the moment when a newly
independent Ukraine began to re-invent its own identity.This situation
is somewhat analogous, perhaps, to some post-war European states. For
the most part, international migrants began to arrive in northern
Europe only after the initial stages of post-war reconstruction. Indeed,
migrant recruitment often was in response to increasingly robust
European economic development. Such an “economic miracle” has yet
to begin in Ukraine.
Third, migration into northern and western Europe has been pro-
foundly economic in nature. Many of Europe’s first original migrants
arrived under the auspices of official programs established by national
governments in conjunction with large corporate employers to supply
laborers to the workshops of a thundering economy. No such boom has
taken place in Ukraine.The migrants who constitute the subject of this
volume have arrived in Ukraine and Kyiv to work in largely unstructured
economic sectors tied to commerce and small manufacture.
Stories of Resilience
The story of one of the migrants interviewed for this project, an Afghan
whom we shall call “Mahmoud,” reveals a vigor and resilience that will be
central to Kyiv’s future vitality.140 Mahmoud and his family fled
Afghanistan in 1993 while he was in his early thirties. They arrived in
Ukraine after having traveled for most of that year through Pakistan and
Kazakhstan. Intending to find his way into Europe, Mahmoud never
expected to remain in Kyiv for nearly a decade.
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Mahmoud, his wife, and daughter eventually received official refugee
status in Ukraine after paying $450 in bribes in 1998. His family secured
an apartment near the robust Troieshchyna market, added a second daugh-
ter, and began to build a life in Kyiv. By 2001, he had invested in an iron
door and window-bars on his apartment to protect the world that he was
building for himself from thieves and bandits.
Mahmoud and his family have rarely received help from Ukrainian
authorities, and only marginal assistance from international refugee organ-
izations.They have made their way in Ukraine on their own. Both daugh-
ters attend Ukrainian language schools, with Mahmoud and his wife peri-
odically participating in various parent-teacher meetings. He is well con-
nected to Afghan community organizations and prays daily at a local
mosque. He can communicate in spoken Russian and Ukrainian, though
he claims not to be able to write in either language. A diabetic with a
crippled right arm, he has received appropriate medical attention in Kyiv
through a variety of channels. His earnings from trading at the
Troieshchyna market provide a living for his family in excess of what he
could have sustained either in Afghanistan or Kazakhstan.
Mahmoud represents the sort of quiet story of success that the litera-
ture on the “informal” city, for all of its flaws and “fuzziness,” reminds
observers of urban life to celebrate as well as to decry. He and his family
have navigated the difficult and complex world of migrant Kyiv to create
a life for themselves unthinkable elsewhere. His success is fragile and tra-
vail certainly lies ahead. He nonetheless is a symbol of all that can be right
with the migrant experience. He, his family, and Kyiv have all benefitted
from one another as much through the “informal” life of the “self-built”
city as through Kyiv’s “official” and “formal” institutions.
Mahmoud’s presence in Kyiv is a consequence of the opening of an
independent Ukraine to social and economic networks that are global in
scale. He and his family fled conflicts in South Asia seeking entry to mar-
kets in Europe, having been assisted in the settlement process by represen-
tatives of international organizations. Mahmoud personifies an openness
to the outside world that was unthinkable under the Soviet regime.
CONCLUSIONS
The opening of borders to the increasingly free flow of goods and capital
similarly encourages the free flow of human beings. Such processes erode
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state sovereignty by relocating, in the words of Saskia Sassen, “various
components of state authority to supranational organizations,” while
simultaneously privatizing “transnational legal regime[s] for cross-border
business transactions which now also includes certain components of
cross-border labor mobility, notably service workers.”141 Nation states cede
portions of sovereignty to trans-border authorities (as in the case of the
Schengen states) so as to facilitate the movement of people in response to
demand from private employers. Simultaneously, cities and metropolitan
regions emerge as central nodes in a global economy which undercuts
sovereignty from below.142 The result, according to Sassen, is a global urban
and economic hierarchy which favors inequality.143
Jeffrey Reitz similarly sees a direct connection between globalization
and migration patterns. “Two contemporary trends linked to global eco-
nomic change,”Reitz has written,“seem to point almost inevitably toward
a growing crisis in immigration on the horizon. Across most industrial
societies, there has been a pattern of change in recent decades toward
more individualistic and market driven institutions...All these trends pro-
duce lower immigrant entry level status.At the same time global econom-
ic integration ensures the continued and in fact increasing importance of
immigration.The logic of these two developments—continued immigra-
tion, and institutional changes producing more inequality for immi-
grants—seems inescapable.”144
The story told in this volume adds depth to the observations of Sassen
and Reitz precisely because Ukraine sits on the periphery of Europe.The
migration systems described in previous chapters are both part of general
European population flows and distinct from it.The fact that tens of thou-
sands of migrants such as Mahmoud are finding their way to the capital
city of an economically struggling newly independent state such as
Ukraine reveals the considerable extent to which migration has become
integral to the global economy.
The connection between globalization and increasing international
migration has deep roots. Many economic historians are coming to argue
that the present is the second, rather than the first era of globalization.The
earlier period extended from roughly the 1840s until August 1914, con-
current with the emergence of capitalist industrial production patterns as
well as the last great wave of large-scale trans-national migration.145 Not
coincidentally, free European migration to the Americas began to exceed
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coerced African migration for the first time only in the 1840s, with some
60 million Europeans departing for the labor-scarce New World during
the decades leading up to the outbreak of World War I.146 The arrival of so
many European workers in North and South America led, over time, both
to wage convergence on both sides of the Atlantic and growing inequal-
ity in the leading New World countries (patterns evident in contempo-
rary globalization trends).147
This strong tie between globalization and intensified international
migration carries two final implications for this study. First, the presence
of significant numbers of residents in Kyiv and Ukraine who have not tra-
ditionally been associated with the region is likely to remain a fact of local
urban and national life for some time to come. Second, inattention by
wealthier and more secure states such as those of the European Union and
North America to the limitations of and constraints confronting states-in-
formation such as Ukraine as they deal with new residents in their midst
potentially places the migrants themselves at risk.
Questions about Kyiv’s—and Ukraine’s—capacity to absorb migrants
add the Ukrainian capital to a long list of the world’s great cities in which
urban social sustainability is being challenged. Urban social sustainability
(which Richard Stren and Mario Polese define as “policies and institu-
tions that have the overall effect of integrating diverse groups and cultur-
al practices in a just and equitable fashion”) stands at the center of how
cities will evolve in the decades ahead.148 Kyiv’s ability to accommodate
large and diverse communities of new arrivals provides a litmus test for
the nature of the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian society more generally.
The story told in this volume has many distinctively local characteris-
tics. Kyiv’s migrants largely represent cultural and religious groups that
have not traditionally lived for long periods of time in the city.They are
arriving at a moment when the local economy has floundered, and when
the new Ukrainian state has struggled to create viable administrative
structures. Ukraine’s new independence simultaneously exposes deep
conflicts among contradictory conceptions of identity. For example, the
country’s official language is non-native for a significant portion of the
city’s population and for the city’s migrant population.149 The success or
failure of efforts to integrate Kyiv’s non-traditional migrants into a
Ukrainian language environment will reveal the strength and limits of
national language policy.
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How Kyiv and Ukraine come to terms with their new residents will
reveal a great deal about what sort of city and country Kyiv and Ukraine
will be in the decades ahead. New arrivals though they may be, the
migrants at the center of this volume are essential to Ukraine’s future.This
study has provided glimpses of both a tolerant and liberal Ukraine, and a
poor and miserly country unable to capitalize on its own resources.
Understanding how Kyiv assimilates its international migrant communi-
ty—or does not do so—carries important information about what sort of
state and society Ukraine will become.
The research contained in this volume also relates to a central set of
issues presently confronting the international community. Myron Weiner
posed the central policy and moral dilemmas presented by today’s large
scale migration patterns in his landmark 1995 book, The Global Migration
Crisis. Challenge to States and to Human Rights.Weiner wrote:
“the problems created by international population movements
differ greatly from one country to another. Some countries are in
a position to accept and integrate large numbers of immigrants
and refugees, while others are not. Some have the military,
administrative, and political capacity to limit, if not control, who
can enter; others do not. Some can intervene in the politics and
economies of countries that produce emigrants and refugees,
others can not. Nor for that matter are states autonomous in the
choices they make. Governments are constrained by the choices
of other governments.And so, it is necessary to understand how
governments influence one another’s exit and entry rules.Above
all, one should not assume that global problems necessarily
require or are amenable to global solutions. Solutions to the
problems posed by unwanted international migration cannot eas-
ily be formulated into sound bites like increasing general policy
frameworks and no analytical modern can encompass the diver-
sity of state capacities or intentions.”150
The materials presented in this volume strongly indicate that the abil-
ity of Ukraine and Kyiv to control migration across its borders is limited.
Whether or not Ukraine and Kyiv can successfully integrate and assimi-
late migrants into local, metropolitan, and national life similarly remains a
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question. Ukraine and Kyiv are precisely the sorts of countries and urban
communities in which the world’s global migration challenge will be
met—or not.The successes and failures of Mahmoud and his fellow non-
traditional migrants to Kyiv will foretell not only what sort of society
Ukraine will be, but also what sort of world everyone will inhabit.
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APPENDIX
Research Design and Methodology
This study was conducted in Kyiv in 2001–2002 with the supportof the George F. Kennan Fund of the Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars’ Kennan Institute, and with the
assistance of the US-Ukraine Foundation and the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Ukraine. The
study consisted of three interrelated parts: a written questionnaire for
immigrants, a survey of Kyiv city residents, and an experts’ survey of offi-
cials from various government levels and specialists who have regular con-
tact with or work directly with nontraditional immigrants. Survey ques-
tions focused on the main characteristics of nontraditional immigrants in
Kyiv, their living conditions, interethnic relations, and the attitude of Kyiv
city residents and the municipal government toward them.
STAGE ONE
The first phase consisted of interviews with 233 immigrant households
and was carried out in June-December 2001.The survey team developed
a questionnaire consisting of twenty-four tables with an average of ten
questions each.The sample included families of immigrants from African
and Asian countries who were living in the city of Kyiv at the time of the
survey. Immigrants from countries that were once within the borders of
the Soviet Union were not included.
Because many of the nontraditional immigrants had vague legal status
(they did not have national documents, permission to stay in Ukraine,
permits to work or conduct business, etc.), reliable statistics for their total
numbers and their countries of origin were difficult to obtain.This made
it impossible to develop a sampling method based on the total number of
immigrants in the city.The survey team therefore used a chain method:
A well-respected third party would introduce the interviewer to a
respondent and describe the nature and goals of the survey. Each respon-
dent found through this initial introduction would in turn indicate sev-
eral other potential respondents.This method ultimately ensured a rep-
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resentative sampling of households in the study. It was particularly impor-
tant to find people who were well known and respected in their fields for
the initial introductions in the chain. Among those who met these
requirements were leaders and activists of civic organizations for immi-
grants, individuals who work in the Ukraine Office of UNHCR or par-
ticipate in the distribution of UNHCR aid, teachers employed at schools
where immigrants’ children study, and respected community doctors
who work in immigrant districts.
At the same time, it was crucial to provide a representative number of
respondents from different countries of origin in proportion to the num-
ber of their compatriots living in the city of Kyiv. Based on the ethno-
national structure of registered foreigners in the city of Kyiv with refugee
status or seeking asylum, researchers set goals for the proportional repre-
sentation of specific ethnic groups within the pool of respondents,.
However, these goals were only guidelines—over the course of the survey
the pre-planned distribution of respondents based on their countries of
origin changed, depending on the ability of interviewers to establish con-
tact with individual ethnic groups of immigrants. Despite this, the gener-
al proportions of the sample remained constant.
The survey of nontraditional immigrants was conducted by means of
semi-structured personal interviews by the members of the study group—
the authors of this work. If respondents agreed, interviews were conduct-
ed in their homes. However, most immigrants were not prepared to invite
interviewers into their homes. In turn, the latter did not insist on con-
ducting interviews in the place of residence, since a few visits to the
homes of a certain group of immigrants sufficed to gain an understanding
of their living conditions.Approximately one in three interviews was con-
ducted in immigrants’ residences.Almost all of these interviews were with
immigrants from Afghanistan,Vietnam, and African countries.
The interviewer filled out the questionnaire during or after the inter-
view, based on recorded notes.The primary respondent (the main individ-
ual questioned by the interviewer) provided information about absent or
underage members of the household and also answered open-ended ques-
tions for evaluative purposes. At the same time, the interviewer recorded
the responses of other members of the household as well. In addition to
the questionnaire, the interviewer recorded other observations that were
typical or, on the contrary, unusual expressions or comments by the
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respondents.The scope and quality of this additional information depend-
ed on many factors: the personality of the respondent, the setting of the
interview, and the interviewer’s ability to establish a rapport with the
respondent.Thus, in some cases there was very little of this kind of infor-
mation, while in others the information allowed the researchers to com-
pile a detailed biography of the respondent and his family.
The interviews, which usually lasted an hour and a half to two hours,
were conducted both at the respondents’ residences and their workplaces
(Troieshchynsky, Sviatoshynsky, and Volodymyrsky trading markets), at the
UNHCR Reception Center, and the UNHCR’s Social Center for Refugee
Women and Children.Whenever necessary, an interpreter from the nontra-
ditional immigrants’ community, who was fluent in Russian and Ukrainian,
would be invited to participate in the interview.These were mostly individ-
uals with whom interviews had been conducted earlier, and they were the
ones who quite often set up meetings with the next batch of respondents.
The team encountered various obstacles during the course of the survey.
As might be expected given their undefined legal status (or more accurate-
ly, its absence), respondents were not always communicative.The language
proficiency of the respondents, and sometimes of the interpreter, determined
the level of communication as well. Occasionally, the presence of the inter-
preter had a negative impact on establishing trust. At the same time, if the
interpreter was an individual with whom the respondent had a friendly rela-
tionship, his participation would spark a detailed, lively conversation.
The gender balance of the sample also concerned the survey team. Only
10% of the questionnaires were filled out as a result of interviews with
women. Most responsive and open were women from Vietnam—women
accounted for almost one-third of the Vietnamese respondents. For most
women, in particular those from Muslim countries, communication was pos-
sible only at the UNHCR’s Social Center for Refugee Women and
Children.The male head of household was the main interlocutor for most
interviews in family homes, with wives perhaps adding passing comments in
some instances. Information obtained through the survey therefore reflects
mainly the male view of the immigrant situation. However, the few ques-
tionnaires that were filled out during conversations with women reveal views
that differ somewhat from their male counterparts.
Unfortunately, the survey did not provide exhaustive information
about all social groups of immigrants.The main motive for immigrants
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to meet with the researchers was the desire to describe their problems
and the hope that the researchers might help them in some way.Those
who agreed to participate were most often individuals without a stable
income or clearly defined prospects, and those whose legal status was
undefined. Immigrants who are more comfortable in Kyiv—those with
legal papers, decent employment, and a defined social status—did not
show great interest in the survey.They either declined offers to partici-
pate in interviews or gave very limited information. Figuratively speak-
ing, respondents comprised mostly the less economically successful
members of immigrant communities, and only partially members of
their community’s “middle class.”
STAGE TWO
The second stage of the study consisted of a survey of Kyiv residents.
Whereas the first stage of the survey examined issues related to the influx
of immigrants to Kyiv and their settlement arrangements, at this stage the
task was to identify and analyze the attitudes of Kyiv residents toward
problems connected with the arrival in Kyiv of people from Asian and
African countries. Do they focus attention on this fact? How do they
gauge the impact of nontraditional immigrants on city life? What do they
know about the newcomers’ relations with government agencies?
To understand these and other issues identified during the study, the
Kyiv-based sociological company “Image Control” conducted a representa-
tive survey of Kyiv residents in May 2002. The sample included 1,000
respondents and was formulated according to the criteria of gender, age, and
education, taking into account employment status and territorial distribu-
tion.Territorial distribution was based on the total population of Kyiv and
the population of its districts.According to the Kyiv Municipal Department
of Statistics, as of early 2001, 2,606,716 people lived in Kyiv.151 Kyiv’s pop-
ulation can be broken down by district as follows: Darnytsky—250,000;
Desniansky—320,000; Dniprovsky—350,000; Holosiivsky—200,000;
Obolonsky—290,000; Pechersky—170,000; Podilsky—210,000;
Shevchenkivsky—200,000; Solomiansky—280,000; Sviatoshynsky—
360,000. Proportionally to this data, the number of surveyed individuals by
district was: Darnytsky—101; Desniansky—124; Dniprovsky—140;
Holosiivsky—78; Obolonsky—101; Pechersky—60; Podilsky—79;
Shevchenkivsky—101, Solomiansky—100; Sviatoshynsky—116.
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The survey team selected streets in each district for the survey and
instructed interviewers not to interview more than three respondents
from the same building. Refusals to participate in the survey were not
recorded.The route lists included the address and the first and last name
of each respondent (if s/he agreed to participate).
The survey questions for the second stage of the study focused on
how average Kyiv residents view nontraditional immigrants; how they
gauge immigrants’ opportunities to adapt to life in the city; their atti-
tude toward the newcomers and immigrants’ attitudes toward them; and
whether Kyiv residents are prepared to live and work alongside people
from distant countries. Interviewers recorded Kyiv residents’ opinions
about the newcomers’ education, their employment, medical services,
etc., separately. In addition, Kyiv residents evaluated the municipal gov-
ernment’s readiness and ability to address immigrants’ problems related
to their arrival and residence in the city.
STAGE THREE
During the third phase of the study, the researchers conducted a survey
of experts—individuals whose official duties or type of work involve
direct contact with nontraditional immigrants residing in Kyiv, and
who therefore have special knowledge and a deeper understanding of
the problem than the average Kyiv resident. Among those interviewed
were several Ukrainian national government officials who are directly
involved in formulating state migration policy; officials of the Kyiv
municipal and local administrations; officers of the municipal and local
police departments; medical personnel; teachers; and representatives of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who work with nontradi-
tional immigrants. The researchers interviewed forty-six experts using
a conversation format based on a pre-prepared questionnaire.The ques-
tionnaire included specific questions pertaining to the respondent’s area
of expertise as well as a set of general questions asked of all the respon-
dents.The questions focused on analysis of various aspects of the life of
nontraditional immigrants in the city of Kyiv and the attitudes of the
municipal government and average citizens toward this problem
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